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CONTENTS

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Bogachev—SDI Threatens Cold War Relapse *[TASS]* 1
NATO Chief's Claims on Soviet Forces Rebutted *[TASS]* 1
Latest Round of CFE Talks Reviewed *[PRAVDA 18 Mar]* 2

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Grinevskiy Urges New European Security System *[TASS]* 3
EC Official Hopeful of Expanded Cooperation *[TASS]* 3
CSCE Economic Meeting Opens in Bonn 19 Mar *[PRAVDA 19 Mar]* 3
Foreign Policy Provides 'Peace Dividend' *[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA No 10]* 4
Talks on European Arms Cuts Continue in Vienna *[Moscow TV]* 5
CSSR, FRG Leaders' Deliberations Noted *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 17 Mar]* 5
Weekly 'Observers Roundtable' Aired *[Moscow Radio]* 5

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

Bush Issues U.S. National Security Report *[TASS]* 9
TASS Notes Discovery of Space Shuttle Debris 9
Cheney Views on Cocom, Force Levels Cited *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 18 Mar]* 9
U.S. Congressman Calls for Afghan Policy Review *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 17 Mar]* 9

China

TASS Reports Deng Xiaoping Resignation 10
Results of Economic Seminar in USSR Detailed *[Moscow International]* 10

Northeast Asia

ROK's Kim Yong-sam Arrives for Visit 20 Mar *[TASS]* 11
Yakovlev, Kim Discuss Ties *[Seoul YONHAP]* 11
NEW TIMES Views Attitudes to Koreas *[No 10]* 11
USSR To Help Site DPRK Atomic Power Plant *[Moscow International]* 14
Cooperation in Timber Cutting Discussed *[Moscow International]* 14
Opening of Mongolia's Great Hural Reported *[TASS]* 14
Leadership Changes Reported 15
Yazov Greets Mongolian Counterpart on Army Day *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Mar]* 15

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Paris Session Shows Growing UN Role in Cambodia *[IZVESTIYA 18 Mar]* 15
Text of SRV Leaders' Message to Gorbachev *[PRAVDA 17 Mar]* 16

Near East & South Asia

Afghan 'Extremist' on Operations Against USSR *[Moscow TV]* 16
Khowst Offensive 'Led' by Pakistani General Staff *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 20 Mar]* 17
'Islamic Jihad' Threat To Execute Hostages Noted *[IZVESTIYA 20 Mar]* 17
Vorontsov, Arab Envoys on Israeli Settlements *[TASS]* 18
PLO's 'Arafat Hails Gorbachev Election *[IZVESTIYA 20 Mar]* 18
Al-Rabitah Said 'Excuse' for U.S. Libya Stance *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 17 Mar]* 19

Sub-Saharan Africa

Gorbachev Sends Congratulations to Nujoma *[TASS]* 20
Namibia Opposition, RSA Occupation Noted *[PRAVDA 20 Mar]* 20
Reportage on Shevardnadze's African Tour 21
Arrives in Windhoek *[TASS]* 21
Meets With Baker *[TASS]* 21
Further on Shevardnadze, Kaunda Talks in Lusaka *[TASS]* 21
Reportage on Shevardnadze Southern Africa Tour *[cross-reference]* 22
Borisov Views Sudan-Libya Integration *[Moscow International]* 22

East Europe

Falin Interviewed on GDR Election Results *[East Berlin ADN]* 23
PRAVDA on 'Sensational' GDR Poll Results *[20 Mar]* 23
IZVESTIYA Analyzes GDR Election Results *[20 Mar]* 24
Primakov, Polish Official Discuss German Issue *[TASS]* 25
SPD's Bahr Charges CDU With GDR Poll Abuses *[PRAVDA 19 Mar]* 25
Portugalov on United Germany Joining NATO *[Vienna TV* 26
GDR's Gerlach Sends Greeting to Gorbachev *[PRAVDA 17 Mar]* 26
Troop Withdrawals From CSSR Said on Schedule *[TASS]* 27
Text of Havel Congratulations to Gorbachev *[PRAVDA 18 Mar]* 27
Havel-Walesa Call for 'Definitive' Borders Noted *[PRAVDA 19 Mar]* 27
Soviet-Czechoslovak Trade Trends Outlined *[PRAVDA 16 Mar]* 27
Bulgaria's Lilov on Political, Economic Reforms *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 10]* 27
Bulgarian Premier Defends Reforms, Pact, CEMA *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 18 Mar]* 32
Soviet-Bulgarian Trade Developments Assessed *[PRAVDA 19 Mar]* 33
Hungarian-USSR Trade Declines, Balance Widens *[PRAVDA 16 Mar]* 33
Old Guard Reform 'Pioneers' Cede Assembly Role *[PRAVDA 18 Mar]* 34
Yugoslav President Congratulates Gorbachev *[IZVESTIYA 20 Mar]* 35
State of Trade With Yugoslavia Summarized *[PRAVDA 16 Mar]* 35
Albanian Aide's Visit to Bulgaria Reported *[IZVESTIYA 19 Mar]* 36

West Europe

Gorbachev Congratulates New Italian Party Leaders *[TASS]* 36
FRG Bundestag Chairman Opposes Lithuanian Move *[TASS]* 36
FRG Politician Opposes Lithuanian Secession *[IZVESTIYA 19 Mar]* 36
Brandt Cited on Role of Germany's Neighbors *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 17 Mar]* 37
Impact of GDR Poll on FRG Parties Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 20 Mar]* 38

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet Session

Supreme Soviet Discusses Bill on Secession Issue 39
Chambers Meet Seperately *[TASS]* 39
Draft Read for First Time *[Moscow Radio]* 39
Draft Law Outlined *[Moscow Radio]* 39
Secession Bill Debated *[TASS]* 40
Parliament Considers 'High-Priority' Bills *[TASS]* 40
Draft on Union-Republics Power Division Discussed *[Moscow Radio* 41
Deputies Approve New Entry, Exit Rules *[TASS]* 41
Economic Reform Body Views Republics' Rights *[Moscow Radio]* 42

Political & Social

16 March Plenum Debate Speeches Outlined *[PRAVDA 19 Mar]* 42
'Top Priority' Discusses Gorbachev Election *[Moscow International]* 56
Interregional Group Discusses Presidency *[Moscow International]* 59
Legislator Supports Presidential System *[TRUD 25 Feb]* 59

Active Reform Seen as Guarantee of Democracy *[IZVESTIYA 13 Mar]* 60
PRAVDA Chides Conservatives, Ultraradicals *[21 Mar]* 62
Poll Taken on Support for Government, Perestroyka *[Moscow International]* 64
Government Submits Economic Reform Program *[Moscow International]* 65
Interdepartmental Council Meets On AIDS Threat *[Moscow TV]* 65
Nationalist Forces Perform Well in Elections *[IZVESTIYA 20 Mar]* 65
Biryukova Interviewed on Social Issues *[Moscow International]* 67
Frolov Addresses 'Friends of PRAVDA' Club *[PRAVDA 24 Feb]* 67
To Meet Soviet, Foreign Journalists *[Moscow Radio]* 67
RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Editor Interviewed *[Moscow TV]* 67
Shalayev 'Satisfied' With Response on Auctions *[PRAVDA 25 Feb]* 68
Public Order Situation Termed 'Very Difficult' *[Moscow TV]* 68
Governmental Body Approves Ecological Bill *[TASS]* 69
Federation of Independent Trade Unions Announced *[Moscow Radio]* 69
Radio, TV Workers Union Planned *[Moscow International]* 69
Forum-90 created at Youth Organizations Committee *[Moscow Radio]* 70
Army Groups Appeal to Komsomol Central Committee *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 24 Feb]* 70
'Democratic Platform' Postures Discussed *[PRAVDA 17 Mar]* 71
'Civic Action' Platform Published *[NEW TIMES No 8]* 72
Murders of Local Party Officials Described *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 7 Mar]* 74
Further Reportage on 25 February Moscow Rally *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 27 Feb]* 75
Estimates of Rally Size Differ *[IZVESTIYA 1 Mar]* 76
Leading Cadre Training Regulation Changes *[IZVESTIYA 27 Feb]* 76
Illusion of 'Collective Leadership' Seen *[IZVESTIYA 9 Mar]* 77
Poll Cited on Foreign Travel Availability *[IZVESTIYA 10 Mar]* 79

Economic

Leningrad-Moscow-Caucasus Rail Link Discussed *[PRAVDA 4 Mar]* 79
Public Opinion Poll Taken on Property Law *[IZVESTIYA 27 Feb]* 80
Gospriyemka To Operate Only Where Needed *[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN No 9]* 81
Azov Sea Pollution Figures Detailed *[Moscow Radio]* 82

Scientific

Khazakhstan Objects to Rocket Fragment Pollution
[KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA 2 Mar] 82
Cosmonauts Continue Space Experiments *[TASS]* 82
Plant Starts Production of Satellite TV Dishes *[IZVESTIYA 11 Mar]* 83

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Vilnius Radio Carries 21 Mar Supreme Council 84
Government Law Debated 84
Government Structure Debated 84
Role of Ministries Debated 84
No Tanks, Disturbances Reported in Lithuania *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 21 Mar]* 85
Baltic Commander Says Army Activity Planned *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 21 Mar]* 85
Report Seeks Volunteers To 'Protect' Lithuania *[Vilnius Radio]* 85
Soviet TV Carries Rally 'Cut Off' Earlier *[Vilnius International]* 86
Landsbergis Addresses 20 Mar Supreme Council *[Vilnius Radio]* 86
Reactions to Lithuanian Independence Reported *[Moscow International]* 87
Lithuania Appeals to Residents for Calm *[Vilnius Radio]* 88
Landsbergis on Ryzhkov Appeal on Economic Links *[TASS]* 88
Landsbergis Interviewed on Independence Process *[Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA 15 Mar]* 88
Supreme Council Decides To Mark Borders *[TASS]* 89
Landsbergis on Withdrawal of Soviet Forces *[Vilnius International]* 89
Vilnius Rallies, Army Service Plans Viewed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 20 Mar]* 90
Lithuanian Party Official Urges Referendum *[Moscow International]* 91

Lithuanian Party Spokesman on Fears for Future *[Moscow International]* 92
Lithuanian Party Supports Congress Decision *[TASS]* 93
Landsbergis, Brazauskas TV Debate Reported *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 17 Mar]* 93
Sajudis Member Interviewed on Independence Issues *[Paris LE FIGARO 17-18 Mar]* 94
Roundtable of Soviet Officials Discuss Lithuania *[Moscow TV]* 95
Roundup on Estonian Election Results Reported *[Tallinn Radio]* 100
Latvian Delegation Meets With Gorbachev *[Riga Radio]* 100
More on Meeting *[PRAVDA 21 Mar]* 101

RSFSR

Results of Russian Federation Elections *[TASS]* 101
Russian Regional Party Chiefs Elected Deputies *[TASS]* 101
'Democratic Forces' Win in Leningrad *[Moscow International]* 102
Electoral Chairman on Campaign Abuses *[Moscow TV]* 102
Tyumen Oil Workers Criticize Committee Response *[Moscow International]* 103
Drug Dealers, Laboratories Seized in Leningrad *[TASS]* 103
Ousted Volgograd Oblast Party Leadership Scored *[PRAVDA 17 Mar]* 103
Leningrad Deputies Appeal for Order *[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 11 Feb]* 104
Donetsk City Party Conference Opens *[Moscow TV]* 105

Western Republics

Kiev Troops Continue Military Exercises *[TASS]* 105
Ukrainian Ecological Situation Called 'Critical' *[SOYUZ No 8]* 105
Decree on Ukrainian Famine Published *[PRAVDA UKRAINY 7 Feb]* 106
Ukrainian Election First Round Totals Reported *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 13 Mar]* 107
Candidate Deputy Charged With Campaign Violations *[IZVESTIYA 14 Mar]* 107
Round of Elections in Belorussia 22 April *[TASS]* 107
More on First Round Elections *[PRAVDA 14 Mar]* 108
Belorussian Census Figures Published *[IZVESTIYA 13 Mar]* 108
More on Report of Minsk, Kiev Election Results *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 10]* 108
Intermovement Supporters Rally in Kishinev *[TASS]* 109

Caucasus

Report on Update of Nagorno-Karabakh Situation *[TASS]* 109
Two Killed in Freight Railway Accident *[Baku Radio]* 109
Armenian Operational Staff on Rail Accident *[Yerevan Radio]* 110
Georgia Supreme Soviet Drops Party Leading Role *[TASS]* 110
Georgian Front Urges Election Postponement *[TASS]* 110
National Forum Brands Candidates 'Traitors' *[Moscow International]* 110
Georgian Party Plenum Information Reported *[ZARYA VOSTOKA 1 Feb]* 111

Central Asia

Turkmenistan Sets Penalties for Public Crimes *[TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA 24 Feb]* 112
Results of Uzbek Election Runoffs Summarized *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Mar]* 112
Rayon Party Officials Penalized for Violations *[PRAVDA VOSTOKA 23 Feb]* 113
Uzbek Supreme Soviet Session To Meet 24 Mar *[PRAVDA VOSTOKA 23 Feb]* 113
Syr-Darya Party Obkom Elects Bureau, Secretary *[PRAVDA 8 Mar]* 113
Tajikistan Supreme Soviet To Meet 12 April *[Dushanbe Radio]* 113
Situation in Dushanbe Normalizing *[Moscow Radio]* 113
Makhkamov Addresses Tajik Plenum Opening *[Dushanbe Radio]* 113
Russian KGB Cadets, Khazakh Students Clash *[IZVESTIYA 13 Mar]* 116
Cadets Charged After Fighting *[IZVESTIYA 14 Mar]* 116
Lukyanov Receives Kazakhstan Muslims Mufti *[TASS]* 117
Karaganda Miners Feel Ongoing Dissatisfaction *[IZVESTIYA 12 Mar]* 117

Bogachev—SDI Threatens Cold War Relapse

LD2003182890 Moscow TASS in English 1804 GMT 20 Mar 90

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—Addressing a seminar in Washington on Monday, U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney insisted that, despite the improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, the importance of the U.S. "Star Wars" programme has not decreased. On the contrary, it is now more important, he said. This is a surprising conclusion and, apparently, an insult to the sober-minded part of his audience.

The U.S. defence secretary noted that, just as President Bush, he favours a more rapid advance to the deployment of the Strategic Defence Initiative [SDI].

Cheney confirmed the Pentagon's intention to pursue the "brilliant pebbles" concept which envisages putting in a near-earth orbit from 5,000 to 10,000 small anti-missiles, to a total value of 12-14 billion dollars.

Why do a number of U.S. officials continue to insist on the Reagan "Star Wars" programme now that the world political situation has so considerably improved?

Surely, not for reasons of security of the United States population. Not even the most dedicated supporter of SDI would dare promise Americans 100 per cent protection against a retaliatory missile strike. It is said in the Pentagon that even if only one per cent of the missiles launched for a retaliatory strike reaches targets in the United States, this would result in unacceptable damage.

Pentagon officials continue to pursue the arms race along the channels most advantageous for the United States.

Stepping up the rates of the development of space strike arms, Washington strategists hope to scare Moscow. They hope that the Soviet Union, following the United States, will start to implement its own costly and senseless programme of "Star Wars." And they expect that this will interfere with the Soviet Union's economic recovery plans.

The Soviet Union is capable of prompter, more effective and less costly answers to the U.S. "Star Wars" programme, as Soviet leaders have pointed out more than once.

Why is the Soviet Union objecting to the SDI and striving to find a mutually acceptable decision on the non-militarisation of outer space? After all, surely it does not care about the Pentagon squandering funds provided by U.S. taxpayers on a pointless military undertaking, thus damaging the United States budget?

The USSR is concerned that the implementation of SDI will sharply increase the risk of the chance outbreak of war as a result of failures in the controls of nuclear arms in space. And it is not only those who favour the Star Wars programme that will have to pay a price for this.

And the militarisation of outer space will increase distrust among countries and hamper arms control. A new spiral of the arms race capable of penetrating anti-ballistic defences, for instance, manoeuvrable warheads, might be started.

And finally, the implementation of SDI will mean a defeat for common sense in international relations.

Humanity will be threatened with a relapse to the cold war.

NATO Chief's Claims on Soviet Forces Rebutted

LD2003232290 Moscow TASS in English 2222 GMT 20 Mar 90

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow March 21 TASS—NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner answering questions from correspondents of French provincial newspapers recently, denied that the Warsaw Treaty Armed Forces are now acquiring a defensive nature.

He asserted that although the Soviet General Staff is reviewing the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces, it has not yet arrived at the final result and has not even embarked on this work. Moreover, Woerner said that the results will have to be expected for a considerable time, five years.

Such statements are rather strange. The NATO secretary-general is in the position to have enough information on this matter.

Even so, one would like to tell Manfred Woerner and those who posed questions to him that the Soviet General Staff has started restructuring the Armed Forces and has already taken a number of steps towards the materialisation of the new military doctrine and the implementation of the concept of defence sufficiency.

First, the structure of the USSR Armed Forces is being transformed in a defensive spirit: the number of military districts, armies and divisions is being reduced. The share of defensive systems increases at the expense of offensive systems. Maneuverable task forces are being disbanded.

Second, the group of forces deployed in the territories of East European countries is being transformed. Three tank divisions, units of strike aviation, assault-landing and landing-and-crossing and other units meant above all for offensive tasks, have been withdrawn from East European countries last year with armaments and military equipment.

The total numerical strength of the forces withdrawn is more than 50,000 men. Troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia and Hungary will be completed by mid-1991. The numerical strength of these troops is at the present 120,000.

Third, all-arms divisions remaining in the territories of Warsaw Treaty countries are being restructured, and defensive structure is imparted to them. A large number of tanks is being withdrawn from their composition: 40 percent of tanks are being withdrawn from motorised rifle divisions (the number of tanks decreases from 260 to 155). 20 percent of tanks are being withdrawn from tank divisions (the number of tanks decreases from 320 to 250).

Fourth, the Soviet leadership agreed to the Western proposal to reduce Soviet and U.S. troops in central Europe to the levels of 195,000 men for each side. This shows that the General Staff has planned to reduce Soviet forces in the German Democratic Republic and Poland by another 240,000 men (from 422,000 to 195,000).

All these facts are quite well known. Moreover, the work towards the reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the change of their structure was reported in detail by the Soviet military delegation when the doctrines of the Warsaw Treaty organisation and NATO were discussed in Vienna. Then what is the purpose of Woerner's statement? Perhaps he wants the Western public to preserve the "enemy image" of the Soviet Union if only in some degree?

Latest Round of CFE Talks Reviewed

PM2003125190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Mar 90 Second Edition p 7

[Igor Melnikov dispatch under "Correspondent Comments" rubric: "Untangling 'Viennese Knots'"]

[Text] Vienna, 17 Mar—Is the pace of the Vienna talks lagging behind the dynamics of the political developments in Europe? Does their progress fit in with the rapidly changing situation?

These questions have assumed paramount importance at the sixth round of Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] talks which has opened here. They do not sound in the least like rhetorical questions. They reflect concern and a desire to synchronize the course of the dialogue between the Warsaw Pact and NATO with the profound and rapid changes taking place on our continent. Even highly experienced diplomats do not seem capable of keeping up with them. Just three weeks ago, assessing the results of the previous round, they described it as "outstanding" and as "having raised the level of mutual understanding," but now their attitude is critical.

And there is no contradiction in this. The reason for the adjustment is that the very theme of the numerical reduction of the armed forces and armaments of both alliances in central Europe has become more complex and urgent. The question has arisen of deciding simultaneously the military and politcal status of a united Germany on which agreement will have to be reached at the "two plus four" talks (between the two German states and the four victorious allied powers). It is bound to be compounded by questions concerning the size of its armed forces. An old problem is also rearing its head again—the need to minimize the time spent on general exchanges of opinion, especially at plenary sessions. One would finally like to see the working groups, which are focusing their main efforts on finding solutions to outstanding problems, working to the full.

What do the prospects for the round that has just opened look like? The accord achieved in Ottawa makes it possible to embark on formulating a coordinated position on the numerical reduction of Soviet and U.S. forces stationed outside national territories in Europe.

Further, it is necessary to define the categories of the arms to be reduced—aviation, tanks, armored vehicles, and combat helicopters, and also to resolve the question of artillery levels. The completion of this very laborious task would make it possible to finalize the major block of the future treaty. It seems that this would provide the best confirmation of the earnestness of the sides' intentions to complete the talks within the set deadline, before the beginning of 1991.

It is assumed that the current round will complete the work on the section devoted to the exchange of information and verification. The preconditions for this are ripe since the sides are ready for the most radical steps at all stages of reduction.

The solution of the aforementioned problems will be the Ariadne's thread which will lead the talks participants to the signing of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe.

Grinevskiy Urges New European Security System

LD2003213690 Moscow TASS in English 2034 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Brussels March 20 TASS—Head of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna negotiations on conventional armaments Oleg Grinevskiy made a speech at the European Parliament's political commission. He spoke about the need for establishing a new system of European security.

To maintain dynamism in the development of the processes in the continent what is necessary is stability which calls for the attention and major efforts of all Europeans, he said. There are many economic, ecological and social problems that can be solved only through the joint efforts of all European countries, he noted.

The Soviet Union believes that its concept of building an all-European home is close to the idea of a confederation of the European countries, put forward by Western representatives. These provisions organically fit into the process the beginning of which was laid in the summit conference in Helsinki.

Speaking of a united Europe, we cannot ignore solution of such a major issue as unification of the two German states, the Soviet representative noted. This issue is now in the centre of the problem of stability and security on the continent. We realise that this is a historical process, which can be accelerated or retarded, but it cannot be stopped. It is giving rise to concern of not only West Germany's and the German Democratic Republic's representatives, and therefore its development should be geared to meet the interests of the whole of Europe and made controllable.

The establishment of an all-European system of security and the conversion of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO military-political organisations into political ones could promote this process. It can also be advanced by more active joint efforts in the sphere of reduction of armaments.

The reduction in the levels of military confrontation and verification measures being developed at the Vienna negotiations should make any military activity in the continent obvious and controlled. There are still many contradictions in the course of the negotiations on conventional armed forces, but they can be solved, provided the good will of the sides, Grinevskiy said.

To establish a single security system is the common task for all the Europeans, in the first place for the organisations which unite, like the European communities and the Council of Europe, many states and which could use their weight and experience to strengthen peace and stability on the continent, Grinevskiy stressed.

EC Official Hopeful of Expanded Cooperation

LD1903120390 Moscow TASS in English 1140 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Leningrad March 19 TASS—"Our first and very successful visit to the USSR gives grounds for hopes that cooperation between your country and the European Council will expand," TASS was told after the visit by Peter Sager, chairman of the European Council's committee on relations with countries not affiliated to the council. He headed a delegation of the committee, invited to the Soviet Union by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

"We held a committee meeting in Moscow, met people's deputies and officials of the USSR Foreign Ministry," Sager said. "In Riga, capital of Latvia, we were able to observe the political situation in the Soviet Baltic region, which, as I see it, is rather complicated. Mikhail Gorbachev was elected president of the USSR during our visit here. The establishment of a presidency is obviously a positive event in the life of your country."

CSCE Economic Meeting Opens in Bonn 19 Mar

PM2103092890 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent Ye. Grigoryev report: "Let Us Look Into the Second 'Basket'"]

[Text] Bonn, 18 Mar—New signs have appeared at the intersections in Bonn, carrying the abbreviation "CSCE"—Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. They lead to the "Maritime" Hotel—a large modern-style hotel complex built in only one year and opened a few weeks ago. A conference on European economic cooperation is due to open there on the afternoon of Monday, 19 March.

"The conference on economic cooperation which will take place in Bonn over the next few weeks," FRG Economics Minister H. Haussmann told PRAVDA's correspondent, "will be the largest economic meeting between East and West up to the present time. It should give new impetus to economic relations between the participating states, help to improve conditions for business activity, and reveal new opportunities for cooperation.

"The Bonn conference," the minister continued, "is taking place at a decisive moment in the Helsinki process, which has considerably facilitated the changes now taking place in Europe. The confrontation stage is over. The stage of cooperation is opening up in front of us. The common European home must rest on solid economic foundations. The process of economic renewal in East Europe, which is a challenge for us all, is of considerable importance here. The economic meeting in Bonn affords the sole opportunity of its kind of finding joint responses to this challenge," H. Haussmann concluded.

The atmosphere in the "Maritime" is animated. About 600 participants in the forum from 35 different countries have already arrived. Alongside the government representatives, that is, the official delegations, are many businessmen. For instance, several dozen of the general directors of our biggest enterprises are there.

The conference is to last three weeks. It is proposed to conduct the final meeting at ministerial level. It is the

working groups, however, that will examine and make recommendations on specific themes. These include the development and broadening of economic relations through such practical measures as business contacts, information, and marketing. Another theme is industrial cooperation, including its legal, administrative, and investment aspects. A third group will study cooperation in specific spheres of energy and resource conservation, technical and ecological systems, agro-industry and the processing of food products, and also problems of development and city planning. Finally, group "D" will specialize in the very complex matter of currency, financial, and monetary provision for foreign trade and industrial cooperation.

There is another sense in which the Bonn conference is important. As is well known, in the Helsinki Final Act a definite balance is struck between three "baskets." As far as security and human rights are concerned, the Helsinki process has visibly moved forward in these areas. The second "basket," however, has not been looked into for a long time.

"The decisive point," the weekly DIE ZEIT reminds us, "is that Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] and the restrictions on exports to socialist countries connected with it still remain the biggest obstacle to the modernization of the national economies of these states."

It is envisaged that the conference should bring economic cooperation up to the level of other forms of cooperation. After all, in conditions where progress is being made in the sphere of disarmament and security in Europe, it is economic instability in the countries of Eastern Europe that may create problems for the successful progress of the Helsinki process.

Foreign Policy Provides 'Peace Dividend'

90UI0430A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 10, 10 Mar 90 p 12

[Article by observer Gennadiy Gerasimov: "The 'Peace Dividend' of the New Diplomacy"]

[Text] In foreign policy, perestroyka is a profitable item.

The successes of our foreign policy are there for all to see. Look around—where are our enemies? Just one country is as yet reluctant to talk with us—Albania. We, however, are prepared to talk with it. And we are patiently awaiting changes here.

But there has as yet been no journalistic, not to mention parliamentary or scientific, study of the savings which our new political thinking with reference to foreign policy has brought us.

How much was the war in Afghanistan costing us? Just as artillery preparation usually anticipates an offensive, so diplomatic preparation preceded the withdrawal from Afghanistan of our army subunits. And this was a laborious, difficult process.

Of course, we are even now assisting the government in Kabul. But we are not incurring the former expenditure on the maintenance in another country of a "limited military contingent." And, the most important thing in this context, we are not sustaining losses.

How much has the maintenance of our troops in Czechoslovakia since August 1968 cost us? It might be said that they have been defending there the forward boundaries of the socialist camp. But such an understanding—or reading—of the situation has been officially reversed by the Warsaw Pact countries, which have acknowledged the commitment of forces to have been a mistake.

Our forces have since that time been stationed in Milovice and elsewhere entirely in a state of full provision with equipment and facilities—all this has cost a great deal.

The same may be said about our forces in Hungary.

Or in the Mongolian People's Republic. Of course, their withdrawal is giving rise to problems: where to deploy the soldiers, where to settle the officers' families? Generals' families at times even. But these are one-time costs and deferred expenditures, as it were—in the final analysis they are inevitable and should have been taken into consideration earlier.

And how much did the arms race with the United States, when it was proceeding at full steam ahead, cost us? How much did this entire overage of missiles, tanks and aircraft, which we are now reducing without detriment to the new principle of defensive sufficiency, cost?

Of course, the very destruction of the weapons which have been built is costing money also. For example, building a plant for destroying chemical weapons is not cheap. But this is the payment for former passions.

Blowing up missiles needs an estimate also. We will explode them in accordance with the treaty with the United States on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. But there is no accountant to compare the cost of their destruction with the costs of their operation and maintenance in proper operational condition. Of course, their original cost itself is simply wasted. Inasmuch as, it transpires, it is safer not with them but without them. And the new political thinking and diplomacy led to this conclusion.

The transition from confrontation to cooperation has meant also a reduction in military production. Once again big savings for our country. And if conversion is experiencing difficulties on account of the inability of our nation of chess players to count several moves ahead, this is not the fault of diplomacy but of those who had no faith in the success thereof.

Glasnost also has produced savings. It has become more interesting for us to lend an ear to our own voices than to latch onto "others'." And again there is no accountant who might estimate the figures of the proceeds from a halt to the jamming of radio broadcasts. They have to be

impressive. Electric power alone on noise and crackle was required of the Dneproges, if not more.

Our new diplomacy is a profitable business and is bringing the country a "peace dividend."

Talks on European Arms Cuts Continue in Vienna

LD1803105490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Mar 90

[M. Osokin report over video; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A new round of talks on reducing conventional weapons in Europe is taking place in Vienna. It promises to be extremely interesting. Observers are trying to guess how the discussion which preceded this round will develop. The spokesmen for the Warsaw Pact have started to say that it would be worth moving on from cutting Soviet and American troops to cutting NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces to 700 [as heard] men on either side. But the head of the U.S. delegation to the Vienna talks has alredy objected to the new proposals at the closed-door conference. Previously, we would traditionally have ascribed this to a reluctance on the part of the military-industrial complex to embark on cuts, and indeed that is often the way it was. But now everything is much more complicated.

The Soviet Army is departing. The troops are returning from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It is some considerable time since we called for all foreign troops to be withdrawn from the territory of other European countries by 1996, but events in East Europe have clearly outpaced us. It is hard to predict the future, but one thing is clear: The Warsaw Pact will not be as before. But something unexpected has cropped up: The other side is showing its dissatisfaction. A U.S. presidential aide has already voiced concern over the unilateral withdrawal of the Soviet troops. It looks as though this is because the question of what they should do has arisen too soon. Who is the enemy now? Many in NATO say that it would be rather strange to continue to seek to have a million soldiers, as though nothing had changed in the East. Both blocs are already saying that instead of maintaining these, it would be better to set up a general system of European security. But it would seem that the Americans are still not quite ready for such a radical idea.

It is never easy to get used to sudden change. Life itself has forced us to do so. For the time being the Americans are in a better position, but this has made them complacent. In the past four decades they, too, have grown accustomed to the happy position of having a strong leader and a strong military alliance. But now, all of a sudden, the question of reviewing all the structures has arisen. So what now? No, there are, of course, a considerable number of new ideas. The United States has resolved to withdraw all its chemical weapons from Europe by the end of the year, and a report has appeared which claims that NATO no longer needs nuclear weapons. But as far as other steps are concerned, argument is still going on within the administration. Some are suggesting an unhurried approach, for it is Moscow and not Washington that has been asked to leave. It is not just the head of the delegation to the Vienna talks who is against radical cuts in East and West. The same goes for the defense secretary. But others are saying that it is better not to delay, since, as the Soviet troops leave there will be fresh calls for the withdrawal of American forces.

Generally speaking, then, the situation is indeed an unaccustomed one. Both Moscow and Washington had the deep-seated mentality that the temporary presence of their troops in other countries appeared permanent. But now there countries are taking the initiative into their own hands, and the awkward time has come to rethink the old structures. Both for us and for them. [Video shows Soviet army trucks, helicopters, tanks moving; U.S. troops and hardware; high-ranking military officers from various countries; NATO meeting in progress]

CSSR, FRG Leaders' Deliberations Noted

PM2003143190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Mar 90 First Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Talks Held"]

[Text] Prague 16 March—Talks were held here between the Czechoslovak and FRG presidents and also between the two countries' foreign ministers. When they were concluded, the Czechoslovak and FRG delegations met. It is reported that questions regarding German unification were discussed.

Germany is aware, Richard von Weizsaecker stated, that this process must take place in the context of the common European process and that it is required to promote the creation of a new system of European security.

Vaclav Havel stated that German unification must be a kind of impetus to speeding up the process of European unification and the creation of a system of security.

Prague could once again become the place for meetings between European peoples, the FRG president noted in his answering speech. The borders are open. We respect them without any kind of restrictions.

Weekly 'Observers Roundtable' Aired

LD2003174890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 18 Mar 90

["International Observers Roundtable" program presented by Gennadiy Aleksandrovich Vedenyapin, with correspondents Nikolay Agayants and Boris Andrianov]

[Excerpts] [Vedenyapin] Hello, esteemed comrade listeners! At the microphone is Gennadiy Vedenyapin, presenter of the program "International Observers Roundtable." Alongside me are my colleagues, the journalists Nikolay Agayants and Boris Andrianov. [passage omitted on foreign media reaction to Gorbachev's election as

president. Quoted are: LE MONDE, Japan's foreign minister, DAILY EXPRESS, WASHINGTON POST, RUDE PRAVO. Also Gorbachev is quoted speaking at congress]

[Andrianov] Of course, amidst all the tempestuous changes taking place in the world, the German issue occupies a special place. It has now come to the center stage of European politics, which is quite understandable. Our position on this matter is well known both in this country and abroad. What it boils down to is that as the Germans exercise their natural right to unity, the danger of war emanating from the territory of Germany must be totally excluded once and for all. Everything else stems from that: the rights of the four Great Powers, the immutability of the borders, the connection with the pan-European process, the need for a peace treaty based on the outcome of World War II, and so on and so forth.

[Vedenyapin] Since we have touched upon the German issue, I do not think we can skip what is going on in the German Democratic Republic today—the first free, multicandidate elections to the People's Chamber. For the results of these could have a bearing on the whole pan-European process. The election campaign, which had lasted rather more than two months, ended in the republic the day before yesterday. It was notable for the fierce passions it generated. Some 24 parties, political groupings and associations which had officially registered with the Central Electoral Commission held a dialogue with the electorate. Of course, not all of them have an equal chance of success. For instance, the Social Democratic and the bloc of conservative forces headed by the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] the Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS] and the Free Democrats can expect a significant number of votes, while the German Beer Drinkers' Union—there is such movement—can scarcely hope to garner any great number of followers. Irrespective of their fondness for the beverage, there are presumably few who would agree to entrust the future of their country to the party of drinkers.

[Agayants] Seriously, though, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, the election campaign in the GDR has been notable for the appearance of a whole range of influential political trends. And the way I see it, one should not discount the Communist Party of Germany. It is just a little more than a month old, and to date it numbers just over 1,000 people. But there are a further 20,000 or so who have written to inform the leadership of the party of their affinity for it. Incidentally, the Communist Party of Germany does not regard itself as a successor to the former Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED]. The communists of today formerly had no political allegiance and they are largely young people. I should remind you that the pass mark to enter parliament works out at almost 30,000 votes. The communists of the GDR expect to surmout this important hurdle.

[Andrianov] Unfortunately, the election campaign has shown that not all the participants have behaved properly. Flying in the face of the decision taken at the roundtable that West German politicians should not participate in the activities of the various parties, some parties have had active recourse to their help. Moreover, not just to moral support. Spokesmen for the West German CDU/Christian Social Union [CSU] party bloc alone have made nigh on 100 speeches on the territory of the GDR. And emissaries from the West German Greens have broken the rules of the game on three occasions. But that is not the whole story: In particular, it has transpired that the West German exchequer has donated 7.5 million marks to fund the election campaigns—of those groups which it considers indispensable, of course. The conservative Alliance for Germany has received the lion's share. Along with the CDU, it incorporates the Democratic Awakening [DA] party and the German Social Union [DSU]. It received 4.5 million marks.

[Vedenyapin] Incidentally, a great scandal has erupted in Bonn over this. The parliamentary opposition has accused the ruling parties of blatant abuse and of squandering state revenue on support for kindred parties and groupings in the GDR. This offhand approach to handling budget revenues has even jarred with the Free Democrats, who, as you know, are in the government coalition with the CDU/CSU.

[Agayants] In trying, during the election campaign, to put pressure on those political groupings they find undesirable, West German politicians—and of course, above all spokesmen for the CDU/CSU—have tried to bolster their positions in the GDR by inciting anticommunist feeling and encouraging neo-Nazi groupings. By offering brazen recommendations to the citizens of the GDR as to whom they should vote for, many Bonn politicians have openly been trying to influence the electorate in favor of the rightwing Alliance for Germany coalition. At the same time, one gets the clear impression that all the main FRG political forces have been waging an active campaign against the Party of Democratic Socialism, and the republic's current leadership. Take, for example, the speech by Defense Minister Stoltenberg in the constitutency of Schwerin. What did he speak about there? Of the need to get rid of the communist era once and for all. He claimed that communism and Marxism-Leninism had led not to progress in the GDR, but to decline. And then Chancellor Kohl even thought it possible to call on his audience to oust all the communist mandarins as he put it. He said the best way of achieving German unity was to make use of the machinery enshrined within Article 23 of the Federal Republic of Germany's Constitution. I should remind you that what this provides for is, quite simply, the de facto unification of the GDR with West Germany by extending the FRG's political, economic and state systems to GDR territory.

[Andrianov] Nevertheless, credit where credit's due. In spite of the effective pressure, right up to the very last minute the Party of Democratic Socialism waged its election campaign, and at its last rally it attracted thousands of people. According to the last straw poll, the PDS has succeeded in winning the support of almost 20 percent of the electorate. And not all voters have yet made up their minds.

[Vedenyapin] Undoubtedly true. On the subject of how this party sees a future unified Germany, Gregor Gysi, its chairman, said this: Our objective is a neutral, peace-loving German state that absorbs organically the finest achievements of the GDR and the FRG, while respecting the interests of its neighbors in the pan-European home. Quite rightly, he noted that they must not run full tilt toward this goal. Every step must be well thought out, and every decision must be weighed up. By proposing immediate unification with the FRG under Article 23 of the West German Constitution, the conservative Alliance for Germany, he went on, is nudging the German people into a political scheme which could have unpredictable consequences. The PDS is full of resolve to struggle consistently against automatic anschluss with West Germany.

I might note that many Western politicans, too, agree with these sensible thoughts. Walter Momper, the chairman of West Berlin's Social Democratic Party [SPD], for example, believes that the process leading to German unity should proceed with the utmost speed, but under no circumstances should this mean the simple absorption of the GDR, which—as he said—could contribute its experience to the FRG Constitution through the incorporation of many provisions, particularly in the social sphere.

[Agayants] The ways of resolving the German question are so complex, and their results are potentially so serious that they have given rise to interest and concern not just in the West, but in the East, too. The PRC Foreign Ministry has deemed it necessary to make its voice heard on the subject, which is quite indicative. A spokesman for it has stated that the solution to the German question—a legacy of World War II—and German unification will exert a great influence on the situation in Europe and throughout the world. The European countries and states in other corners of the world are, quite naturally, voicing concern over this. China, too, is following the development of events attentively.

[Andrianov] It is, indeed, a complicated situation that is developing in Europe at the moment. And it is the German question that lies at the heart of the problem. The trouble is not that we or anyone else is against the right of the Germans to self-determination, but that the North Atlantic Alliance wants to have unified Germany as a member. This has been stated quite categorically by the leaders of the United States, Britain, and France. Chancellor Kohl, too, holds the same viewpoint. He even rejects the very idea of a neutral Germany. Moreover, for some reason he supposes that our country is, well, let's say, indifferent to this issue, at the very least. Meanwhile, our Foreign Ministry's statement indicates plainly that a unified Germany's membership of NATO is unacceptable to the USSR.

[Vedenyapin] As regards the neutral status of the future unified Germany, which is rejected out of hand by Chancellor Kohl despite appearing to be the most sensible way out of the situation, his position is clearly at variance with the opinion of the Germans themselves. It turns out that 79 percent of GDR citizens and 49 percent of FRG citizens are in favor of the neutrality of a unified Germany.

[Agayants] All the same, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, the West is pinning partiuclar hopes on the outcome of today's elections in the GDR: Hopes that forces which support Germany's membership of NATO will come to power. It is worthy of note that the Social Democratic Party of the GDR, which is the most popular party according to the results of opinion polls, has not, so I believe, yet set out clearly its position on this most fundamental of issues. And so, I believe the danger cannot be ruled out that the process leading to German unification could, without warning, head off in a direction that would run counter to the basic interests of many European countries.

[Andrianov] One thing is clear: If the coalition that supports Hans Modrow suffers defeat, and if the forces in favor of the immediate unification of Germany and her membership of NATO come to power, then that could only aggravate the situation in Europe and lead to a sharp deterioration in relations between East and West. For essentially what we are talking about here is an upset of the military-strategic balance on the continent.

[Vedenypin] Incidentally, in substantiating the plan to draw the unified Germany into NATO, western leaders are employing various theoretical—not to say speculative—constructions. In particular, it is suggested that NATO's zone of action would not be extended to the territory of the GDR, and that a demilitarized zone would be created there. But even that option would mean an alteration in the strategic balance in NATO's favor, with a territorial concession and the disbanding of the GDR's national army. And anyway, where is the guarantee that one fine day NATO might not draft its troops into this demilitarized zone?

[Agayants] Here, colleagues, I would like to pay attention to the following. The thing is that the exacerbation of the relations between the East and the West, which is possible in future, in itself may not at all necessarily be connected with Germany itself. For in East Europe more than enough problems have at present come about: A prolonged economic crisis and the absence of real prospects for solving social problems fast.

All of this is naturally superimposed on the existence of a whole range of ethnic and territorial conflicts between East European states. It will suffice to recall the Romanian-Hungarian conflict over Transylvania. It is probably the most well-known one. But if one goes into the depths of history one may also recall that after World War I Croatia and Slovenia passed from Hungary to Yugoslavia, and Slovakia and sub-Carpathian ruthenia to Czechoslovakia; Bulgaria gave up part of its territory, mainly with Macedonian population, to Yugoslavia. Up to the present the ethnic conflict in the Yugoslav region Kosovo is still not extinct. Likewise it is no secret that in Hungary and Romania some publications of rightwing persuasian have recently started openly to make claims for our territory as well.

As you can see, more than enough explosive material has accumulated in East Europe. And whereas before, conflicts of that kind were somehow covered up and

smoothed over, in the present-day situation, characterized by processes of rapid political changes in the countries of East Europe, they are less amenable to control and may well destabilize the situation on our continent.

[Andrianov] And precisely so that such destabilization, if it happens one day, does not lead—God forbid—to an armed confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact organization, it is vitally important that between the two Alliances a stable equilibrium of forces be maintained.

[Vedenyapin] By the way a whole range of legal aspects is linked with the United Germany's possible membership in NATO. One cannot mention all of them, of course. But let us consider at least the main one: The relations between the four powers on the one hand, and the FRG and GDR as sovereign states on the other, is at present regulated by a whole network of agreements. But the reunification and the creation of an all-German government leads automatically back to the starting point, since it is necessary to conclude a peace treaty with this government, which—as is well known—has not existed until this day, for well-known reasons. Further, to hold with this purpose a peace conference, with the participation of a wide range of states that took part in the war against Germany. Such a conference would consolidate both the existing borders and those questions that are connected with the military and political status of Germany.

As for the status of Germany subsequently to the declaration of the reunification and before the signing of the peace treaty, here all the agreements of the victorious powers of the war and postwar period automatically come into force.

[Agayants] You mean, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, of course first of all the Yalta and Potsdam agreements as well as probably the agreement on the control mechanism in Germany?

[Vedenyapin] Yes, of course.

[Agayants] But one can think that, in principle, they have already come into force after both German states declared their intention to unite and adopted the "two plus four" formula, quite well-known by now; that is they have in fact agreed to act in the talks with the USSR, the United States, Britain, and France as one side.

[Andrianov] What does all this testify to? First of all to the fact that the united Germany's becoming a member of NATO cannot be the prerogative of just the German authorities.

[Vedenyapin] Likewise the presence in the GDR of a group of Soviet troops is an important guarantee of our interests in settling the German problem. They are located there—I will remind you—in accordance with the treaty on the relations between the USSR and GDR of 20 September 1955, and the time period of this treaty, by the way, has not been established. It ceases to operate either because of the restoration of Germany's unity, or when both sides come to an agreement on the change or cessation of its operation. So that neither the present nor a future GDR government can withdraw from this treaty on a unilateral basis and demand the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from its territory.

[Agayants] Our Western partners are well aware of the fact that the demands that the Soviet troops be withdrawn from East Germany have no legal grounds, and for this reason seem to agree, in word, to the presence of these troops even if Germany should be united in the framework of NATO. But as for their ultimate purpose, it can be seen clearly enough. First of all, to achieve the unification of Germany in the framework of NATO and only then—by hook or by crook, so to speak—to push the Soviet troops out of the Eastern zone. In the view of these strategists one could achieve this in the following way: Create unbearable conditions for our soldiers' and officers' stay on the territory of Germany.

[Andrianov] But one cannot fail to see also that such actions on the border between the two military Alliances may lead to truly unpredictable consequences. Certain Western circles probably keep forgetting that we have broad legal rights to defend our military and political interests in Germany.

[Agayants] One thing is clear, Boris Vasilyevich: With any dangerous course of events precision and clarity in the positions of all the sides are necessary. Otherwise serious crisis situations may occur. And this is especially important for modern international problems; the more so for such a key region as Germany, where the two mightiest military groupings are confronting one another.

[Vedenyapin] During the recent meeting of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev with the GDR governmental delegation, it was stressed that stirring up a hullabaloo, the desire to annex GDR and the policy of faits accomplis, so to speak, fall short of a responsible approach to tackling a sensitive issue for the fate of Europe and the world as the German issue. Nor does it meet, in our opinion, the interests of Germans themselves. The only acceptable policy is one that takes into consideration all the realities and consequences: External and internal, political and economic, and of course the psychological reaction both on the part of Germans and in other countries, especially in those that participated in the anti-Hitler war. The time of our program has come to the end. [passage omitted]

United States & Canada

Bush Issues U.S. National Security Report

LD2103121490 Moscow TASS in English 1146 GMT 21 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondents Igor Borisenko and Vladimir Matyash]

[Text] Washington March 21 TASS—President George Bush sent a report on the U.S. strategy in the sphere of national security to Congress on Tuesday. The report sets forth the main principles of U.S. domestic and foreign policy, as well as U.S. objectives and tasks through the end of the century.

The report stressed that the United States was giving indisputable priority to strategic relations with the Soviet Union in the broad community of nations as one of the main tasks facing the Washington administration.

Touching upon long-term military policy, Bush pointed out that the United States was going to reduce its Armed Forces, making them more mobile and more suitable for possible actions under any circumstances and conditions.

At the same time, Bush stressed the U.S. desire for Germany to remain a full-fleged member of the NATO bloc, including militarily. The report reiterated U.S. allegiance to the implementation of the broader than ever arms control agenda in order to negotiate agreements with the USSR this year on the reduction of strategic armaments, conventional armed forces and armaments in central Europe and chemical weapons.

TASS Notes Discovery of Space Shuttle Debris

LD2003183390 Moscow TASS in English 1640 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—The 17-tonne American spy satellite, put into orbit by the American Atlantis shuttle on March 1 for purposes of visual and radiotechnical surveillance in the interests of the U.S. Defence Ministry, developed some technical faults and had to be blown up.

On March 8, four of its major fragments were located in space by Soviet space monitoring devices. One of the fragments, TASS was told at the USSR Defence Ministry, ceased to exist (after burning and disintegrating in the denser layers of the atmosphere) at 19:12 Moscow time on Monday above the Pacific, 1500 kilometers north of Midway Island.

The other three fragments continue travelling in circular orbits. Their parameters are such that these fragments are expected to disintegrate before April 12, 1990.

Continuous Soviet monitoring of the fragments continues, although experts say they pose no danger as they will burn up on entering the atmosphere.

Cheney Views on Cocom, Force Levels Cited

PM2003154990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Mar 90 Single Edition p 7

[TASS report: "On the Right to Force"]

[Text] U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney addressed the "Changing Europe" round-table conference in the American capital on Friday.

He expounded to the participants in this representative conference, attended by administration officials, experts on Soviet-American relations, and leading representatives of U.S. business circles, his views on the political processes under way in the USSR and the countries of East Europe.

As the head of the military department noted, these changes are really very considerable, and "no one would have ventured to predict a year or two ago" what has happened in the Soviet Union this week. However, he maintained that the USSR does still pose a threat to the United States. Therefore, the Pentagon boss went on, our strategy of nuclear deterrence, "offensive and defensive nuclear potential," is essential to us. Moreover, Washington reserves the right to "station military forces outside the country," in Europe, the Pacific, and any other place.

Broaching certain problems of commercial relations between the United States and East Europe, Richard Cheney stated that he sees an unchanged operating mechanism in the future for the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control [Cocom], which monitors exports to the Soviet Union and the countries of East Europe.

Cheney expressed the opinion that the process of democratization in the countries of East Europe and the USSR could be "reversed" and the Soviet Union again "pose a threat" to American interests. He stressed that the United States should in no way cut its military expenditure below a certain level.

U.S. Congressman Calls for Afghan Policy Review

PM2003141190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Mar 90 First Edition p 6

[TASS report: "For a New Approach"]

[Text] New York, 16 March—Lee Hamilton, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, has advocated a reevaluation by the Washington Administration of the situation in Afghanistan and the implementation of a policy aimed at putting an end to bloodshed in that country.

A year has passed since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the congressman writes in an article published in the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. However, the prospects of establishing peace there remain minimal. War is continuing in the country and the number of victims is growing. Up to the present, the

United States had constructed its policy on the assumption of a mujahidin military victory. Washington did not reject the possibility of solving the problem by means of talks, but only on the terms put forward by the Afghan opposition. However, events of the past year have put a question mark over U.S. policy with respect to Afghanistan.

China

TASS Reports Deng Xiaoping Resignation

LD2103125990 Moscow TASS in English 1248 GMT 21 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondents Andrey Kirillov and Vyacheslav Tomilin]

[Text] Beijing March 21 TASS—The current session of the Chinese parliament has accepted Deng Xiaoping's resignation as chairman of the Central Military Commission.

A draft resolution to this effect was approved on Tuesday evening by the session presidium.

Today deputies heard a letter from the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, which said that on September 4, 1989, Deng Xiaoping requested the party's Central Committee to release him from his duties as chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Military Council and the Chinese Central Military Commission.

At its fifth plenary meeting, the party's Central Committee met his request and elected Jiang Zemin chairman of the military council.

As announced by the parliament's speaker on the eve of the session, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin is the most probable candidate for the chairman of the Central Military Commission.

Results of Economic Seminar in USSR Detailed

OW2103003190 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Excerpts] The first Soviet-Chinese scientific seminar on the economic reforms in the Soviet Union and China was held in Moscow not long ago. Economic experts from the two countries attended the meeting. They discussed some pressing issues regarding the fundamental reform of the economy which is being carried out in the two countries. It is expected that the countries will cooperate in the area of scientific research and the reform process. We asked (Jiang Hanzhang), deputy director of the International Liaison Department under the Chinese Academy of Sciences and a participant in the seminar, for his impression of the outcome of the meeting.

(Jiang Hanzhang) said: The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences jointly sponsored the first scientific seminar. Chinese economists are familiarizing themselves with the experiences of the Soviet economic reform. Chinese experts visited the Soviet Union in the past to acquaint themselves with the Soviet reform process. Members of the Chinese delegation include experts in the areas of industry, technology, agriculture, finance, and prices. Liu Guoguang, vice president of the Academy of Social Sciences and noted expert on reform heads the Chinese delegation. Both sides had fruitful exchanges of opinions on the economic reforms in the two countries. Scientific exchanges between the Soviet Union and China are expanding.

We now ask (Jiang Hanzhang) to discuss the results of bilateral cooperation in 1989 and about future plans.

[Begin recording] [(Jiang Hanzhang)] In June 1989, a 13-member delegation headed by Hu Sheng, president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, visited the Soviet Union. That delegation signed an agreement on academic exchanges with the Soviet Academy of Sciences. [passage omitted] Last year has been a fruitful year for both sides. [passage omitted] I believe, however, that we should raise the effectiveness of academic exchanges in 1990. The duration of scholars' visits should be appropriately lengthened; your scholars' visits to China and our scholars' visits to your country should be no shorter than two weeks, although three, four or more weeks would be better. This will enable both sides to gain a deeper and better understanding of the state of academic research in each other's country. [passage omitted] I also believe we should increase exchanges of books and other information this year.

[Unidentified reporter] Comrade (Jiang Hanzhang), what is your impression of the Soviet Union?

[(Jiang Hanzhang)] I have visited the Soviet Union three times as a member of an Academy of Social Sciences delegation. I first visited your country in 1986 and again in 1989. This is my third trip here. I also have made two stopovers in Moscow. During my three visits, the Soviet Academy of Sciences, in addition to arranging our visit to Moscow, also arranged our trips to other areas including Leningrad, Tbilisi, and Alma-Ata. [passage omitted] Each visit to the Soviet Union left a deep impression on me. Of course, it is now more than three years since my 1986 visit and my 1989 and present visits. The Soviet Union has undergone many changes during that time. Still, generally speaking, the impression has been deep. I am not going to dwell anymore on it. Your side will host a banquet tomorrow, at which the head of our delegation will speak. He will speak about his impression of the Soviet Union. [end recording]

I believe the effective cooperation between the two countries' economic experts will continue. The two scientific research centers will carry out direct contacts. The next joint Soviet-Chinese seminar on the economic reform will be held in Beijing in 1991.

Northeast Asia

ROK's Kim Yong-sam Arrives for Visit 20 Mar

LD2003180990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1645 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 20 Mar (TASS)—Kim Yong-sam, chairman of the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), the ruling party of South Korea, spoke "for resolute progress" in relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea. He arrived in Moscow today at the invitation of the USSR Academy of Science World Economics and International Relations Institute (IMEMO).

Upon his arrival in the USSR Kim Yong-sam expressed hope that his visit "will bring concrete results in the field of development of the political and economic bilateral ties." "I am convinced," he noted in a short interview at the airport with the TASS correspondent, "that the positive development of the bilateral relations will serve mutual interests of South Korea and Soviet Union, the other countries of the Far Eastern region and all the world."

During the eight-day program of Kim Yong-sam's visit to the Soviet Union there will be meetings with Aleksandr Yakovlev, CPSU Central Committee secretary, and Politburo member, and with the members of the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission. He will also lecture at Moscow State University.

Yakovlev, Kim Discuss Ties

SK2103100990 Seoul YONHAP in English 0948 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Moscow, March 21 (YONHAP)—Kim Yong-sam, a co-leader of South Korea's ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), Wednesday discussed ways to promote diplomatic relations and bilateral economic cooperation between Seoul and Moscow with Soviet Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev.

During a 90-minute meeting held at the office of the Soviet Politburo in the Kremlin, Kim stressed that establishment of diplomatic relations is essential for South Korea's investments in the Soviet Union. He noted that economic cooperation between the two countries has been increasing steadily.

Yakovlev, a top foreign policy aide to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, was learned to have accepted the increase in the bilateral economic exchanges as "an encouraging phenomenon" and discussed with Kim measures to expand Korea's investments in the Soviet Union.

Yakovlev is said to be the highest responsible figure in charge of the Soviet policy toward Korea.

First State Minister Pak Chol-on and Reps. Hwang Pyong-tae and Chong Che-mun also attended the meeting.

Later that day, Kim and his entourage attended a dinner hosted by the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee at the guest house.

Meanwhile, Minister Pak contacted Soviet Government officials to make "behind-the-scenes" negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations while Kim Sang-ha, chairman of the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, who is accompanying the DLP leader, visited the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry to discuss ways to protect investments exchanged between the two countries. [passage omitted]

NEW TIMES Views Attitudes to Koreas

PM2003162690 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 10, 6-12 Mar 90 p 19-21

[Leonid Mlechin article: "Sitting on the Fence"]

[Text] Three years ago I was "on the other side," in the figurative and literal meaning. Accompanied by [DPRK] People's Army officers, I gazed at a summer house built in a traditional style. American tourists crowded on its roof looked at us, and we looked at them. They were taking pictures of the scene. I also focused the lenses of my camera and pushed the release button. Luckily, we had only harmless cameras in our hands.

It is difficult to remain nonchalant at Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Koreas, with their troops standing face to face, for only an armistice agreement has been concluded between them. The old argument of confrontation, "those who don't side with us are against us," prevails near the demarcation line, where only a step separates you from "the other side." To make this step, I had to wait for three years and fly over several thousand miles on the Moscow-Tokyo-Seoul route.

Three years ago I gazed at the summer house, called Freedom House, and crowded with American tourists. And now, accompanied by American officers, I went up to its observation point to see the place where I stood three years ago. Someone was standing there, listening to People's Army officers and staring at me. I hoped he did not regard me as an enemy, and not because most likely he was my compatriot (though did not realize that), but because something had changed around and within us during these three years.

They are so different

People's Army officers, stern and tense, are very differnt from officers of the South Korean Army, who have adopted not only the uniform of Americans, but also their manner of behavior. "Two worlds, two systems," as we usually remarked on such occasions in the past. The People's Army outfit resembles the old uniform of Soviet

troops. Officers and men are not very tall, strong, broad-shouldered and reliable. Under the black cap peaks their weather-beaten faces looked handsome and manly.

"Look out, provocations are possible," an interpreter kept saying. "Americans behave quietly now, while the South Korean puppets are capable of anything."

In the People's Army, the show of the demarcation line to journalists was evidently equal to combat operations. Vehicles without number plates, top secrecy, the ranks of officers and the numbers of units are not mentioned in conversations.

We inspected the enemy positions through a telescope set up in a trench. Music could be heard from a loudspeaker mounted somewhere. A lieutenant colonel asked us to listen more intently. He said that Americans were firing near the demarcation line. We listened more intently. "It's very dangerous," the lieutenant colonel added. "That's why we have to go to a more quiet place." It seemed to me that I also heard the sound of firing.

Compared with servicemen of the People's Army, Americans and their South Korean allies look careless. What seems to be a combat mission in the North is regarded in the South as a routine and tiresome work. The GI's serving as guides rattle off the texts learned by heart, exchanging jokes during intervals. In the Army, Americans smile perhaps no less often than in civil life.

At the request of my colleagues from the Seoul newspaper Choson Ilbo, a public relations woman officer from the U.S. Army headquarters in South Korea took me in a military car through a garrison town. Much of what I saw there seemed amazing to me, a senior lieutenant (reserve) of the Soviet Army. There was no usual secrecy. Everywhere I could see huge boards carrying in almost metre-high letters the number of a unit, the families and ranks of the commander and the chief of staff. Reconnaissance and staff units are not an exception in this respect.

Several tall Americans told me about Panmujom, illustrating their story with slides. It was curious to hear a different account of the story I heard three years ago. Both accounts began with events which took place forty years ago.

What's the real history?

In the North, I was told that after the liberation of Korea, the U.S. imperialists and their puppet Syngman Rhee separated the southern part of the country from the northern one. On June 25, 1950, they unleashed a war against the North, but the People's Army utterly defeated them and liberated almost the entire South within several days. However, the Americans intervened by landing an immense army at Inchon and taking the offensive. They captured Pyongyang and reached the Yalu River. But then Chinese volunteers came to the aid of their North Korean brothers. In the end, the Americans were forced to sign an armistice agreement at Panmunjom on July 27, 1953.

This version has been fully adopted by Soviet historians.

Here is an account of the same events, as told to me in the South.

The United States withdrew its troops from the Korean Peninsula in 1949, leaving a poorly equipped army of 96,000 men in the South. In the North, an army of 200,000 had been raised by the summer of 1950 with the help of Soviet instructors and arms. Speaking in the National Press Club, Secretary of State Dean Acheson revealed that South Korea was outside the United States' defensive zone. The North took the statement as a signal. Pyongyang began a war and destroyed the South Korean army almost completely. The whole of the West, not only Washington, branded North Korea an aggressor. This was expressed in a resolution passed by the U.N. Security Council. The troops of 16 states landed in the South to protect the democratic state. The defeat of the North was inevitable. But, unexpectedly for Washington, Mao Zedong hurled 150,000 "volunteers" to the front. The proposal to begin talks came from the North. However, an armistice agreement was signed only after Stalin's death, who seems to have incited Pyongyang to war. About two million South Koreans became victims of the war, and as many people fled from the North to the South.

This version has been adopted by historians in almost all countries not allied with North Korea. Many people have already forgotten about the Korean war. But nearly 40 years ago, when hostilities broke out, it was actively discussed in Soviet society.

Do Soviet historians intend to maintain the old version of the Korean war? It will not be simple to write the history of the three-year war for those who will try to do that by relying on American and Soviet archive documents. For the war is merely an episode in the postwar history of the Korean Peninsula. It is clear now that this history must be written anew, and not only for the sake of restoring the truth. It is in itself a goal worthy of note.

Satellites and allies

The journalists now visiting North Korea have found the following way out. They reproduce word for word either praises to the great leader Kim Il-song and the beloved leader Kim Chong-il, or the speeches of these leaders. This produces a rather strong effect, especially on those who have the patience to read these speeches to the end.

The Soviet Union needs allies, but not for fighting when every soldier is welcome. Malta has dismissed the policy of siding with everyone who demonstrated his anti-Americanism. We need allies and partners for joint economic development and the tackling of global problems. In this sense the Republic of Korea, a dynamically

growing state, advancing from the authoritarian regime to democracy, can become such an ally and partner.

Soviet scholars have long pointed to the need of establishing diplomatic relations with Seoul, first of all in the economic interests of the Soviet Union. The Republic of Korea wants to imitate Japan on a smaller scale, and is looking for new markets. But unlike Japan, it is ready to deal with Eastern Europe in exchange for political and diplomatic recognition. This is important for its self-assertion.

Hungary understood this earlier than others and was the first East European country to have established diplomatic relations with South Korea, receiving good contracts in exchange. Its example was followed by Poland and Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union is slow in doing that, and one can understand the reason. We remember Pyongyang's harsh reaction to the Hungarian decision. It can be assumed that the Soviet Foreign Ministry has already been warned about consequences.

Trade and economic benefits are not the only argument in favour of establishing ties with Seoul. The division of Korea is a consequence of the cold war, and the United States is not the only country to blame for it. In any case, the differentiation between great powers on the principle, "you support the South, and we support the North," is an anachronism, and is not a harmless one. It creates a pressure force which consolidates the division of Korea. The North and the South will not advance towards each other as long as Pyongyang feels the unequivocal support of Moscow, and Seoul of the United States.

It is a different matter that under the present state of affairs real agreements between the North and the South are impossible. In Seoul, I had a long talk with the new minister of national reunification. A university professor in the past, he set forth his concept of bringing together the two parts of a formerly single country. But, frankly speaking, he did not voice any optimism. Pyongyang and Seoul are equally producing a mass of different initiatives and proposing dozens of subjects for negotiations. Such negotiations do begin at Panmunjom, but they have never ended in success. I think the proposals of both sides go in a parallel direction with each other and never cross; because they do not wish to reach an agreement. The present regimes in Seoul and Pyongyang cannot coexist, because they are mutually excluding. That is why it will take some time before Korea is reunified.

It may be that we shall not have to wait for a long time. Nothing is eternal on earth. Regimes, people and policies are changing, and this process may begin rapidly, as it happened in Germany. It is necessary to be prepared for such a change and to establish working relations with both partners.

The latest events in Europe have compelled Moscow to shift its foreign policy emphasis to European problems. I am afraid that Far Eastern problems are again being pushed into the background. However, big changes may expect us in that region, too, and they may prove an unpleasant surprise to the Soviet public which, unlike diplomats, does not yet have access to a considerable volume of foreign policy information. To lessen the possible shock, journalists and historians should forget about considerations of political expediency. What took place, and is taking place, in the Korean Peninsula should be described honestly, and diplomats should not feel hurt: unpleasant explanations which Moscow may have to give to Pyongyang today will make it easier to establish friendly ties with a united Korea tomorrow. From whatever side we look at the demarcation line—from the North or the South, from the headquarters of the joint command of the People's Army and Chinese volunteers, or from the observation point of the Freedom House, in the company of tense officers in a familiar uniform or smiling Americans—the absurdity and tragedy of the country's division are obvious. There is no single country to blame for such a situation: during the past 40 years the neighbours, allies and friends of the two Korean states have done practically nothing for their reunification. On the contrary, efforts in the opposite direction have been made.

Politics and morals

In the last one or two years, since a cautious rapprochement between Moscow and Seoul began, the Soviet news media have felt awkward in regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Allied interstate and interplay relations have been preserved. We do not know what the state and level of contacts are, but it can be assumed that the dialogue is not shaping in the best way possible. On the one hand, we find new Soviet leaders who are transforming the very fabric of society and, on the other hand, leaders who most of all wish to preserve the status quo. I have in mind the great leader Kim Il-song and the beloved leader Kim Chong-il, his son and official heir (the inheritance of state power is a unique phenomenon in the present-day world).

Moscow is doing its best not to irritate Pyongyang. For this reason national papers and magazines give a rosy picture of the situation in North Korea, as distinct from the rep[illegible]can, especially Baltic, press which has long been carrying articles from Western newspapers, in which that country is depicted even in darker colours than Romania under the Ceausescu dictatorship.

The current anti-Soviet sentiments in Romania can be interpreted as a reaction to Moscow's long silence and to the decoration of Ceausescu with the Order of Lenin on several occasions. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze disclosed recently that Vitaliy Vorotnikov, who headed the CPSU delegation to the last congress of the Romanian Communist Party, was tired of standing up when the audience applauded Ceausescu. He thought it was not polite to sit when the delegates rose. But the Romanians who watched the congress deliberations and knew nothing about the subtle feelings of the Soviet guest understood all this as Moscow's support for Ceausescu.

One can, of course, tell the public now about his dissatisfaction and discussions during the talks with former Romanian leaders. But will the Romanian people listen?

In real life, it is difficult to reconcile politics with morals, and allied commitments with the struggle for human rights. At one time we ridiculed President Carter's attempts to do that. Incidentally, James Carter openly expressed his dissatisfaction with the human rights situation in South Korea, where military regimes replaced one another. He even raised the question of withdrawing American troops from the peninsula. The next president, Reagan, was less sensitive. He said that American troops would stay, and demonstrated by his visit to Seoul that the strategic ally was more important than reports of the Amnesty International. Washington did not intervene during student riots in Kwangju, which President Chon Tu-hwan crushed by tanks, and this hardly improved the American image in South Korea.

While middle-aged and older people remain grateful to the United States for its aid during the Korean war and would like to keep American troops in the peninsula, many young people have anti-American sentiments. The Soviet television has repeatedly shown student demonstrations in Seoul and other cities demanding the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. In Seoul, I saw the library of the American Cultural Centre, which was set on fire by gasoline bombs. The library burned down. It is a terrible thing to burn books, the more so that the library was intended for students. But a mob acts against the rules of logic. In Krakow, it demands pulling down a monument to Lenin, and in Seoul, it sets a library on fire.

Young South Koreans are not interested in Washington's strategic considerations. They no longer want to be grateful for what happened some time ago. They hate Americans because they backed the dictator.

Anti-Soviet sentiments in Eastern Europe have the same roots, and one should not look for causes somewhere else. "When it seems to us that we are not respected much, it is necessary to see whether we live properly," wrote Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. It is necessary to draw lessons from the sad experience of Americans who are insulted in a country where American soldiers shed their blood.

National newspapers and magazines display maximum tolerance for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. None of the journalists wants to do harm to Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet media continue to follow the old policy with regard to North Korea and Cuba. It can be formulated like this: we are not writing about you what you are not publishing in your own press. At one time such a position was held with regard to all socialist countries.

USSR To Help Site DPRK Atomic Power Plant

SK2003122790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 19 Mar 90

[From the "News on Soviet-Korean Relations" program under the "Annals of Friendship" program]

[Text] In order to (?determine) a site for the DPRK's first atomic power plant, Soviet (?geologists) will participate in the examination of continental shelves and coastal areas. A few days ago, (Georg Primoriya) and (Marion), scientific research ships of the [name indistinct] company, left.

Cooperation in Timber Cutting Discussed

SK2003122390 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 12 Mar 90

[From the "Annals of Friendship" program]

[Text] Dear listeners: In this hour, we will discuss Soviet-Korean cooperation in the forestry sector. A Russian word meaning (?forestry) is painted on the bottom side of airplanes. They can fly across the sky over the vast Far East. [Words indistinct] Khavarovsk Kray and Amursk, close to the DPRK.

According to an intergovernmental agreement, a joint timber cutting project has been under way for (?22) years. Approximately 5 million square meters of timber are cut a year. Cooperation has been promoted in this joint timber cutting project as time goes by. Soviet and Korean workers have built approximately 30 large wood cutting enterprises in a relatively short period of time in sparsely populated areas in the vast Soviet Far East. Wood for industrial purposes [words indistinct] is produced at these enterprises.

Timber cutters are carrying out their tasks [words indistinct]. Last year, alone, Soviet and Korean workers built 24 houses, a kindergarten, and several schools and hospitals in the Khavarovsk Kray. Measures have been taken [words indistinct], too. Soviet-Korean joint [words indistinct] were organized at a series of forestry stations. For example, a sovkhoz specializing in [words indistinct] is being organized. Green houses will be built to grow vegetable at [words indistinct]. [passage indistinct] Guaranteeing equipment necessary for timber cutting enterprises is one of the difficult problems. [Words indistinct] are unavoidably related to illegal timber cutting and other negative phenomena. These issues were discussed at a Soviet-Korean forestry meeting in Pyongyang last year. The Korean side assured that it would take necessary measures to normalize the situation.

Opening of Mongolia's Great Hural Reported

LD2103121290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] The current session of the Great People's Hural of the Mongolian People's Republic opened in Ulaanbaatar

today. The deputies will discuss draft laws on the electoral system and on foreign investment, questions of amendments to the law on pensions, members of agricultural organizations, and legislation on the activities of the law enforcement organs. Gombojavyn Ochirbat, general secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, leaders of the Mongolian Democratic Union, and other new socio-political movements recently formed in Mongolia are taking part in the session work.

Leadership Changes Reported

LD2103142490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1225 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 21 March (TASS)—The 11th current session of the Mongolian Peoples' Great Hural which has opened here today has discussed organizational matters. The deputies have complied with the requests from Jambyn Batmonh, the chairman of the presidium of the People's Great Hural, and Dumaagivin Sodnom, the chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, about relieving them from their posts.

The session has elected 48-year old Pulsalmaagiyn Ochirbat the chairman of the presidium of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR] People's Great Hural. He is a mining engineer, has received his higher education in the USSR. He worked in the mining enterprises for a number of years, then at the ministries of fuel and power industry, geology and mining industry. In the last few years he was the minister of foreign economic relations and supply.

The session has confirmed Sharavyn Gungaadorj as the head of the government. He is 55 years old, an agricultural specialist by profession. Before his appointment for this post he worked as the deputy chairman of the MPR Council of Ministers.

The deputies are discussing a wide range of questions of the great importance for the formation of the law-governed state of Mongolia, including the establishment of the post of the president of the country.

The session's work will continue for three days.

Yazov Greets Mongolian Counterpart on Army Day

PM2003124190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 90 First Edition p 1

[Message from Army General D. Yazov, USSR defense minister "to Lieutenant General Comrade Luvsangombyn Molomjants, Mongolian defense minister"]

[Text] To Lieutenant General Comrade Luvsangombyn Molomjants, Mongolian defense minister

Esteemed Comrade Minister!

On behalf of the USSR Armed Forces and in my own name, I cordially congratulate you and all Mongolian servicemen on the 69th anniversary of the Mongolian People's Army.

We express the firm conviction that Mongolian People's Army servicemen will carry on honorably fulfilling their patriotic duty and reliably protecting the Mongolian people's peaceful creative labor and freedom and independence.

On the holiday Soviet servicemen wish their Mongolian brothers in arms new successes in improving combat skills and further strengthening Mongolia's defense capability.

May the inviolable friendship and all-around cooperation between the USSR and Mongolia be strengthened!

Army General D. Yazov, USSR defense minister

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Paris Session Shows Growing UN Role in Cambodia

PM2003110790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "UN Cambodia Plan"]

[Text] Paris—Representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—the USSR, the United States, China, Britain, and France—have agreed at the third round of talks on achieving an all-embracing political settlement of the Cambodian conflict, held in Paris, on the need to create a "transitional UN authority in Cambodia." It will provisionally administer the country and hold free elections.

"The transitional UN authority in Cambodia," the Paris meeting final document notes, "will be created by the UN Security Council under the direct leadership of its secretary general. It will be exercised throughout the country's territory in order to protect the Cambodian people from threats, violence, and economic and social discrimination and to guarantee them basic rights."

Under the accord reached in the French capital the United Nations bears responsibility for organizing elections in Cambodia on the basis of valid, checked voter lists. Cambodian refugees and displaced persons will be guaranteed the right to vote. All the Cambodian sides, the final document stresses, must give a commitment to respect the election results. An elected constitutent assembly will adopt the country's constitution and will then be transformed into a legislative assembly.

In addition, the UN Security Council permanent members issued an appeal to the four Cambodian sides involved in the conflict to agree to the creation of a Supreme National Council, which would embody sovereignty and national unity throughout the transition period.

The Supreme National Council, whose composition will be determined by the Cambodian sides themselves, will from the moment of its creation transfer all necessary powers, including those allowing free elections to be held, to the "transitional UN authority in Cambodia."

Commenting on the results of the meeting, whose participants met with UN Under Secretary General R. Ahmed, observers note that the agreement reached marks a substantial step toward solving the Cambodian problem. They stress the growing role of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and the entire UN organization in the search for acceptable solutions to settle the different aspects of the Cambodian conflict.

At the same time, as the Paris-published American INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE writes, citing participants in the meeting, "substantial disagreements among the Cambodian sides remain an obstacle to the rapid implementation of the plan." The French press considers that the road to peace in Cambodia will be a long one still.

Meanwhile the talks among the "five" will continue. A new round will be held in New York in May, and then they will again assemble in Paris and, if the conditions are ripe, consultations will begin with the representatives of the four Cambodian sides. It is also reported that the United Nations is sending two special missions to Cambodia to study the situation in the country.

Text of SRV Leaders' Message to Gorbachev

PM2003142790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[Greetings message to M.S. Gorbachev from SRV leaders under general headline: "Telegrams of Congratulation"]

[Text] To Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet

We send you warmest greetings on your election as USSR president at the Congress of People's Deputies.

Your election to the highest and most responsible state post at the current extremely important stage of perestroyka in the USSR is a manifestation of Soviet people's confidence in you and testifies to their support for the line of continuing the transformations aimed at giving new dynamism to socialist building in the Soviet Union, strengthening universal peace, and further developing the world revolutionary process.

The Vietnamese people invariably value the relations of cohesion, friendship, and all-around cooperation with the Soviet Union, and are fully resolved to continue developing and deepening these relations in order to ensure that they serve even more effectively the cause of perestroyka in the USSR, the renewal of society in the SRV, and the aims of strengthening peace, security, and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and worldwide.

We firmly believe that the fraternal Soviet people, forged in a long revolutionary struggle, will overcome all difficulties and trials under the CPSU's leadership and ensure the further advancement of the cause of perestroyka.

We wish you, esteemed Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, good health and great successes in your responsible activity.

Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam
Vo Chi Cong, chairman of the SRV Council of State
Do Muoi, chairman of the SRV Council of Ministers

Near East & South Asia

Afghan 'Extremist' on Operations Against USSR

LD2003175290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 20 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer Kiselev] In Kabul new facts have been made public, according to which Afghan extremist groups are training saboteurs for subversive work against the Soviet Union. Our correspondent in Kabul reports the facts:

[V. Pasko] The person whom you now see sitting beside me was trained by the special services of one of the extremist groupings of the Afghan opposition, the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, for subversive activity on the territory of the Soviet Union. His name is Sayyed Nadar. Tell me, what assignments were you set by your former leaders?

[Sayyed Nadar, in vernacular, followed by Pasko's Russian translation] When we entered the school four years ago, we were taught the techniques and tactics of heavy armament utilization, and specifically that of the Sakr-20 and -30 missiles. We were also set the assignment of mining the Soviet Union's territory. The next assignment which was set was that of recruiting Soviet citizens. Apart from that, we were taught to carry out brainwashing and to make films.

[Pasko] Tell me, from which countries were the representatives who trained you?

[Sayyed Nadar] There were 60 people in my class. As far as the teachers were concerned, they were from Pakistan, the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia. [video shows Pasko sitting with nadar and Afghan interpreter]

[Pasko] This person's admissions are important for us, comrades, especially if one recalls recent reports on the intention of extremist circles of the Afghan opposition to intensify the penetration of Soviet Tajikistan, including the supply of weapons and subversive literature. The channels of penetration are in operation.

This is a map especially prepared for us by our Afghan comrades from Afghanistan's security service. The sectors where bandits have already crossed the Soviet Union's border are marked with red arrows. As you can see, there are a considerable number of them.

I would like to note that President Najibullah has warned the leaders of the Afghan opposition that their subversive operations against the Soviet Union will be cut short by the government. This does not mean, however, we must rely entirely on the Afghan side here. The border with Afghanistan is very difficult to defend against spies [lazutchiki], and we must bear this in mind. [video shows Pasko pointing out the red arrows indicated on a map of Afghanistan. There are two arrows entering the USSR from Faryab Province in Afghanistan, one from Jowzjan Province, one from Balkh Province, one from Samangan Province, three from Konduz Province, three from Takhar Province, and five from Badakhshan Province]

Khowst Offensive 'Led' by Pakistani General Staff

PM2103103790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[Special correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Oliynik telephone dispatch: "A Front at the Walls of Khowst"]

[Text] Kabul, 19 Mar—Khowst is the administrative center of a border district. Fierce fighting has been under way here for three weeks now. The city has to all intents and purposes been blockaded by superior insurgent forces. The mountain which links it with Gardeyz is held by the opposition. The only thread linking the heroic garrison with Kabul is an air service. However, it passes over a considerable area of opposition-controlled territory.

Why has Khowst been chosen as a target for an insurgent offensive? What forces and means are they using to storm the city? I put those questions to Colonel General Amanuddin [name as transliterated], chief of the Afghan Army General Staff.

In more than 10 years of war Khowst has repeatedly found itself under an insurgent blockade, Colonel General Amanuddin said. And each time the garrison together with the city's population has successfully repulsed the insurgents' attacks. The national flag has proudly flown over Matun Heights all these years. The insurgents' current offensive is linked, rather, to the opposition leaders' determination to take revenge for their defeat at Jalalabad. That lesson was not to their liking. So they decided on a different course of action. Additionally, there is an airfield in Khowst and a well-developed trading system. So, if they won, the so-called "transitional government" could be installed there. Moreover, it is just about 30 km from the Pakistani border.

In the first few days of March, Colonel General Amanuddin continued, the insurgents attempted to storm the city. Contrary to the provocative claims of Western radio voices, this attack was in no way linked to the putsch in Kabul. Not a single subunit in the garrison supported the former defense minister, even though he is a member of the local Tani [name as transliterated] tribe.

The first armed opposition strike was against the 25th Infantry Division and the 2d Border Brigade on Toregaregor [name as transliterated] Heights. The insurgents, outnumbering the defenders of the mountain ridge by three or four to one, broke through the defenses using tanks, artillery, and rocket launchers, seized Toregaregor Height—which dominates the surrounding area—and dug in on it. They then brought up heavy artillery and rocket launchers, which they have been using to shell the city and the airfield intensively every day.

Despite the enemy's numerical superiority, the garrison headed by Lieutenant General Faruq is steadfastly holding out and inflicting tangible blows against the insurgents. Our combat aircraft and rocket artillery are operating here with great effectiveness.

The overall ringleader of the insurgent forces at Khowst, Colonel General Amanuddin explained, is Jalaluddin Haqqani. The Khowst offensive, as intelligence shows, is actually being led by representatives of the Pakistani Army General Staff. Pakistani helicopters have been supplying the insurgents with weapons and munitions in the regions of Dzhavar [name as transliterated], Jaji Maydan, and certain other areas deep in Afghan territory.

[Oliynik] What are the insurgents' tactics at Khowst at the moment?

[Amanuddin] A new tactical point in the insurgents' actions is that, fearing attacks by our aircraft and missiles, they are operating in dispersed groups of not more than 10-15 men. Before an offensive the insurgents rely on using heavy armaments and organizing air defenses, up on the heights they have seized, in order to repulse strikes by our aircraft. The opposition forces have a centralized material and technical supply system, in which even nongovernment organizations and firms on Pakistani territory are involved. In short, the opposition is now doing everything to take the garrison by force. [Amanuddin ends]

...Things are hard in Khowst right now. The front line is outside its walls. But the unbowed garrison is hanging on and repulsing the insurgents' attacks. And the national flag of Afghanistan continues to fly on Matun Heights over the city.

'Islamic Jihad' Threat To Execute Hostages Noted

PM2003140990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent V. Lashkul dispatch: "'Jihad' Threats"]

[Text] Beirut—Western news agencies in the capital of Lebanon have received a statement from an underground extremist organization, "Islamic Jihad (Holy War) for the Liberation of Palestine."

The "Jihad" statement, accompanied by a photograph of Robert Polhill, one of the American hostages held by this organization, contains threats of attacks on airports and airlines that take part in transporting Jews from other countries to Israel and the occupied Arab territories. It stresses that "Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine" will not stand idly by while people are settling illegally on Palestinian lands.

Furthermore, the Muslim extremists announced in their statement that they refuse to hold any talks on the hostage problem until the United States forces Tel Aviv to release 450 Arabic political prisoners being kept in Israeli prisons. The "Jihad" statement stresses that in the event of refusal of its demands, the organization will execute the hostages. Remember, 17 citizens of various states are in the hands of the kidnappers.

Vorontsov, Arab Envoys on Israeli Settlements

LD2103032690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1810 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 20 Mar (TASS)—Yuliy Vorontsov, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs, today received a group of ambassadors of Arab states accredited in Moscow: A.O. Muhammad of the YAR, M. Hammud of Lebanon, I. Na'ib of Syria, M. Yala of Algeria, A. Makhir al-Sayyid of Egypt, I.S. al-Abbudi of the UAE, M. El May a representative of the Arab League as well as S. Abu Imara, the Pakistani charge d'affaires.

The Arab diplomats reported on the results of the session of the council of the Arab League at the foreign minister level which took place in Tunisia on 10-12 March. They drew attention to the illegal actions of Israel in creating settlements and in settling immigrants on the occupied Arab territories.

Yu.M. Vorontsov stressed that the concern of the Arab countries in connection with the plans pronounced in Israel to use immigrants, including those from the USSR, for the settlement of Arab lands, is shared in the Soviet Union. Such a policy is unlawful, it creates serious hurdles on the road to peace in the Near East and should be ceased. Proceeding from this, this issue has, at the initiative of the Soviet Union, been submitted for consideration by the UN Security Council.

Those taking part in the meeting confirmed their aspiration for further Soviet-Arab political interaction corresponding to the interests of a settlement of the Near East conflict as soon as possible and a fair solution to the Palestinian problem.

PLO's 'Arafat Hails Gorbachev Election

PM2103102590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Message from PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir 'Arafat to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev; undated]

[Text] To Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

Esteemed Comrade M.S. Gorbachev

Revolutionary greetings!

On the occasion of your election as president of the USSR I am pleased to send you, on behalf of the Palestinian people and the fraternal members of the PLO Executive Committee, and on my own behalf the warmest, most cordial congratulations and best wishes for further successes.

Your election to this post is an expression of trust on the part of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and your people both in you personally and in the policy you are carrying out to ensure the economic progress and increased social well-being of the Soviet Union.

We believe, comrade president, that the relations of friendship, solidarity, and fruitful cooperation that exist between the Soviet Union and the Palestinian State will continue to be based on constant coordination and will develop and strengthen for the benefit of our peoples and in the interests of achieving a just peace in the Middle East region and throughout the world.

Taking advantage of this occasion I express to your excellency, to your esteemed government, and to the peoples of the friendly Soviet Union our deep gratitude for and huge acknowledgment of the stances of solidarity and support adopted by the friendly Soviet Union for the just struggle of the Palestinian people and its popular uprising in the name of ending the Israeli occupation of our land and creating an independent Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem.

Once again I ask you to accept my cordial congratulations and wish you good health, happiness, and further great successes in the work of leading the peoples of the friendly Soviet Union in the name of progress and prosperity.

Best and cordial wishes,

Revolution to Victory!

[Signed] Yasir 'Arafat, president of the Palestinian State, and chairman of the PLO Executive Committee

Al-Rabitah Said 'Excuse' for U.S. Libya Stance

PM2003104790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Mar 90 Single Edition p 7

[TASS correspondent for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA V. Anchikov report: "A Stick With Which to Beat the Insubordinate; How Political Ambitions Are Threatening To Turn Into Armed Conflict"]

[Text] Tripoli—If you go directly south from Tripoli you come to the city of Gharyan a little over 50 km away: The highway, which first crosses a plain, gradually becomes increasingly steep, then turns into hairpin bends and climbs upward. The road signs show that Gharyan is to the right of it, and a little to one side the population center of Al-Rabitah. Two years ago few people knew that Al-Rabitah existed. I think not even all Libyans knew, let alone the world community. The name of this population center appeared in U.S. newspapers at the end of 1988 when the United States stated that Libya was building a chemical weapons plant in Al-Rabitah. These statements concealed threats to eliminate this enterprise, and the same old theses about "Libya's support of international terrorism" were trotted out in support. Let us recall that a similar propaganda campaign was mounted in April 1986 to accompany a U.S. Air Force missile and bombing strike against Tripoli and Banghazi. Then Libya was accused of involvement in an explosion at a discotheque in West Berlin and terrorist acts at Rome and Vienna airports. The accusations were groundless, without any evidence to support them. But this was enough for strikes to be delivered against the home of Libyan leader M. al-Qadhdhafi and residential areas of the two cities.

Last January Washington seized on Al-Rabitah. The aircraft carrier "John F. Kennedy" was hastily dispatched to the Libyan coast. Either this was done to frighten Libya, or R. Reagan was really determined, as he left the White House, to see the anti-Libyan campaign through to the end. Fighters which took off from the deck of the aircraft carrier shot down two Libyan patrol aircraft over the international waters of the Mediterranean. Libya and the United States were on the verge of a new military confrontation. The fire which almost flared up was extinguished thanks to international intervention and also largely thanks to the composure of Libya, which showed restraint at that time and did not let itself be provoked into taking reciprocal actions.

The change of administration in Washington and the new president's routine concerns had pushed the question of U.S.-Libyan relations, including the Al-Rabitah problem, further into the background. But, one year on, it turns out that the United States had not forgotten about Al-Rabitah.

At first the mass media, particularly the ABC television company and various radio stations, alleged that Libya was producing chemical weapons. Then a succession of officials and a White House spokesman not only talked about the Libyans' chemical weapons, but also stated that the United States did not rule out the possibility of delivering a strike against the plant. Last year's scenario is being repeated. Now we can expect U.S. aircraft carriers off the Libyan coast, renewed dogfights, and probably a strike against the plant and at the same time against the place where M. al-Qadhdhafi happens to be. I would like to ask: What right do they have? Who gave the United States the authority to threaten a sovereign state with aggression? The Libyan Jamahiriyah has stated clearly and unambiguously that what has been built in Al-Rabitah is a pharmaceutical enterprise necessary for Libya to produce drugs and medicine. The People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation has repeatedly stressed that Libya advocates the elimination of all forms of mass annihilation weapons, including chemical weapons. It officially welcomed the Soviet-U.S. statement on chemical weapons adopted during the recent visit to Moscow by U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker. Libya has also stated its willingness to sign an international convention banning chemical weapons. The General People's Congress—the Jamahiriyah's supreme organ of legislative power—reasonably asks the question: Why is Washington fanning an uproar around Al-Rabitah and saying nothing about its ally, Israel, which is producing both chemical and also other forms of mass destruction weapons? The answer to this question is clear: It is not the plant which is at issue here, but M. al-Qadhdhafi and the stances taken by the country he heads.

A year ago the well-known Libyan writer 'Ali Misurati said: "The Al-Rabitah plant is just an excuse for mounting a campaign of threats against the Jamahiriyah. The United States cannot forgive my country for its anti-imperialist tendency." Even today these words have not lost their relevance. The Libyan leader got in R. Reagan's way, so Reagan tried to kill him, imposed economic sanctions against Tripoli, and froze Libyan assets in U.S. banks valued at $4 billion. It is possible that the new U.S. President does not like M. al-Qadhdhafi, since he took up his predecessor's policy and extended the sanctions against Libya.

In this connection it is appropriate to recall that on the eve of G. Bush's accession to the White House M. al-Qadhdhafi stated that Libya was ready to come to the negotiating table with the new U.S. Administration and to settle all differences by peaceful means. But this call was not heard across the ocean—something that can only be regretted, because the changing political climate in the world dictates the need to reject strong-arm tactics in politics. It is no accident therefore that 12 March, at a press conference in Moscow, G. Gerasimov made the following statement on behalf of the USSR Foreign Ministry: "The fact that U.S. spokesmen do not rule out the use of force against the Libyan pharmaceutical enterprise in Al-Rabitah is outrageous. Raising this question contradicts the predominant tendency in the international arena toward the peaceful settlement of conflicts and respect for the sovereignty of other countries." It may be that Washington considers the "Grenadian"

and "Panamanian" versions preferable. Armed intervention is still a U.S. device for installing loyal politicians as leaders in a number of countries. But the time for aircraft carriers and gunboats has surely passed. In any case, we would like to hope so. As for Libya, the people of that country have declared their determination to defend the September revolution gains at any price. It has on its side the support of the world's progressive forces and the solidarity of the Arab and African states.

Even as these lines were being written, an alarming report has come from Al-Rabitah about a big fire at the pharmaceutical plant there. According to some reports, unfortunately not yet confirmed, an act of sabotage was carried out on the instructions of one of the Western countries' special services. Is this again a stick with which to beat the insubordinate?

Sub-Saharan Africa

Gorbachev Sends Congratulations to Nujoma

LD2003183690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1748 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 20 Mar (TASS)—Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the USSR, sent congratulations to Sam Nujoma, president of the Republic of Namibia, on the occasion of that country's declaration of independence.

The victory of the people of Namibia in the many years of selfless struggle against colonial and racial oppression, in the vanguard of which the party of South-West African People's Organization invariably has been, the congratulations say, is an event filled with deep historical significance: The last colony on the African continent has ceased to exist.

"Soviet people, who all these years have been on the side of Namibian patriots, have lent them aid and support, welcome Namibia's acquiring of freedom. Guided in mutual relations between states by the principles of equality, territorial integrity, freedom of choice, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, the Soviet Union solemnly states that it recognizes the Republic of Namibia as a sovereign independent state and is ready to establish diplomatic relations with it and to exchange diplomatic envoys on the level of embassies," the message stresses.

Mikhail Gorbachev expressed confidence that the Soviet Union and Namibia will continue to develop full-blooded relations in the interests of the peoples of both countries, of peace and international security, and wished the citizens of independent Namibia happiness and prosperity.

Namibia Opposition, RSA Occupation Noted

PM2103094990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[Own correspondent I. Tarutin dispatch: "On Threshold of Freedom"]

[Excerpts] Windhoek—The independence of Namibia, the last colony on the African continent, will be proclaimed at midnight on 20-21 March. Following an illegal occupation by the RSA [Republic of South Africa] lasting many years, the country is acquiring its long-awaited freedom. A new sovereign republic is appearing on the map of the world. [passage omitted]

Elections were held to the Constituent Assembly—the future parliament. SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization] won a convincing victory. It polled 57 percent of the votes and won 41 of the 72 deputies' seats. SWAPO acquired the right to draw up a draft constitution, but a two-thirds majority was needed to approve it. The organization did not have that number of seats in the assembly. So it needed flexibility and the ability to make compromises. And it coped brilliantly with that task. Suffice it to say that the constitution was adopted ahead of schedule—which in turn made it possible to accelerate the proclamation of independence.

Even those openly hostile to SWAPO have been forced to appreciate its considered approach to the basic problems. Sober account has been taken of the realities that have taken shape, even including the maintenance of close economic ties with the RSA for the immediate future. It has been announced that Namibia intends to keep the South African rand as its national currency for two years and to remain in a customs union with the RSA for three years.

To be fair, it must be pointed out too that SWAPO's opponents have not engaged in obstruction or advanced deliberately unacceptable demands and have shown a readiness to seek constructive solutions when disagreements have become apparent. The idea of national reconciliation does not seem unrealizable now, although, of course, the emergence of various difficulties over this question in the future cannot be ruled out.

But, while paying due tribute to the Namibians, it is also necessary to point to the other participants in the settlement. Primarily, of course, the military and civilian personnel of the UN Transitional Assistance Group. They bore a great deal on their shoulders. Endurance, the ability to act in unforeseen circumstances, and professional training were all required. Finally, it simply took courage, considering that many of the men were living under quite difficult field conditions in an unaccustomed, difficult tropical climate.

Pretoria fulfilled the commitments it adopted. Various situations arose during the transitional period, and yet it displayed realism in the end. This was appreciated both by the international community and by the Namibians themselves.

The permanent members of the Security Council and a whole series of countries remote from and close to the south of the Dark Continent made their contribution on Namibia's long path toward independence. Solidarity with the Namibian patriots' struggle in the region and throughout Africa was of tremendous significance.

Many people did what they could to bring this day closer. And now it is here. Happy birthday, independent Namibia!

Reportage on Shevardnadze's African Tour

Arrives in Windhoek

LD2003200190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1835 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Windhoek, 20 Mar (TASS)—E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, arrived here today from Lusaka. He will take part in the ceremonies on the occasion of the declaration of Namibia's independence.

At Windhoek airport Hage Geingob, prime minister in the future government of independent Namibia and Theo Ben Gurirab, foreign minister in this government, met the USSR minister of foreign affairs.

Namibia is the third stage of the nine-day trip of the Soviet minister around countries of Africa. E.A. Shevardnadze visited Angola and Zambia on short working visits. From Windhoek he will leave for Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Nigeria.

In the history of Soviet-African relations this is the first visit to tropical Africa by a head of the Soviet foreign policy department.

Meets With Baker

LD2103083690 Moscow TASS in English 0756 GMT 21 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Prosvetov, Vitaliy Chukseyev, and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Windhoek March 21 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker met here on Tuesday. The two men arrived here to attend festivities marking the proclamation of Namibian independence.

They had a one-on-one conversation that lasted three and a half hours and focused on wide range of international issues and Soviet-U.S. relations.

Shevardnadze and Baker noted with satisfaction the Soviet and U.S. contribution to the creation of a new independent state in Africa. This is a convincing implementation of the course, proclaimed at the Wyoming ministerial, to move the Soviet-U.S. relationship from mutual understand to interaction.

Outstanding regional problems were considered priorities in the implementation of the peacemaking potential of Soviet-U.S. dialogue. Shevardnadze and Baker spoke about the situation in southern Africa, including Angola and Mozambique, as well as in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Some new thoughts were expressed regarding the creation of an atmosphere that will foster the just political settlement and national reconciliation. Hope was expresed that new conditions in South Africa will be conducive to the peaceful dismantling of the apartheid system and to conclusive talks between the government and the opposition. The reform process there must become irreversible.

The two men confirmed their general understanding of the responsibility of the Soviet Union and the U.S. for European stability, taking account of the interests of all states. This responsibility is felt in connection with German reunification, and the two sides' readiness to cooperate in the framework of the "two plus four" mechanism.

The two statesmen discussed all issues raised, in preparation for the June Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in the USA. By mutual agreement the forthcoming meeting will focus on the key unresolved problems of nuclear space weapons and the attainment of progress in other disarmament areas.

In order to prepare the summit meeting properly, another two rounds of full-scale talks will be held between the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state in Washington in early April and in the Soviet Union in May.

Both Shevardnadze and Baker described the frank and substantive talks in Windhoek as timely and useful.

Further on Shevardnadze, Kaunda Talks in Lusaka

LD2003151690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1052 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Lusaka, 20 Mar (TASS)—E.A. Shevardnadze, Politburo member of the CPSU Central Committee and minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, who is on a working visit to Zambia, has been received by President Kenneth Kaunda and has had a lengthy conversation with him.

Both sides expressed satisfaction with the state of Soviet-Zambian ties and contacts, which are developing on the basis laid by M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with K. Kaunda in November 1987 in Moscow. Great significance, stressed the president, is attached to the visit by the USSR minister of foreign affairs in Zambia. This is also attested to by the nature of the Soviet minister's recepton—the leadership of Zambia were virtually all present at the conversation.

Opening the conversation, K. Kaunda spoke about the approval with which the peacemaking activity of the Soviet leadership, led by M.S. Gorbachev, is viewed in Zambia. In his opinion, the Soviet leader's merit consists in the fact that, proceeding from the primacy of common human values, he has initiated a process of overcoming mankind's East-West schism. The task, continued K. Kaunda, is now one of applying the radical changes with regard to north and south, too.

Supporting this argument, E.A. Shevardnadze showed the key significance that overcoming the atmosphere of

confrontation in the international arena has for the search for an answer to the global challenges of the contemporary period, which threaten unpredictable consequences. It is unthinkable to settle the problem of debt and to halt the slide toward ecological catastrophe while continuing to spend colossal funds on a ruinous arms race. And conversely, real progress toward a period of peace will make it possible to achieve results in various spheres which that have seemed impossible only recently. It is by no means an accident that the current profound changes in the south of Africa have coincided with the end of the cold war.

The discussion of the situation in the south of Africa under conditions where Namibia is becoming independent and where positive shifts are taking place took up a considerable part of the Soviet minister's conversation with the president of Zambia. Speaking about the epoch-making significance of the elimination of the system of colonialism on the African continent, K. Kaunda emphasized: The foundations for the acquisition of independence by all former colonies were laid by the 1917 revolution. The African peoples are profoundly grateful to the Soviet Union for this, as well as for the comprehensive aid rendered to them in the liberation struggle.

E.A. Shevardnadze and K. Kaunda conducted a broad review of the situation in various regions of the world from the point of view of ensuring the stability of the international system and using all opportunities for settling the conflict situations that still exist.

E.A. Shevardnadze spoke about the political, economic, social, and national features of implementing the policy of perestroyka in the USSR, describing both their domestic and external aspects. K. Kaunda expressed cordial wishes of success to the Soviet people in making them the impressive program of transformations into a reality.

Reportage on Shevardnadze Southern Africa Tour

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For southern African reportage on the visit to southern Africa by Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze, including his meetings with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Republic of South Africa President F.W. de Klerk and his attendance at the Namibian independence ceremonies, see the Southern Africa and Republic of South Africa sections of the 19 March 1990 and subsequent issues of the Sub-Saharan Africa DAILY REPORT.

Borisov Views Sudan-Libya Integration

LD1203184390 Moscow in English to Africa 1700 GMT 11 Mar 90

[V. Borisov commentary]

[Text] The results of the visit by the Sudanese leader General 'Umar al-Bashir to Tripoli were reflected in an agreement between the Sudan and Libya on integration, which will come into force after it has been ratified by the legislative bodies of both countries. It is proposed that within four years, the political, economic, and military spheres will be completely integrated. Vladimir Borisov comments on this.

The Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, when addressing the representatives of the mass media at the beginning of the year, said the world is moving towards the establishment of a Jamahiriyah. I do not know if it is so simple and easy to resolve the questions of trends developing in the present-day world. However, there is no doubt the regime of the general who came to power in Khartoum in the middle of last year has aimed from the very beginning to turn the Sudan into a theocratic state modelled on the Libyan Jamahiriyah. It is another matter of how real the plan is to create a single Libyan-Sudanese state. It is already being suggested that the plan is hardly likely to be met with sympathy in the Arab world, in the West or in Africa.

The West's attitude to Al-Qadhdhafi's radicalism—and this is the only way it is possible to look at the steps taken by the Libyan leader—has always been negative. For understandable reasons the plan of uniting Libya and the Sudan will be given a hostile reception by its immediate neighbors, Chad and Ethiopia. As to the Arab world, there's every reason to believe this is why General Al-Bashir visited Cairo prior to going to Tripoli.

The assessment of the results of the visit in the Western mass media tended to be polarized, but the general opinion about the talks with the Egyptian president, who is also the present chairman of the Organization of African Unity, Mr. Mubarak, was that they were unsuccessful. There is really no need to add that the numerous attempts to organize something of the kind in the Arab countries of Africa have not shown any practical results. (?Neither) are Arab Libya and Afro-Arabian Sudan insured against such differences.

All the same, [words indistinct] which has a direct and no small influence on the development of the internal and external political (?process), the more so because Khartoum and Tripoli are already planning to set up a political working body which would study the question of integration. The leaders of both countries will be members of the Supreme Council on integration, and a ministerial council will be set up with representatives from 10 key ministries of the Sudan and Libya.

It's clear that regardless of how real unity will be in the future, all the steps being taken by the present Khartoum regime are in the direction in which the Islamic fundamentalists are pushing it. It's by no accident the initiative came from Khartoum. Here it is not a matter of world trends, but a search for a way out of the dead end, the Sudanese military regime has got itself into. Integration with Libya, especially in the military sphere, would strengthen its position in the face of the collective forces of the opposition movement in the Muslim north and the

Christian south. By the way, in the south, where a conflict has been going on for seven years between the rebel Christians and the forces of the central Muslim government of the Sudan, the situation has been changing recently, and is more to the benefit of the rebels.

East Europe

Falin Interviewed on GDR Election Results

LD2003143590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1306 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow (ADN-Corr)—The result of the People's Chamber election in the GDR is a real fact, which in many respects changes the political configuration in the GDR. This has been stated by Head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, Valentin Falin, in Moscow today in an ADN interview. The Soviet stance on the process of the unification of Germany and bilateral relations with the GDR remains unchanged however, as it is based on long-term factors.

Unification and "annexation" [anschluss] are two absolutely different terms, Falin said in response to a question about the Soviet Article 23 of the FRG Constitution. There can be no identical stance regarding these terms. The USSR is for a united Germany, which adequately takes into account the interests of all European peoples—this is, according to Falin, the USSR's position. The Soviet Union is categorically against an "annexation," in whatever form it might take place. This has also been expressed in the latest statement from the USSR Foreign Ministry.

Asked about his assessment of the results of the Prague meeting of Warsaw pact foreign ministers, at which no united position with regard to the procedures for the German-German unification process could be worked out, the expert on German affairs said: The meeting confirmed only one thing, that the Warsaw Pact is an alliance of states that are sovereign and have equal rights, and has certain shades and nuances in the approach to certain international questions.

PRAVDA on 'Sensational' GDR Poll Results

PM2003141790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[Correspondent May Podklyuchnikov dispatch: "GDR: Elections Over"]

[Text] Berlin, 19 Mar—The results of yesterday's elections to the GDR Volkskammer became known late at night. Just after 0200 Petra Bless, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, appeared before the television cameras.

She reported that the Christian Democratic Union had received 40.9 percent of the votes, the SPD [Social Democratic Party] 21.8 percent, and the PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] 16.3 percent. The parties of the right-wing bloc will now have 193 of the 400 seats in the Volkskammer, the SPD 87, and the PDS 65.

The correlation of political forces differs in the country's various Bezirks. Thus, in Thuringia the bloc of right-wing parties received 61 percent of the votes, the SPD 17 percent, and the PDS 10 percent. But in Berlin the right-wingers got just over 20 percent, while the SPD got 33.5 percent and the PDS 33 percent.

The election results are considered sensational both inside and outside the GDR.

Public opinion polls had hitherto shown that the sympathies of the majority of voters were inclining toward the SPD.

The Volkskammer elections have concluded a complex stage in the GDR's life. It began last October with mass demonstrations in Leipzig, and then in other cities, which were held under slogans of the country's renewal and a protest against the erroneous policy of the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. The demonstrators were not coming out against socialism but wanted it to acquire a democratic, human look. Radical political changes occurred in the country under pressure from the civic movement. They were opening up the possibility of embarking on a path of restructuring.

Soon, however, it became noticeable that the organization of mass rallies and demonstrations had passed to other hands. Those who demanded the unification of the two German states came to the fore, seeing this as the only way to overcome the political and economic crisis in which the GDR found itself.

The election campaign lasted two months. The political changes in the country were continuing during this time.

The question of the two German states' unification became the axis of the political struggle. A situation took shape in the GDR which no sovereign state had encountered before. The political forces of another state—the Federal Republic—became the most active participants in the elections. A number of GDR parties received support from the West.

Mindful of the fact that the new parties and public groupings which had arisen in the country did not yet have the material base necessary for political activity, the Volkskammer agreed to their receiving one-off material aid from abroad. In fact, however, FRG politicians began conducting their own election campaign on GDR territory. The leaders of West German parties took to attending their eastern neighbor's election rallies. In all, as was calculated yesterday, they delivered more than 200 speeches in the GDR. Their "one-off" material aid was also summed up—20 million West German marks were spent on the election struggle in the GDR through various channels. Agitation posters, brochures, and duplicating equipment streamed into the republic from outside.

The speeches delivered in the GDR by West German politicians contained many words about "freedom," "unity," "prosperity" and the FRG's readiness to help "compatriots" who have gotten into difficulties. The chief trump card was the proposal to conclude a currency and economic union of the two German states. As can be judged from the election results, a considerable section of the population believed the Western promises and expects from the planned union the rapid resolution of their material problems.

However, specialists warn that the hasty introduction of the West German monetary unit in the GDR could entail serious social misfortunes. In this connection I. Boehme, chairman of the SPD (GDR), remarked yesterday evening: "I fear for the people in our country."

A strong parliamentary opposition will be of tremendous significance for defending the GDR's social achievements and the interests of its working people. It will include PDS deputies. Assessing the results obtained in the elections by the PDS, G. Gysi, its chairman, pointed out that they can be deemed good if you consider the fact that it was opposed by all the other parties and movements, that it was the object of fierce attacks by Western mass media, and that it managed without help from abroad. In addition, it had to combine the election struggle with a profound process of renewal in its own ranks.

The bloc of right-wing parties will henceforth have just under half the deputies' seats in the Volkskammer. In order to ensure a simple majority to adopt the decisions it wants, it needs a coalition. And a majority of two-thirds of the votes will be required in order to ensure a change in the Constitution. In this connection political observers are asking this question: Does this mean that the right-wingers will have to seek an accord with the Social Democrats? With any change in the distribution of forces within the country and in the Volkskammer, the new GDR government will, when taking steps toward uniting the two German states, have to heed the fact that unification must be carried out at a pace and with methods which will make it possible to combine it simultaneously with the creation of new security structures in Europe. No ambiguity in the question of the inviolability of postwar European borders is permissible. The principles formulated by PDS Honorary Chairman H. Modrow—the ability to judge by eye and circumspection—still retain their force.

IZVESTIYA Analyzes GDR Election Results

PM2003140590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Lapskiy dispatch under the general heading "GDR: Vote Counting Ends": "The Victor's Name Is Kohl"]

[Text] Berlin—The first free elections in the GDR took place amid extremely high activeness on the part of the voters. A 10-man delegation from the Council of Europe was invited to supervise the elections. No violations or incidents were recorded. According to Petra Blaess, chairman of the GDR Central Electoral Commission, all possibility of falsification and cheating was ruled out.

The preliminary results of the voting became known late Sunday evening. They amazed both correspondents and leading politicians from both German states at the Palace of the Republic in Berlin. The GDR Christian Democratic Union [CDU] received more than 40 percent of the votes and almost double the number received by the Social Democrats. The "Alliance for Germany," in which the CDU was the leading force, just failed to poll 50 percent of the vote. In response to the question as to how he regards the preliminary results, De Maiziere, chairman of the GDR's CDU, replied that they came as a total surprise to him. Gregor Gysi (PDS) [Party of Democratic Socialism] commented on the results in the following way on television: "Victory has gone to a party which has played no part in the process of democratization since fall 1989." As we can see, those forecasters were right who claimed that we would learn the true victors of the "fall revolution" later. Victory did not fall to the "New Forum," which courageously opposed Honecker's stagnant regime, or "Democracy Now," or to the "United Left," who fought for the GDR as a socialist alternative to the FRG...

The Social Democrats' election defeat—they were forecast outright success a month ago—came as a complete surprise to everyone. (While he was in the Palace of the Republic, Willy Brandt remarked with a cool smile: "Who could have thought a year ago that one in five citizens in the GDR would vote for the Social Democrats?") The moderate, well-considered program for socioeconomic reforms and gradual German unification with consideration for all Europeans' interests seemed more in line with the sentiments of most GDR citizens than the conservatives' slogans. But things turned out differently.

GDR CDU leader De Maiziere told journalists that the future government would be set up on the basis of "the broadest coalition possible." Geisler, deputy chairman of the West German CDU, expressed a similar opinion: The GDR's problems are so great that they cannot be managed any other way.

A coalition, but with whom? A "grand coalition" with the Social Democrats like that which has existed in the FRG for some time? The Social Democratic Party [SPD] is not opposed in principle to a parliamentary alliance with the conservative bloc—provided that the blatantly right-wing "German Social Union," with which the SPD is politically incompatible, is not to be included in it. The "Union of Free Democrats" (liberals), which won just over five percent of the votes, is also willing to enter a coalition with the conservatives.

All the major parties have opposed a coalition with the PDS (which won more than 16 percent of the vote, and more than 32 percent in Berlin—a result that merits

attention!). H. Modrow said that this party could cooperative in a future parliament with the Democratic Peasants' Party of Germany and the Green Party.

So, why did the conservatives win? They exploited to the full the flagrant mistakes made by Honecker's regime. The CDU's election tactics were based on tough, uncompromising criticism of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-PDS. The following slogans prevailed: "No more socialism!" "Freedom instead of socialism!" "No more socialist experiments!" Introducing the masses to these slogans did the Social Democrats palpable damage.

However, the main reason was the outright massive involvement in the election skirmishes of Chancellor Kohl and his comrades in arms. Today's commentary in BERLINER ZEITUNG is simply headlined: "The Victor's Name Is Kohl." The newspaper writes, speaking of the GDR's CDU: "A party that shared government responsibility for 40 years, did not have a chance of winning by its own efforts. Votes given to the Alliance, primarily the old-new GDR CDU, were votes in favor of 'Germany—one Fatherland.' No political force in the GDR demanded the rapid unification of the two German states so insistently."

Regrettably, one has to acknowledge the obvious: Many voters in the GDR believed the promises made by Chancellor Kohl and his ministers that in the event of an Alliance victory a "second German miracle" would soon come along in the GDR. People have grown tired of crisis and lack of confidence in the future, most of them followed those people who promised them immediate salvation...

Primakov, Polish Official Discuss German Issue

LD2003145290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1308 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 20 March. (TASS)—A detailed and sincere exchange of information on the activity of the Soviet Union's and Poland's parliaments took place during a conversation between Yevgeniy Primakov, chairman of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Andrzej Stelmachowski, marshal of the Senate of the Republic of Poland, in Moscow today.

The Soviet side's understanding of the German problem was set forth, and the conviction that a united Germany should not be within NATO was voiced. It was stressed that the logic of confrontation between blocs has never ensured security and never will.

It was specially noted that the immutability and preservation of the western borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia are vitally important for the USSR regardless of what governments are in power in these countries.

SPD's Bahr Charges CDU With GDR Poll Abuses

PM2003113190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[Interview with Egon Bahr, member of the (FRG) Social Democratic Party Presidium and Board, by TASS special correspondent Vyacheslav Kevorkov under the general heading "Country's Future Decided": "At the Last Minute..."; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Berlin, 18 Mar—Egon Bahr, member of the Social Democratic Party [SPD] of Germany (FRG) Presidium and Board, who is visiting Berlin in connection with the election here, gave TASS special correspondent Vyacheslav Kevorkov an interview right after the polling stations had closed.

Question: So, the polling stations closed their doors a few minutes ago. Thus a page has turned in the history of Germany and of Europe as a whole. We will learn the results a little later; however, your opinion of the course of the election struggle in the GDR would be interesting now.

Answer: What I have seen during the time I have spent in the GDR has made me extremely indignant. This was the most sordid election that I have seen in my entire lifetime.

Question: To what are you referring?

Answer: The entire election campaign was transformed into an event managed by West Germany's Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU]. This was a disgraceful action to which no serious political party in the FRG would have stooped. Paid groups of louts tore down or covered up SPD (GDR) posters. Things reached the point where automobiles with Munich registration plates—it is well known that the CSU has its headquarters in Munich—filled the streets of Leipzig and urged people through powerful loudspeakers not to attend the rally where W. Brandt was speaking.

Question: Who witnessed these events?

Answer: W. Brandt saw it all with his own eyes, and he was not the only one.

Question: Are not actions of this kind prohibited in the FRG?

Answer: Categorically prohibited. These groups could only act like that in a country where there is no master or, more precisely, where they felt themselves to be the masters. In small towns in Thuringia and Saxony many well-known members of the SPD or PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] systematically received anonymous letters carrying threats of physical violence. In Sohl one youth who was urging people to vote for the SPD had both his legs broken and was left lying on the square until he was offered assistance. They did not balk at using children either. Juveniles were given Western money to run around homes, circulating pamphlets issued by the

"German Social Alliance"—an offshoot of the West German CSU. This constituted very real psychological terror, Goebbels-style. I repeat that this political contamination has been exported from the FRG. I am sure that such manifestations should be suppressed at their source.

Question: What do you think can explain such extreme manifestations on the part of the CDU/CSU?

Answer: Kohl was terribly afraid that democratic forces would win success in the GDR election, and that is why he acted according to the notorious maxim that the end justifies the means.

Question: To some extent the GDR election was the forerunner of the FRG election. The same factors that will influence the FRG election were at work here. In this connection do you not rule out the possibility of the CDU/CSU's using the same sordid methods during the December election?

Answer: I do not.

Portugalov on United Germany Joining NATO

AU2103094290 Vienna Television Service in German 2100 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Interview with Nikolay Portugalov, CPSU Central Committee expert on Germany and close adviser to Gorbachev, by Raimund Loew in Moscow; date not given—recorded]

[Text] Even recognized experts on Germany in the Soviet Union were surprised and consternated about the outcome of Sunday's [18 March] elections in the GDR. Thus, the expert on Germany of the CPSU Central Committee and close adviser to Gorbachev, Nikolay Portugalov, for example, stated that Moscow had not expected these results. There is disagreement among the Warsaw Pact states as to whether a unified Germany could be member of NATO. Our correspondent in Moscow, Raimund Loew, discussed this issue with Nikolay Portugalov.

[Portugalov] For God's sake, if we speak about neutralization, we speak only about the legal aspect of the word. This does not mean that we want to pull Germany out of the Western alliance system per se. Who would expect a neutral Germany to no longer be part of the EC? I would say that this is a problem that has to be settled between the EC and Germany. For us, neutralization means the description of the state in which—I want to stress this—it becomes completely impossible for the danger of war to emanate from German soil. (words indistinct) I believe that the Americans—I think I can assume that—understand very well—and also the Germans—that this view, this position which favors full NATO membership with certain reservations on the basis of the Genscher plan, which are rather irrelevant. [sentence as heard] The principle of the Western strategists has always been that it is not the intention that is decisive but the objective possibilities.

[Loew] You are speaking of full NATO membership. Does this mean that for the Soviet Union partial membership...

[Portugalov interrupting] You should ask Mr. Baker, the U.S. secretary of state, what he meant when he mentioned in Moscow some kind of association between a future united Germany and NATO a few weeks ago—or maybe one month ago. When he was asked later what he meant by this, he backed down and stated that only full membership is acceptable. I assume that he knew what he was saying.

[Loew] Does this mean that the French example of a political membership...

[Portugalov interrupting] France is no longer the only country like this. Spain and Greece are doing the same thing. You know, the membership of a united Germany in NATO with foreign weapons of mass destruction, mainly nuclear weapons, on German soil—this cannot be acceptable to anybody. And—I must make this very clear—we are quite willing to drastically reduce our troop presence in the near future or to completely withdraw our troops on the basis of reciprocity concerning our troops and nuclear weapons. The United States is not willing to do that. It will certainly have its reasons. However, this should be settled diplomatically. I hope that we will finally achieve a solution.

GDR's Gerlach Sends Greeting to Gorbachev

PM2003143590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[Greetings message under the general heading "Telegrams of Congratulation"]

[Text] To Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, President of the USSR

Esteemed Mr President!

On your election as USSR president please accept sincere congratulations on behalf of the GDR State Council and people and on my own behalf.

May the friendly relations between the GDR and the USSR—relations which are imbued with trust and joint responsibility—continue to develop fruitfully. They will benefit our two countries' peoples and promote the creation of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.

I wish you great successes in this high post, good health, and creative energy.

[Signed] Manfred Gerlach, acting chairman of the GDR State Council

Troop Withdrawals From CSSR Said on Schedule

LD2103092990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0846 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Prague, 21 Mar (TASS)—The latest meeting of authorized representatives of the governments of the CSSR and USSR on questions relating to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia has taken place here.

It was noted that up to 19 March, 54 trains and 11 motor vehicle convoys carrying Soviet troops and weapons had left for the Soviet Union. The schedule for troop withdrawal is being observed.

The authorized representatives examined comments and suggestions made by citizens living in the places where Soviet military units and subunits are stationed. Particular attention was devoted to mutual relations between Soviet servicemen and the local population, to the state of the installations being handed over, and also to questions relating to environmental protection.

Text of Havel Congratulations to Gorbachev

PM2003113590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Undated message from Czechoslovak President Havel to M.S. Gorbachev on his election as President of the USSR]

[Text] Esteemed Mr. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, president of the USSR

Esteemed Mr. Gorbachev! I congratulate you sincerely on your election to the post of President of the USSR. In your person I see a guarantee of the irreversibility of the processes which are under way in the USSR and which are to ensure freedom, democracy, and prosperity for all the nations and ethnic groups, for all the people of your country. I believe that relations between our countries will develop in the spirit of mutual respect, equality, and friendship.

I wish you much strength and optimism in the implementation of your responsible mission.

[Signed] Vaclav Havel, president of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

Havel-Walesa Call for 'Definitive' Borders Noted

PM2003132790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[PRAVDA-TASS roundup report under the general heading: "From the Flow of News"]

[Text] 18 Mar— Great hopes are opening up before Central and Eastern Europe, according to a communique published following a meeting on the Polish-Czechoslovak border between V. Havel, president of Czechoslovakia, and L. Walesa, chairman of the "Solidarity" trade union. Our task, the document points out, is to make these hopes a reality. We must endeavor to finally settle as soon as possible all the regrettable consequences of World War II. Definitive recognition of Europe's existing borders, which no one must ever dispute and which must at the same time become increasingly open, must be an indisputable element in this.

Soviet-Czechoslovak Trade Trends Outlined

PM1603162290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Mar 90 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent S. Vtorushin report under general heading "How We Trade": "USSR-Czechoslovakia: Changes Are Overdue"]

[Text] Prague—"As envisaged in our commitments, commodity turnover between the USSR and the CSSR in 1989 totaled about R12.5 billion," I. Panteleyev, USSR trade representative in the CSSR said. "Commodity deliveries in the course of the year were balanced. However, the size of imports from the CSSR was dependent on the value of exports of Soviet goods, and primarily on the value of energy sources, the prices of which, within CEMA, had a tendency to decrease.

"The structure of Soviet exports last year remained unchanged. Oil, gas, iron ore, and other raw materials made up almost two thirds of the total.

"From the CSSR, as in previous years, our country received machinery and equipment, including equipment for light industry. Consumer goods occupied a significant place in deliveries from Czechoslovakia.

"The main problems in Czechoslovak-Soviet trade were the mutual disruptions in the delivery of goods, the export structure, which has remained unchanged over many years, especially on the Soviet side, the small proportion of productin sharing, and the complexity of settling accounts because of the transferable ruble. Consequently, it is important that the partners should continue the talks which were started recently on going over to calculations in hard currency according to world prices, since in the present conditions this is an important factor determining the benefit of both partners and one of the conditions of increasing the competitiveness of commodities traded between them."

Bulgaria's Lilov on Political, Economic Reforms

90UI0419A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No. 10, 7 Mar 90 p 14

[Interview with Aleksandr Lilov, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Party Council of the Bulgarian Communist Party, by Oleg Prudkov, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA international section editor: "This Complicated Affair of Perestroyka"; date and place not specified; first three paragraphs are LITERATURNAYA GAZETA introduction]

[Text] Aleksandr Lilov responded immediately to the request of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA for an interview. In spite of an extremely busy work load, he received our representative on the eve of a most important event, the plenum of the Supreme Party Council convening the end of February.

Lilov was elected chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Party Council quite recently—2 February—at an extraordinary session of the Bulgarian Communist Party. However, he is a well-known and authoritative figure in the party and in the country. Lilov is deservedly considered a progressive politician and opponent of Zhivkov's pseudo-Marxism. And it is for this reason that in 1983, as secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, he was removed from the Politburo and Secretariat at Zhivkov's initiative.

Lilov obtained his higher education in the field of Bulgarian language and literature. He became a candidate of philological sciences after completing studies at the Moscow Academy of Social Sciences. He defended his doctoral dissertation in the Philosophy Department of Moscow State University. He is a professor and corresponding member of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. In recent years he worked as director of the Institute of Modern Social Theory. Lilov is an intellectual leader of experience. To learn his particular views on Bulgarian perestroyka, we invite the reader's attention to the interview we publish here today.

[Prudkov] Last autumn might be said to have been the stormiest time since the days of the October Revolution. Here in Sofia, under the windows of the Bulgaria Hotel, where I live, rallies and demonstrations take place every day. Yesterday, for example, adherents of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) gathered here. Endlessly they chanted just three phrases—"Democracy," "SDS," and "Down With the Communist Party." There are people in the West who speak about the end of the "Communist experiment." Others are more "modest" in their expression, calling the events which have taken place the collapse of the Stalinist authoritarian-command era. Comrade Lilov, how do you evaluate the situation today in Eastern Europe and in Bulgaria?

[Lilov] If we talk about serious research, the books of Zbigniew Brzezinski for example, we see that these contain rather interesting factual material for us. It would be difficult, however, to consider the theoretical generalizations in these studies sufficiently justified. They are rather strongly ideologized. To a certain extent they are guilty of the very same mistake we made before, when we asserted that the end of imperialism was imminent, that the hour was just about to strike... They should wait until history has accumulated more experience in the realization of socialist ideas. The kind of revolutionary society socialism represents simply cannot be built in half a century. In France, for example, 200 years have passed from the scaffold of revolution to the democratic system of today. True, our experience has not been very successful to date. To formulate the necessary generalizations we must have a rigorous and realistic analysis of the path traveled. We must find a system model where that which is truly socialist is inseparable from the heights of humanity and the loftiest achievements of human civilization.

I believe the ideas we have today regarding the future of socialism will not necessarily be realized over the course of history. I also think the predictions of Brzezinski and other authors are not adequate in view of the trends we are seeing today. It seems to me that history will follow a different path. A close interrelationship among various social realities, formations, and problems is being engendered and developed today, an interrelationship not yet known to mankind. Today we see the questions formulated differently regarding peace, war, the ecology, the rich and the poor, technology, forms of production, and productive forces. All of this will likely determine the shape of our future world. It will chart new paths for the realization of socialist values and principles.

[Prudkov] You want to create in Bulgaria a society based on broad political consensus, on dialogue between various parties and the currents within them. Are the people—brought up under conditions of an authoritarian system—ready for this? What is being used to fashion the political consensus?

[Lilov] Today we know very well what we should not be and what we must not do. There are answers to these questions, prompted by reality. But we do not have a well-founded answer to the question as to what the socialist society will look like, the society which replaces the totalitarian regime.

We have already formed the concept that the party is following a course toward democratic socialism. One of the paths leading to construction of the new socialist society is political pluralism, without a doubt. There can be no democracy without this. We must create conditions for developing a genuine pluralism which are not limited to the framework of the party itself on the basis of some single idea. Pluralism will grow from the interests of various social groups which have a practical place in society. It is these interests which are producing the many parties we observe today in Bulgarian society. And the party sees no variant other than the creation of a democratic society and democratic political system, no way other than the search for common dialogue with all political forces, constructive dialogue with all who are striving to build a democratic Bulgaria, to build a country with a developed and progressive economy, to provide benefits for all members of society, humanize all spheres of our life, establish a law-governed state, etc.

We do not present the question of political dialogue and consensus only on the basis of socialism. We are seeking a broader base for discussion. As far as our party is concerned, it will always work to defend the tenets of socialism. We arrived on the scene in order to fight for it. We have no other purpose. We will therefore attempt to attract as many people as possible to this idea—the more

the better. But there exist common human values as well as socialist values. It is on this basis that constructive dialogue can be developed.

Not long ago, at the end of last year, there was a moment when Bulgaria found herself on the brink of grave crisis as a result of the gross errors committed by the previous regime. We are talking about the situation of the Turkish speaking population. The smell of blood was in the air then. There was danger of conflict. Consensus allowed us an escape from this dangerous development of events.

[Prudkov] Do you think the edge of this sharp issue has been blunted?

[Lilov] Yes, but the problem will not be solved quickly. Common national interest prevailed in this instance, the interests of all the people. It is an example that shows political consensus is possible, that all political forces can be united... We introduced a package of political initiatives at a plenum of the Supreme Party Council. One of these was the proposal to conclude an agreement among all parties concerning peaceful transition to a democratic society. We are hoping to achieve a consensus so that we can avoid conflicts, preclude what occurred so tragically in Romania, and ensure forward movement toward the achievement of radical political reform through peaceful means and stable conditions. In view of all this we remain realists. We are striving for a full consensus on major common national issues and for constructive dialogue on other questions. Consensus is desirable, but the most important thing is that there be thoughtful, alternative ideas.

[Prudkov] There are several streams of thought within the Communist Party, one of which is the "Path to Europe." Its adherents propose that Western parliamentary democracy be taken as a model. How do you feel about this?

[Lilov] We have a great many movements today—both inside and outside the party. Many political slogans are being promoted, many platforms proposed. There is even the concept of returning to capitalism, professed by the Union of Democratic Forces. Our "Path to Europe" stream sees something in certain of the European developed democracies which we should aspire to achieve. I believe we must adopt everything of value which civilization has created, including civilization in Europe—and perhaps primarily there.

The socialist countries are not just a cemetery of mistakes and distortions. Values have been established in them which do not exist in the West. We should all go out and search for ourselves, without making a fetish of any of the existing models. The countries of Northern Europe are geographically small, but much can be gleaned there in the sphere of social politics. They have created institutions, found forms, and allocated resources providing for children's care, education, health care for the sick, crippled, and elderly, so as to narrow the social distance between various segments of society, to remove the very rich and the very poor. But we cannot mechanically transfer all of this to Bulgaria. A certain stage of development is required in productive forces, traditions, and political culture.

We must open ourselves up to the modern world entirely—our thinking, our society, our economy more so, and technology most of all, because we greatly lag behind. Without Europe, without Japan, without America, we will be unable to resolve our technology problems. And I do not see anything terribly frightening or shameful in this...

[Prudkov] Does this mean that Bulgarian foreign policy is oriented on the West more than was the case previously?

[Lilov] The Soviet Union and Bulgaria are part of Europe. And each attempt to separate them from Europe is dictated by mercenary aims. I would not be able to imagine a European culture without Dostoyevskiy, Tolstoy, Bulgakov, or your art. I could not imagine a European market without the economic expanse and boundless market of the Soviet Union. I could not imagine European science without Soviet scientific potential. Thus, I am for a genuine Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals. This is one of the greatest concepts of the century. Bulgaria must participate properly in European construction and occupy a suitable place in it—not somewhere in the basement or attic.

[Prudkov] It is evident that radical reform, economic reform, will be necessary for this, and such matters are presently being discussed and argued. What does this mean in your situation? Earlier you mentioned excessive ideologizing in Brzezinski's books. Perhaps we also are distracted too much by ideology in economics at a time when we must be solving purely economic problems?

[Lilov] Yes, I think so. I believe ideology must be taken out of the framework of economics. Economics should be guided by economic considerations alone. For socialism, everything which delivers economically is good—everything which produces benefits effectively, in sufficient quantity, of high quality, and at today's level. In my view, this is the only criterion of economic reform. We must not create ideological prejudice with regard to one form or another of organizing the economy. I don't know how it is with you, but there is some resistance here to the development of economic initiative. We are very afraid that people will become more well off. We have some deep conviction that poverty is a synonym for socialism. No one gets annoyed or angry because we are all poor, but it is noticed very quickly and declaimed when people use their own minds or effort to become richer, when they have a better house and one or two cars...

[Prudkov] You know, this is very similar to the situation in the Soviet Union, with our cooperatives, individual labor activity, etc.

[Lilov] I don't think you can have a rich state in which poor people live. We must overcome this kind of

thinking and encourage those who show initiative, who earn a lot of money by virtue of their labor and enterprising ability. We have our work cut out for us in order to achieve a different understanding of things.

[Prudkov] Following World War II, Bulgaria accepted the Soviet model of building socialism under Stalin's dictate. Does the economic structure which has taken shape conform to the country's natural conditions, resources, and traditions? I am told that industrial facilities constructed during the period of the command-administrative system are inactive or produce goods which have no market. 80 percent of your industry is "Group A," and only 20 percent "Group B."

[Lilov] True.

[Prudkov] But conditions are ideal in your country for the development of agriculture. Does the reform provide for any change in Bulgaria's economic structure?

[Lilov] I believe this is Bulgaria's greatest and most significant problem. The existing structure does not suit us, and not only for the reasons you have stated—it lags dangerously behind modern trends. The leading progressive branches of the world economy are being poorly developed in our country. We need a new structure, a modern one which is suited to our particular capabilities. But this is a complicated matter and requires time. Major errors were made, libertarianism permitted. Gigantic machine-building plants were built, like those in Radomir and Ruse for example, where nuclear equipment is produced which has no market. We are not competitive and our enterprises are therefore unprofitable. In essence, when they did the construction they buried billions in the ground. And now we need hundreds of millions in subsidies. Tens of thousands of people work there.

We need to develop branches of industry which require less metal, because we don't have that in Bulgaria, less energy because we don't have that in Bulgaria. And we need greater use of intellect, because Bulgaria could look better than it does at present in this sphere. We intend to develop agriculture because our villages are in a very serious condition. This is one of the paradoxes of totalitarian socialism, especially that of the last years of the Zhivkov regime. Production of grain, wine-growing, and wine-making suffered very heavily as well.

[Prudkov] Apparently the same misfortune which befell Russia has befallen your country. We see a loss of peasant heritage, and it would probably be difficult to return people to the village.

[Lilov] Yes. The country is very quickly—I would say spontaneously—undergoing urbanization. The structure of the rural population is most unfavorable. The average age is more than 50 years. New agrarian reform provides land to those who will work it, under a pricing policy which will interest city-dwellers. If such a city-dweller can earn 1,000 lev per month in the village, why would he not go there? And there are isolated instances of this. But we see other problems here as well. We have to get things going in the production of small-scale agricultural equipment, provide for its servicing, make it available. Presently this is very expensive. Then we must tie the producer directly into the markets—domestic and foreign.

Of course, we do not intend to alter either the nature of our system or our strategy. Yet we wish to create realistic conditions advantageous not only for ourselves, but for Western capital as well. This does not in any way imply that all this will take place at the expense of our relations with the socialist countries. Present ratios will of course change. However, our main support will remain economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

[Prudkov] Is the participation of foreign capital envisaged in restoring the Bulgarian economy, and if so, to what extent?

[Lilov] Truly, we will not succeed in accomplishing reform without the participation of such capital. We need it in various forms—financial credits, investments, joint enterprises, technology access. But of course the West is not so noble or disinterested as to be guided by economic considerations alone. Assistance will be provided depending on specific changes in each socialist country. Mr. Baker visited recently and explained this to us intelligently, but rather clearly—if not to say crudely.

[Prudkov] Do you see any prospects for continuing and developing CEMA?

[Lilov] Yes, if it reforms itself radically and stays in keeping with the reforms taking place in our two countries. It is important today to find out how to do this. There is a great divergence in interests.

[Prudkov] Doesn't it seem to you that renewal of CEMA should take place using EEC experience and its high level of integration?

[Lilov] Yes, we must ponder over why such a level of integration has been achieved in Western Europe today. There is nothing like it in the East—we see bias and disintegration. This is an important fact which demands thorough analysis.

[Prudkov] Perhaps it was brought about by the successful technological revolution in the West?

[Lilov] To a certain extent, probably so. But it is also likely to be due to the economic development of these countries, which has reached the point that they cannot develop on a national basis alone. Objective processes will not allow it. These countries are so economically intertwined that a question arises as to the bounds of sovereignty. Western Europe is overcoming great barriers, is far more contemporary than we and, we might say, more socialist as well.

[Prudkov] You know, our newspaper printed an article last year entitled "What System Does the United States Belong To?"...

[Lilov] I read it—it made a very strong impression on me. Some interesting facts are cited in it—the number of stockholders, for example. There are 47 million stockholders in the United States, and only 1,500 of the very largest are wealthy individuals. Here you see where this middle class has appeared, whose existence, following Marx, we did not recognize.

[Prudkov] What effect, in your view, will the unification of Germany have on the common European process?

[Lilov] We all thought this was something in the distant future. But suddenly it turns out it is a question of today. The changes taking place there are so abrupt and filled with such potential that it would be very difficult today to comprehend, weigh, and find the correct solution necessary for creating a stable, peaceful Europe. I believe that German reunification is inseparable from the unity of Europe, and that every divergence from this is fraught with the possibility of untold consequences. A united Germany, a powerful country, an economic giant with tremendous potential, might yield to temptation and pose certain questions, present claims of one sort or another which affect the interests of Europe. Such possibilities will no longer exist within the framework of the common European process.

[Prudkov] You are a professional man of letters and a critic. You have written many books and articles on literature. The program of the Communist Party talks about the unification of labor and intellect. This is an entirely new formula for Bulgaria, and not just for Bulgaria. We know that Zhivkov kept the intelligentsia on a short leash, if we can use this expression... How do you see the role of the writer today?

[Lilov] One of the greatest sins of the former regime consists of the fact that it pursued an incorrect cultural policy. During the last years it even headed towards confrontation with the intelligentsia, using methods of physical and moral repression on the one hand, and corruption on the other. And both of these paths were equally dangerous. It is the task of perestroyka to change this incorrect policy. Without the intelligentsia it is impossible to build a democratic, socialist society. It determines social consciousness, generates ideas, liberates minds, and humanizes customs. The intelligentsia must lead society through purification. Neither the party nor ideology can replace it in this function. We need a Bulgarian Likhachev, Sakharov, Sagdeyev. Our party has beautiful traditions which have existed up until recently. Like your party, ours was created by the greatest intellects. Even during the time of the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia was with us and not with the palace. And we are very happy that today it is returning anew. I believe that representatives of our intelligentsia have not lost faith in the party. Of course, there exists disappointment, but it is a disappointment in actuality and not ideas. Even people who yesterday were the ringleaders of new formations, clubs, etc., are now coming to us again. Some have even become members of the party leadership. And I am very happy that outstanding names appear alongside us.

[Prudkov] Your prediction for the coming elections—they will be held in May?

[Lilov] By law—yes. But we see very active discussion taking place right now. Our opposition believes that elections in May are not to its advantage, insofar as it is still not organized to the necessary degree. They need time. Our party does not want to put things off. The problems of Bulgarian development require solutions, and the sooner the better. But a new parliament and strong government are necessary to effect this. Therefore, we believe it is impossible to wait until the end of the year. Presently we are proposing that the elections be conducted in June. In addition, we propose they be conducted entirely freely. In order to do this, to guarantee it, we will invite as guests representatives of the European Parliament and Council of Europe, representatives from the Soviet Union, FRG, France, Britain, Italy, Finland, and Austria. They will not be here in observer status. That would damage the people's dignity and the sovereignty of the country. They will have the status of guests of Bulgaria. And it is our government that will invite them. They may travel all around the country so as to be convinced that the elections are truly free. I predict that if our party does not make political mistakes, it will win. All the same, the elections are rather complicated. We still have not gotten over disappointment and dissatisfaction with the former regime. We too need time. Everything is possible. But our position is clear. And if some kind of surprise awaits us in the elections, we will calmly accept the will of the people.

[Prudkov] Now, will the diverse streams within the party appear together for the elections?

[Lilov] Yes.

[Prudkov] Are you presently changing the party structure?

[Lilov] Yes. This is also an initiative in our package. We are proposing that the parliament pass a law which would ban the existence of organizations of political parties at enterprises—the present crisis is pretty severe even without this. And if the enterprises enter the arena of this conflict—with our parties already numbering over 20—and all these parties bring their own structures to the enterprises, industrial production will find itself in an exceedingly difficult predicament.

[Prudkov] So, at present there are no primary party organizations at the enterprises? But what about ties between the party and the masses, the influence of the party?

[Lilov] We believe the party will not go away. It will not abandon its social base. We are not that naive. But we want to organize party organizations outside the enterprises, on the principle of territoriality. They can also be established under appropriate territorial committees. Or in the form of clubs of communists of a given enterprise. Thus they will maintain ties with the working class and express its interests as before—but without interfering in management of the economy.

[Prudkov] Are party committees being preserved on the level of commune or oblast?

[Lilov] Only on the commune level. There will also probably be country-wide changes in state structures. Oblast, the current administrative unit, has turned out to be impracticable. But this is a very complex question. We do not wish to decide it quickly. It must be pondered carefully. And then we will go forward with a proposal as to which structures are best for the government of society and the state. We will then probably adapt our party structure to it somehow...

[Prudkov] I went to a rally on Sunday. A couple of bearded men were standing in the square near the Aleksandr Nevskiy Church, each holding a placard. Written on one of them was "Tsar Simeon—Last Chance for Democracy." And on the other—"We Demand Regular Television Broadcasts of Tsar Simeon." What is this—political joviality?

[Lilov] I don't think the problem of the monarchy has any great significance in our political life. And there are no significant social forces behind it.

[Prudkov] A national roundtable was created as the basic means of conducting dialogue between all political forces in Bulgaria. Has its work been interrupted?

[Lilov] No, it is continuing to work. Our package has a special document concerning the work of the roundtable. We believe we must make it a common political forum for all of Bulgaria, at which we will discuss basic problems. We must raise the level of delegation leaders to the top party leadership and establish working subcommittees in which experts of various parties discuss matters, develop possible concepts and alternative solutions. The future roundtable must think less about television cameras and microphones, and more about delving into Bulgaria's problems.

[Prudkov] What else would you like to say as we end our interview?

[Lilov] I would like to extend my wish that LITERATURNAYA GAZETA continue to enjoy the great popularity it currently enjoys in Bulgaria and in the world. And I hope it continues to participate so actively and fruitfully in perestroyka in the Soviet Union. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA has done a great deal for perestroyka in Bulgaria as well, and I am not referring to its significance for literature. The publication has always been a major factor in the development of Soviet literature. It has acquainted us with such a number of new names and creative works that it has not just enriched our cultural life, but has expanded our spiritual horizons, our vision and understanding of culture.

Bulgarian Premier Defends Reforms, Pact, CEMA

PM2103093990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Mar 90 Single Edition p 7

[Interview with A. Lukanov, chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, by APN Correspondent A. Kuranov: "The World Is Becoming More United"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Sofia—On the eve of a working visit to the USSR, A. Lukanov, chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, gave an interview to your APN correspondent at SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's request.

[Kuranov] Do you consider the pace of the political and socioeconomic changes in Bulgaria the optimum one?

[Lukanov] Around four months have passed since the transformations began. I would not say that this has been the optimum pace, and hardly anyone else would claim that either. Nevertheless, in depth and scale the changes have been very significant. So when people talk about a slow pace and say that Bulgaria differs from other East European countries by the somewhat protracted nature of the processes of transformation, I would not entirely agree. After all, in our country a multi-party system already actually exists, democracy is developing, a decision has been taken to hold elections in the very near future, and socioeconomic reform programs are being prepared.

In brief, we try to show initiative all the time. But it cannot be denied that there is opposition to that.

What we really hope for is civilized opposition. And a concern for the peaceful course of change becoming a concern really common to all forces.

We very much need a certain period—a few years rather than months—to create a new political culture so as to become used to life in a truly democratic society. And until that happens we must abide by certain rules and norms so as to prevent the nation from being exposed to the danger of fratricide.

[Kuranov] As premier of a country belonging to the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, how do you see the future of those organizations?

[Lukanov] I am not one of those who have recently been predicting the demise of CEMA. On the contrary, I am convinced that our countries need it, because we are linked by profound economic mutual relations of a decisive, structural nature. The destruction of those ties would be excruciatingly painful for every CEMA member.

In short, I categorically favor the preservation of CEMA. But only on the condition that there is a major reform of the basic cooperation mechanism. We need to put into practice the rules that govern the development of the whole world economy.

The Warsaw Pact is needed to guarantee stability and peace in Europe. Bulgaria intends to continue taking an active part in its work. Although, here, too, of course, there must be changes and renewal linked to the general development of European processes.

At the new stage of the world community's development, these general human values are not just a fine slogan. They dominate and unite people. The world is gradually becoming more united, more integrated.

Soviet-Bulgarian Trade Developments Assessed

PM2003152690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Special correspondents L. Zhmyrev and A. Krushinskiy report: "Good Friendship Is Accurate Bookkeeping. The New Frontiers of USSR-Bulgarian Cooperation"]

[Excerpts] Sofia, Moscow—The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and Bulgaria was concluded 18 March 1948, and its provisions were consolidated later by a second treaty, signed 12 May 1967. Behind the text of these documents are plants, electric power stations, whole sectors of industry created in a spirit of fraternal collaboration, reciprocal deliveries of raw materials, equipment, and consumer goods. Many problems of cooperation, however, have remained unresolved, and at the present stage, life is setting us new, more complex tasks. [passage omitted]

According to many indicators, Bulgaria leads other countries in cooperation with the USSR. For example, it was Bulgaria that pioneered the establishment of joint enterprises and firms with us. As far back as fall 1985 Soviet-Bulgarian associations were begun in the sphere of engineering by ZMM [expansion unknown] (Sofia) and "Krasnyy Proletariy" (Moscow) and by Ivanovo and "Beroe" (Stara Zagora). Forty-nine joint enterprises and more than 70 international associations, laboratories, design bureaus, and so forth have been set up between the USSR and Bulgaria. More than 500 pairs of Soviet and Bulgarian enterprises and organizations have established direct links.

In short, the view from the outside is a good one. But how do things stand in the workplaces themselves?

....A furniture factory in the municipality of Vrubnitsa in the Bulgarian capital. The director of the enterprise, T. Tanchev, says that the first furniture deliveries to the USSR began as far back as 1951. Now the volume of exports has reached 8 million leva a year, and furniture is dispatched to 200 different addresses. More than a third of all deliveries are addressed to the USSR—to Baku, Tbilisi, Barnaul, Yoshkar-Ola, and dozens of other cities.

"What worries us most of all are delays in the delivery of furniture to customers through the fault of Soviet transport workers," Tanchev says. "In your country there are strikes, but how are we Bulgarians to blame? After all, we are paid according to sales of our output, and it is standing in railcars in sidings!"

"The bureaucratic machine gets in the way a lot," adds the factory party organizer Ivan Pavlov, joining the conversation. "We have been unable for more than three years now to break into the Soviet market with new ranges of furniture. They just cannot agree on prices. We know that you have a furniture shortage, we offer 2,000 bedroom suites to 'Raznoexport,' and they reply: 200, and not one more!"

....A visit to the well-known firm "Elektron," which specializes in the production of radiocommunications technology in the Bulgarian capital, generates contradictory feelings.

Firm leader I. Ivanov and N. Pokrovnichki, director of a leading institute, told us that, on last year's results, productivity at the firm grew by 33 percent. But here is the problem: They stopped receiving orders from the USSR, whereas in previous years, deliveries there accounted for 30 to 50 percent of the total. The reason? Radio equipment bought from our Bulgarian partners turned out to be too expensive for the Soviet client. Prices were two to three times higher than on the equivalent Soviet items.

While it is a matter of the exchange of ideas and developments with Soviet specialists, everything is fine. But when it comes to putting them into practice, then the final cost of radio stations of Bulgarian production is several times higher than that of Soviet radio stations. Hence the high prices.

A difficult process of lowering output costs, agreeing prices, and so forth is in prospect.

Figuratively speaking, in the spirit of the market principles now being introduced in both the USSR and Bulgaria, our cooperation is also going over to economic accountability.

Hungarian-USSR Trade Declines, Balance Widens

PM1603151190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Mar 90 Second Edition p 7

[Own Correspondent V. Gerasimov article under the general heading "How We Trade": "USSR-Hungary: Alarming Disproportion"]

[Text] Budapest—In recent years the value of Soviet exports to Hungary has been constantly falling, from 4.6 billion rubles [R] in 1987 to R4.5 billion in 1988 and R4.1 billion last year. The reasons? The fall in world

prices for energy sources and current Soviet economic difficulties. To prevent an imbalance in bilateral trade the Hungarian side is also reducing the volume of its deliveries: from R5.1 billion in 1987 to R4.9 billion in 1988 and R4.7 billion last year. Total trade turnover in 1989 fell by 7 percent.

Energy sources form the basis of Soviet exports to Hungary—more than 70 percent of all deliveries. Machinery and equipment make up 15 percent. They include VAZ [Volga Truck Plant] vehicles, agricultural equipment, and machine tools. There is a traditional market here for clocks, watches, and photographic equipment, too. Some 46 percent of Hungarian deliveries to the Soviet Union are made up of Ikarus buses, river boats, cranes, communications equipment, medical equipment, electronic goods, and electric lamps. Consumer goods provide 17 percent and food 15 percent. Medicines make up a high proportion.

The 1989 final balance of payments figure was planned to produce a R170 million surplus for Hungary but because of the imbalance in commodity supplies and the increased flow of Soviet visitors and tourists it actually reached R782 million in the Hungarian Republic's favor.

Hungary, which has been experiencing economic difficulties, has been consequently taking economic sanctions to prevent the further increasing of the imbalance in bilateral relations. The ruble has been devalued by 5 percent against the forint and exports are strictly linked to reciprocal deliveries. Rubles earned by enterprises above the plan target are not exchanged by the national bank but are now being sold in a special currency market. Subsidies on ruble-earning exports have been reduced. As a result a number of Hungarian enterprises are refusing to export to the USSR—there is no benefit in it, it is unprofitable. For example, they have stopped exporting poultry products and canned meat.

Hungarian-Soviet economic relations, based on unrealistic transfer rubles, were on the brink of severe crisis. The solution to the crisis is seen in switching to payments in freely convertible currency at world prices. In that event the Soviet Union will immediately become a creditor: Hungary's "debt" will increase by 1.5 billion-1.8 billion dollars a year. A search for mutually acceptable compromises to resolve this problem is now under way.

Because the Hungarian surplus has continued rising since the beginning of the year, Hungary's Ministry of Trade introduced a more rigorous new system of licenses for ruble-earning exports on 25 January: The volume of exports will be fixed according to the results of each quarter depending on the fulfillment of deliveries.

Old Guard Reform 'Pioneers' Cede Assembly Role

PM2103092390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Mar 90 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent V. Gerasimov dispatch under general rubric "From the Scene of Events": "Down the Parliamentary Ladder. Last Session for 'Kadar-Era' Deputies"]

[Text] Budapest—It was a special and at the same time a sad session of the National Assembly. Special, because the results of five years of work were being summed up. New incumbents of the House of the Nation, which is how Hungarians refer to their parliament, will take up their places in the semicircle of wooden seats from the end of March, after nationwide elections. It was sad because it was the last session. And the "Kadar era" deputies were leaving with a sense of dissatisfaction because, despite the magnitude of what has been achieved, it seemed that much more should have been done.

"Many people feel," Prime Minister M. Nemeth said addressing the session, "that neither parliament nor government has lived up to their expectations.

"True, we have not fulfilled impossible demands, we have not created the potential for the growth of material welfare and complete social security, and we have not defused the tensions which have built up over the past 40 years... However, we have implemented the historic behest of the times, and in a certain sense we have achieved more than was expected of us... We have changed the model of society, we have succeeded in proving that the path of constitutional revolution is possible, and we have created guarantees for its development."

I remember well the Sunday in June 1985 when the multi-seat [mnogomandatnyy] elections were held. I remember well how our newspapers tried to avoid using those very terms "multi-seat" and "multi-candidate." Around 94 percent of the citizens entitled to vote came to the ballot boxes at that time to elect between two and five representatives, in some districts from as many as 35 people on a nationwide list. This is how the "current" parliament came into being. I will also cite the following figures: 63 percent of the deputies had been elected for the first time, 77 were members of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party].

The reforms set in motion on the MSZMP's initiative were implemented by the parliamentarians consistently and "apace." Between 1985 and 1988 44 laws were passed. During the period since 1988 through the last session 100 laws were passed! Despite the attacks launched against the deputies and against the goverment by opposition parties getting carried away in the heat of the election campaign in recent months, the breakthrough and perestroyka were legislatively implemented

by the "old guard" in peaceful and constructive fashion. Their contribution to Hungarian history is unquestionable.

Last year only about 10 deputies were recalled. They were replaced by members of the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats. Parliament became a multi-party body. Great changes were introduced in the political structure of the corps of deputies and its proportions by the MSZMP-MSZP Congress held in October of last year.

The arrival of the "new boys" from the opposition parties added heat to the discussions and debates.

At times the government was hanging by a threat. The opposition accused the MSZP and MSZMP groups of "having failed to break with the bolshevist policy." I am reminded of this as I watch them leave the parliament building because they were the pioneers, as it were, in instilling correct political behavior and standards. They bore the brunt of the attacks. The representatives of the five to eight parties, from among the twelve parties which have now gained leading positions in the election campaign, who will take their places will have an example to follow. But will they want to?

"In the future law and order, legality, and genuine democracy will prevail in the country," M. Nemeth said hopefully.

But the country's acting President M. Szuros, who also addressed the last session, warned nonetheless against the danger of ending up in a historical impasse should the system that has now been rejected be replaced by another similar one, by another dictatorship.

The wide ornamental staircase of the House of the Nation sweeps upward with its white marble columns, its broad red carpet, its fine golden candelabras, and its strapping, solemn guards standing as if rooted. Deputies were coming down the staircase, relaxed, bidding farewell to each other, exchanging visiting cards. A few of them will mount this staircase again to get to the vaulted hall with its 27-meter dome. The red star above its outer "shell" has been removed. Yes, other incumbents of the House of the Nation will arrive. New times will break. Let us describe them as turbulent. In my opinion, this is as yet unavoidable.

Yugoslav President Congratulates Gorbachev

PM2103100790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Message from Ante Markovic, chairman of the SFRY Federal Assembly, to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev under the general heading: "Congratulations to the USSR President"]

[Text] To USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev

Esteemed Comrade President,

I am sincerely glad of this opportunity to congratulate you on your election as president of the USSR. I am convinced that in this supreme state post you will fully promote the further development of democratic reforms in the Soviet Union, along with the strengthening of trust and cooperation in international relations.

I greatly appreciate the understanding and support which you are affording to the successful development of Yugoslav-Soviet cooperation and the strengthening of friendship between our countries and peoples.

We wish you great success in your activity in this highly responsible post, good health, and personal happiness.

[Signed] Ante Markovic, president of the SFRY Federal Assembly.

State of Trade With Yugoslavia Summarized

PM1603153190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Mar 90 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent Ye. Fadeyev dispatch under the general heading "How We Trade": "USSR-Yugoslavia: Good Prospects"]

[Text] Belgrade—Despite all the difficulties, 1989 was a good year for cooperation between us, Soviet trade representative I. Khramtsov said. Commodity turnover ceased its decline in 1987-1988 and showed a tendency to increase in 1989. The volume of trade between our countries rose by three percent in 1989 in comparison with 1988. Moreover, the SFRY supplied the USSR with additional consumer goods for freely convertible currency to the tune of $426 million. Thus commodity turnover between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia totaled $6.3 billion last year.

As a positive factor, I would point out the increase in Soviet exports of machinery and equipment. In comparison with 1988 there was a 12.5-percent increase in these exports. Another favorable element is that we signed a protocol in November 1989—in advance for the first time—for 1990.

Raw materials form the bulk of our deliveries to Yugoslavia. They include oil, diesel fuel, fuel oil, coking coal, "Lada" automobiles, nonferrous metals, ferrous metallurgical and chemical output, and cotton. From the SFRY our country receives tools and lines for the automobile industry, equipment for the food and light industries, and also consumer goods. We also receive considerable amounts of medicines and detergents.

Unfortunately, last year it did not prove possible to stop our great debt to the SFRY increasing. By the end of December 1989 it totaled $1.65 billion.

There are considerable problems in our trade and economic ties. The main one being the structure of commodity turnover. We have reached the limits of our capabilities for supplying raw material goods to Yugoslavia and machines and equipment still represent a

small fraction of Soviet exports. I would also cite the reduction in the amount of investment cooperation with the USSR, the preservation of the clearing form of transaction, and the inadequate development of cooperation ties and such forms of cooperation as the creation of joint ventures.

Albanian Aide's Visit to Bulgaria Reported

PM2103112790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Important Stage of Cooperation"]

[Text] Sofia, 17 Mar—The practical acceleration of the dialogue between Bulgaria and Albania can be expected in the very near future. B. Dimitrov and R. Malile, the two countries' foreign ministers, declared this at a news conference held here Friday [16 March]. Malile was on an official visit to Bulgaria.

The leader of Bulgaria's foreign policy department pointed out that this visit was an important stage in the development of bilateral cooperation and confirmed both countries' readiness to include new spheres of social life in it. In the economy this presupposes a broader transition to stable forms of collaboration, including the creation of joint projects. Ties will also be developed between the two countries' parliaments.

R. Malile emphasized that during the talks special attention was devoted to the real prospects for the development of relations between Albania and Bulgaria.

West Europe

Gorbachev Congratulates New Italian Party Leaders

LD2003173490 Moscow TASS in English 1636 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev cordially congratulated Italian Communist Party General Secretary Achille Occhetto and Chairman of the Italian Communist Party Central Committee Aldo Tortorella today on the occasion of their election to the top party posts.

He wished them success in their activities for the good of the Italian people, in the interests of democracy and socialism.

FRG Bundestag Chairman Opposes Lithuanian Move

LD2103122190 Moscow TASS in English 1205 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] New York March 21 TASS—Rita Suessmuth, chairman of the FRG Bundestag, objected to Lithuania's secession from the Soviet Union and backed the Soviet Federation.

"I believe it is a bad idea to return to nineteenth century parcellation, that is to small national states outside federal structures," she told journalists at the New York headquarters of the Institute for East-West Security Studies.

Commenting on events in Lithuania, Suessmuth said that the process had reached a critical point. "We do not know what the final reaction of the Soviet leadership will be," she said. "Gorbachev implied that Lithuania's secession from the Soviet Union would not solve the problem. I believe granting maximum autonomy to Soviet Republics within the federal state would be a way out of the predicament, if it's not too late."

"In any case," Suessmuth said, "I sincerely hope the problem will be settled through political dialogue."

FRG Politician Opposes Lithuanian Secession

PM2003131590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS correspondent N. Kalintsev dispatch: "Separatism Complicates Perestroyka. Bundestag Deputy on the Lithuanian Leadership's Actions"]

[Text] Bonn, 18 Mar—The Lithuanian leadership's separatist aspirations create obstacles in the way of peaceful European development and are a serious blow to perestroyka in the Soviet Union. C. Ewen, Bundestag deputy for the Social Democratic Party of Germany, voiced this opinion in conversation with TASS correspondent N. Kalintsev.

The policy of glasnost and perestroyka, he declared, has led to a new boost for peaceful development in Europe. In accordance with the Helsinki Final Act and the UN Charter, it has created additional opportunities for the peoples' self-determination—which fact is undoubtedly to the credit of Mikhail Gorbachev. Within the framework of this process it has become possible to evaluate differently the chances of achieving German unity. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have become more independent, although they remain members of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, the equilibrium of forces in Europe which has taken shape in the postwar period will not be upset one-sidedly. That will happen, however, if Lithuania exercises its right to self-determination and really secedes from the Soviet Union. Particularly as it is not yet clear how it will order its foreign and defense policy. The steps taken by Lithuania raise additional problems for all Europeans, and precisely at a time when a serious discussion about arms reductions is being conducted at the Vienna and other talks. This process cannot be allowed to be disrupted because of nationalist—at least, this is how it is seen from the FRG—aspirations in one country.

A process of rapprochement among states and effacing of national borders is taking place within the EC framework. Economic and political ties are strengthening, while the cultural distinctiveness of each nation and region is invariably preserved. The peoples' national features will not be eroded even in a united Europe—

governmental and intergovernmental programs are being adopted to ensure that. There will continue to be a diversity of languages, religions, customs, and traditions on the continent.

Such political and economic development, combining the joint existence of union republics within the framework of a single state with the preservation of the national distinctiveness and culture of individual peoples and nations, could be an acceptable option for the Soviet Union. Full cultural autonomy with elements of economic independence or even a revision of federative relations on a new basis, with a guarantee of the republics' independence within the framework of the union, appear more expedient than their secession from it. At the present crucial time for the Soviet Union it is necessary to gather all forces and mobilize all economic resources so that all citizens feel the positive influence of perestroyka. Right now is a time when separatist actions merely complicate this process and certainly do not aid it. I would like to hope that moderate forces in Lithuania will decide to review the decisions adopted and come out in favor of close cooperation with all Soviet republics.

The potential for Lithuania's existence as an independent economic unit also give rise to profound doubts. Every state must guarantee for its citizens the appropriate economic conditions, the right to work, the provision of food and housing, and freedom of movement. It must possess its own natural resources or the funds to buy them on world markets. If you take into account the present world prices for raw materials, it is difficult to imagine how Lithuania would be able to switch to economic independence after many years of being supplied with resources from all the republics at preferential prices. Lithuania has a population of less than four million. That is barely half the number of inhabitants of the land of Lower Saxony and just a little more than the Saarland. Yet neither Lower Saxony nor the Saarland could exist independently. They are too small to do so. Their existence is ensured by the fact that they receive subsidies from the federal government, which in turn accumulates the funds coming in from all the lands and redistributes them in accordance with their level of development. However, no one would say that Lower Saxony is a backward state formation, and it even has its own natural resources, including oil.

It is difficult to imagine that the EC will now accept Lithuania into its ranks. The EC is currently engaged in integrating the GDR fully or partially. Austria is next in line to join the community, although there are problems with its status as a neutral state.

The Lithuanian leadership's actions are being taken formally within the framework of freedoms, including the right to self-determination, guaranteed by the process of perestroyka in the USSR. Unfortunately, in politics the exercise of rights and freedoms is not always associated with rational thinking, as is happening in this case. Proceeding from the interests of the republics' lengthy joint existence in a single home, it would be desirable for the individual groups and sections of the population in each republic to be given time to ponder decisions, proceeding here certainly not from nationalist motives. It seems that precisely such aspirations are coming to the fore in the Baltic and also some Central Asian republics, and not the reasonable need for cooperation within the framework of a federation. I and many other politicians in the FRG, the deputy emphasized, are concerned about attempts to go too far in the interests of individual national groups and not of the whole of society. Each person's freedom ends where others' freedoms begin to be restricted.

Brandt Cited on Role of Germany's Neighbors

PM2003133990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Mar 90 First Edition p 6

[TASS report: "W. Brandt's Speech"]

[Text] Bonn, 16 Mar—The unification of the two German states is a matter for the Germans, but not for the Germans alone. So it is extremely important to express ourselves clearly and precisely on ways to include the unification process in the framework of the common European process, W. Brandt, honorary chairman of the SPD [Social Democratic Party], has stated. At a press conference in Bonn he expressed the idea that the consultations that have begun between representatives of the two German states and the four victorious powers should be supplemented by talks according to a "two plus nine" formula. In this way, Brandt explained, all states that border directly on the future united Germany would be involved in resolving the question. It is also necessary, he added, to bring the EC partners into the process of creating an FRG-GDR currency and economic union.

In Brandt's opinion, uniting the GDR and the FRG on the basis of the Article 23 of the West German Constitution is going "the wrong way." As a result of insistent appeals voiced in Bonn to go in that direction, GDR citizens have the impression that no one is interested in their opinion any more. This has also led to the formation of a distorted opinion among the FRG's allies, which have been adequately informed about the course of the unification process.

The honorary SPD chairman criticized the speeches of certain West German politicians during the GDR election campaign. Representatives of FRG political parties, he said, have tried to exert pressure on the electorate and encourage them to vote for a particular party, connecting this with the granting of economic assistance. Instead of this, Brandt stressed, FRG political parties should jointly aim for the most important result in the GDR elections—a victory for the forces of democracy.

Impact of GDR Poll on FRG Parties Viewed

PM2003145590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Ye. Bovkun report under the general heading "GDR: Vote Counting Ends": "View From Bonn"]

[Text] It was hard to predict the results of the GDR Volkskammer election. The FRG public opinion polling institutions which set up "exploratory groups" to go to the East and conduct polls there among the population accompanied their predictions with many reservations. It looked as though almost one-third of the voters still did not know whom to vote for the day before the election.

Most Western experts nonetheless agreed that the conservative parties' bloc and the Social Democrats would end up neck and neck. For that reason people in the FRG followed the development of events with greater intensity perhaps even than Bundestag elections.

The trend was established when the voting papers in the first electoral precincts had been counted. Even the western Christian Democratic Union [CDU] did not expect this result. Although they were hoping for good results after the great effort that they had expended on the election campaign. H. Kohl alone addressed a million GDR citizens at six rallies. His party circulated approximately 20 million pamphlets there.

Obviously, conservative politicians from Bonn's ruling coalition succeeded in appealing more convincingly to their future allies than the Social Democrats and managed to present the ideas of social and economic union in a more attractive light.

Some of my colleagues believe that the absence of a "five-percent proviso" in the GDR electoral law like that for parliamentary elections in the FRG (a party nneds at least five percent of the vote to enter the Bundestag) partially facilitated the conservatives' success. Small groupings pulverized the left-wingers' political efforts.

Of course, we can argue about whether it was right for the Bonn parties to take such an active part in the election struggle in the GDR, but that's all water under the bridge now. The die has been cast. To be objective, we must remember that politicians from the GDR were not forbidden to take part in public events in the FRG. Some have already availed themselves of this opportunity, while others will probably do it later, when the Bundestag election campaign enters the decisive phase.

Incidentally, the results of the Volkskammer election cannot fail to change the domestic political picture in the FRG. Processes affecting the alignment of forces are already taking place.

First, a split has occurred within the ruling coalition. The Liberals, headed by O. Lambsdorff, chairman of the Free Democratic Party [FDP] (FRG), and Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher (who are, according to poll results, the most popular Bonn politicians in the GDR), are disappointed that the chancellor has not coordinated some fundamental questions of German policy with them.

Second, the CDU and the Christian Social Union [CSU], which form a Bundestag grouping, will probably fall out soon. If the Bavarian CSU really wants to unite with its "fraternal" party in the GDR—and everything points to that—it will by that token effectively extend its activity to all Germany—something that it should not do under the terms of the agreement regarding its alignment with the CDU.

Not only may new electoral alliances and coalitions form but new political trends may also appear. In Hamburg, for instance, the reformist wing of the German Communist Party (FRG) has just formed a Land organization—the Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS]—with a view to uniting and consolidating left-wing forces in both parts of Germany.

Virtually all of Germany's political system is on the move. Having admitted masses of new voters—politically more active voters, moreover, as is indicated by the high turnout figures (over 93 percent)—that system must inevitably be transformed in accordance with "Eastern" ideas of German and European policy.

The development of intraparty contacts between East and West Germans will of course depend on many factors, notably economic and social factors, but the state must at any rate guarantee them equality. Willy Brandt has suggested to FRG President Richard von Weizsaecker caling together the chairman of the parties with representation in the Bundesrat (upper chamber) in order to discuss their experience of the involvement in the GDR election campaign.

This is seen not as a pro forma attempt to generalize acquired experience but something more—a desire to exploit the supreme prestige of presidential power and the president himself to elaborate national accord on those questions of importance for Germany, its neighbors, and East Europe on which political parties cannot compromise.

The GDR Volkskammer election has indisputably been a historic event—and not only for Germans, moreover. German unification will be hard because the two states' problems will be combined. Time will tell whether it will shorten the path to unity.

Supreme Soviet Session

Supreme Soviet Discusses Bill on Secession Issue

Chambers Meet Seperately

LD2103084790 Moscow TASS in English 0838 GMT 21 Mar 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 21 TASS—The USSR Supreme Soviet today began to discuss bills to renew dramatically the Soviet Federation. The two chambers—the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities—met separately.

In the morning the Council of the Union began to discuss the first reading of bill on the settlement of problems connected with the secession of a union republic from the USSR. The bills included in this package will formulate a new union treaty and define the division of authority between union republics and the centre, the order of a possible secession of a republic from the USSR, the protection of the rights of citizens of any nationality living on territory of the republic and other issues.

The individual bills are in various stages of preparedness, but the developments in some union republics, especially in the Baltic region, call for speeding up the preparation of these documents.

The extraordinary Third Congress of People's Deputies held last week conveyed to the parliament that the bills on the renewal of the Soviet Federation are of priority importance.

Draft Read for First Time

LD2103105190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] The session of the USSR Supreme Soviet is continuing its work. Over to commentator Lyudmila Semina at our Kremlin correspondents' office:

[Semina] Separate sittings of the chambers are under way at the session today. First thing in the morning, the Soviet of the Union, chaired by Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, the chairman of the chamber, started discussing the draft law on the procedure for settling issues relating to secession of a union republic from the USSR. A package of laws is being drawn up, including on renewing the union treaty and demarcation of powers between the USSR and the union republics, and on increasing accountability for encroachments upon the ethnic equality of citizens and for forceful destruction of the unity of the territory of the union. Defining the procedure for settling issues related to the secession from the union of a union republic is demanded by the situation in the country, and the situation in the Baltic republics. But it is important today to proceed not only, and not so much from the specific situation; it is necessary to survey the long-term significance of these laws, determine what sort of federation we are to have, and determine the precise legal democratic foundations of the union. The deputies talked about this today.

The law on the procedure for secession from the union is being given its first reading today. Reports on the draft law were delivered to the committee for legislation by Andrey Yevgeniyevich Sebentsov, and to the commission on nationalities policy and interethnic relations by Georgiy Stanislavovich Tarazevich—he is chairman of the commission. Professor (Vladimir Konstantinovich Sobakin), an expert, joined them in answering deputies' questions.

Today, conceptual approaches to the document are being worked out: attitudes to the problems of defining historic borders, economic ties, and international ties. The draft law contains a brief preamble and 19 articles. The preamble states the following: The means of manifesting the will of the people of a union republic on the issue of seceding from the USSR is a referendum, a popular vote, conducted by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the union republic, or on the demand of one tenth of the citizens of the USSR permanently resident on the territory of the republic and having the right to vote in accordance with the legislation of the USSR. The referendum is conducted by secret ballot no less than six months after the adoption of a decision to raise the issue of a union republic's secession from the USSR. Citizens of the country permanently resident on the territory of the republic take part in the referendum.

Discussion of the draft has begun. I may say that in spite of an appeal to comment on the document in conceptual terms at the first reading today, some deputies immediately went deep into discussion on individual articles, and a number of deputies lapsed into improper exchanges.

However, the discussion is proceeding in a fairly professional way, demonstrating the people's deputies' serious concern for the destiny of the union, renewal of the federation, and the rights of the individual. The details of the discussion will be reported in the next news bulletin, in an hour's time.

Draft Law Outlined

LD2103114690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Summary] Today the Soviet of the Union examines, in its first reading, the draft law on the order of the issues to be resolved in connection with the procedure of a union republic's secession from the USSR. According to Article 72 of the Constitution, the law stipulates the resolution of this question on the basis of the will of the peoples of the seceding republic. A referendum has been envisaged as an instrument of the demonstration of such a will. It is to be carried out at the decision of the union republic's Supreme Soviet or on demand from the one tenth of the

USSR citizens living on the republic's territory who have the right to vote according to the laws of the union.

"Article 15 says: USSR citizens abiding on the republic's territory are given the right to choose their citizenship, their place of abode, and place of work. The sides will carry mutual expenses involved in their citizens' relocation. Article 16: In accordance with the universally acknowledged principles and norms of international law and the USSR's international obligations, the seceding republic is to provide the civil, political, social, cultural, and other rights and liberties to the USSR citizens who will continue to live on its territory."

Secession Bill Debated

LD2103135890 Moscow TASS in English 1319 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 21 TASS—Tensions ran high today in the Soviet parliament as deputies grappled with a bill designed to set procedures for secession from the Soviet Union.

The new bill, put before both houses of the Supreme Soviet, says that the referendum on secession from the Union may be called by the republic's Supreme Soviet or on the demand of a tenth of its total population.

Secession is granted if no less than two-thirds of citizens permanently residing on the territory of the republic approve.

After the results of the referendum are discussed at the Congress of Soviet People's Deputies, the republic can leave the Union during a five-year transition period.

Five years are given to determine what to do with federal property on the territory of the republic and settle property and financial issues with the Union and other republics, the bill says.

Under the bill, the outcome of the referendum is considered final, irespective of the outside reaction, said Deputy Andrey Sedentsov from Moscow, who spoke on behalf of the parliament's Legislative Committee.

Sebentsov praised the draft for a smooth economic transition mechanism. Some provisions in the document should be improved, including the part on the separate count of referendum results in ethnic enclaves, he said.

The debate that followed showed that deputies were divided on the issue. Some flatly rejected even the first reading of the draft, saying it was badly formulated.

Vaidotas Antanaitis of Lithuania said that he and his compatriots were attending the session only as observers.

However, he said the bill should take account of the differences between republics, the history of the republic's entry into the Soviet Unon and "its current international standing."

Yevgeniy Primakov, who chaired the session, then interrupted Antanaitis and told him to sit down, saying that he had deviated from the subject and was presenting his own interpretation of events that happened half a century ago.

Deputy Yevgeniy Kogan, who represents Estonia's Russian speakers, suggested not to limit the transitional period to five years, but let it continue indefinitely until all disputable questions are settled. Several other speakers supported him.

The Council of the Union passed the bill in the first reading, submitting it to parliamentary committees for improvement. It will then be put before the other house—the Council of Nationalities.

The Council of Nationalities will begin its session in the afternoon.

Parliament Considers 'High-Priority' Bills

LD2003215990 Moscow TASS in English 2110 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—Soviet parliamentary committees and commissions pondered today over a package of high-priority bills submitted for the consideration of the current session.

The legislation committee approved an updated version of the bill on principles of local self-government and local economic management, which is due for a second reading debate at the session. Committee members stressed the need to promptly finalise two other interconnected bills—"On the procedure of settling disputes relating to the secession of a republic from the union" and "On the separation of powers between the union and the republics."

The finalised version of the latter bill will be submitted for the first reading in the Council of the Union chamber very soon. Deputies criticised the bill on secession. They pointed to the need to add provisions reflecting changes in the Constitution following the establishment of the post of president of the USSR.

The Council of Nationalities chamber's Commission for Nationality Policy and Inter-ethnic Relations discussed three bills today. Lively debate was evoked by the bill on the rights and duties of Interior Ministry troops involved in protecting public order. Tragic events in a number of hotbeds of tension made clear the inadequacy of the present legislation which leaves Interior Ministry troops weak and unprotected against rioters.

Interior Ministry Deputy Chief of Staff Boris Borukayev stressed that the new bill specifies procedures for the use of special means and weapons and guarantees conditions enabling troops to reestablish order.

Commission members then focused on the bill on the state of emergency.

Next they considered the bill on the separation of powers between the union and republics. Debates flared up when discussing the rights of autonomies. Commission Deputy Chairman Boris Oleinik said that the autonomies had performed their mission in the main, but it was not advisable to make haste in equating them with union republics, it is better to proceed gradually and with due caution.

A working group of the Committee for the Protection of the Family, Maternity and Childhood discussed the bill on taxation.

The International Affairs Committee discussed the bill on exit from and entry into the Soviet Union. Committee members stressed the need to let Soviet people taste straight away practical results of democratization. The bill provides this opportunity. It will also contribute to the country's international prestige, they said.

The committee decided to urge the Supreme Soviet to consider this bill during its current session.

Draft on Union-Republics Power Division Discussed

LD2003113890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0900 GMT on 20 March broadcasts a six-minute report by Vladimir Markin from the building where the committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet work. Markin reminds us that yesterday's session decided to examine laws concerning nationalities problems in the near future. He introduces G.S. Tarazevich, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities Commission on Nationalities Policy and Interethnic Relations, which is presently discussing the draft law on demarcation of powers between union republics and the USSR.

Tarazevich says that the drafting of the law is a complex affair, because there are so many interests involved. There are many representatives of autonomous formations in the commission, and they are concerned that the law should protect the interests of these. He goes on to say: "The autonomous republic, which is a sovereign socialist state, is at the same time part of a union republic. How will it delegate part of its powers to the union republic? In the first version of the draft of our law, it was written that this is determined by the USSR. Today we have come to the conclusion that the powers of the autonomous formations, the autonomous repubics, are voluntarily delegated to the union republics."

Markin then asks: "Georgiy Stanislavovich, is there any hope that this draft law, this law, will be passed at the current session?"

Tarazevich replies: "I think that it is hardly likely that this law will be passed at this session in its final form. If this law is made the basis for renewing the Union Treaty, then the opinions of the supreme bodies of authority of the union republics, or of persons who may be empowered by the supreme bodies of authority of union republics to conclude a union treaty or to express their attitude to the bill in question on behalf of the republics, will certainly have to be expressed concerning its content. For this reason this will, of course, be connected with some fairly complicated further procedures."

Markin concludes by wishing him luck on behalf of the listeners.

Deputies Approve New Entry, Exit Rules

LD2003145890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1305 GMT 20 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow, 20 Mar (TASS)—The draft law on procedures for entry into and exit from the USSR has been described by lawyer and publicist Fedor Burlatskiy, one of the authors of the draft, as "a major indication of democratization in the USSR." This document was examined in the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee today for the last time before it is submitted for discussion by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Last year, Fedor Burlatskiy reported, 235,000 people left the USSR to live permanently abroad. Two million people went for temporary trips abroad, 300,000 of them in Western countries. In 1990 we can expect these figures to double, and adoption of a new humanitarian law according with the norms of international law will undoubtedly play a big role in this.

The draft law states that Soviet citizens need no permission to go abroad, and exit visas are abolished. A foreign passport valid for five years is given to anyone who wants one, upon application to the Internal Affairs Directorate. The length of stay abroad is determined by the citizen himself. A passport for a temporary trip should be issued no later than one month after the application is submitted, and a passport for permanent residence abroad no later than three months afterwards.

The only grounds for refusal can be considerations of state security, or if criminal proceedings have been instituted against a citizen, or if he is still serving a prison sentence imposed by a court. It is laid down that the "security" clearance period for any individual may not exceed five years; a citizen may appeal against refusal to issue a foreign passport, going as high as the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Presenting the draft law, Fedor Burlatskiy stressed that in contrast to many laws of an economic nature, undoubtedly more fundamental, the document in question will yield an immediate return, and will enable the prestige of the USSR abroad to be enhanced. The deputies approved the draft, while pointing out the dangerous delay in resolving issues without the implementation of

the law is unthinkable, in particular further improvement of the procedure for currency exchange and putting passenger transport into order.

The Foreign Affairs Committee—its Chairman Aleksandr Dzasokhov told the TASS correspondent—will insist on the Law on Entry and Exit Procedure being adopted at the current session of parliament, which is expected to last until the end of April.

Economic Reform Body Views Republics' Rights

LD2003150990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0930 GMT on 20 March carries a seven-minute report by Andrey Nikiforov from the Supreme Soviet's Committee for Issues of Economic Reform, where he is interviewing Deputy Valentin Fedorovich Minayev, a secretary of the committee.

Nikoforov says that today the committee is in session on Kalinin Prospekt, discussing thd draft law on the renewal of the union treaty and the demarcation of the powers of the USSR and the union republics. The law's 12 articles are being discussed one by one. Yesterday a special working group within the committee examined the draft, while today virtually all the deputies attending the session have spoken about the underlying concept of the law. Nikoforov reports that they all agreed that a new union must be constructed on an economic basis.

Minayev then notes that as far as the law's concept was concerned, many deputies expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the law covers two points—the renewal of the union treaty and the demarcation of powers. Many deputies feared that if the law were adopted and a union treaty drawn up, the independence of republics would be sharply reduced, says Minayev. The committee has thus taken the view that the law's title should be altered to "Demarcation of the Powers of the USSR and Union Republics as the Basis for a Union Treaty."

Furthermore, says Minayev, the deputies felt that centrifugal rather than unifying forces within the Soviet federation are accentuated in the draft, and that the economic interests that unite the republics should be set out in the preamble to the law.

As far as the law's articles are concerned, the deputies took the view that paragraph 1 of Article 4 stipulating that the "bodies of state power and of administration of the union republics coordinate and control the activity of enterprises in matters of meeting the population's demands, using labor resources, and protecting the environment," should be cut out, and that the above bodies' relationships should be governed by laws such as those on ownership, land, socialist enterprises, and taxation. Instead of this, the deputies drafted wording to the effect that union and autonomous republics, and autonomous units, have the right to decide all socioeconomic matters while being guided by the USSR Constitution and by Soviet and republican legislation, Minayev adds.

The Committee on Issues of Economic Reform will work on this draft law for the rest of the day, and is to submit its conclusions to the USSR Supreme Soviet by the end of the week so that the draft law can be examined by Monday's Supreme Soviet session.

Tomorrow the USSR Supreme Soviet's chambers will be sitting separately, notes Nikiforov, in conclusion.

Political & Social

16 March Plenum Debate Speeches Outlined

PM1903182190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 90 Second Edition pp 2-3

[Debate speeches at 16 March session of CPSU Central Committee Plenum]

[Text] **A.D. Lizichev (member of the CPSU Central Committee and chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate)**

Comrades, in his report on the first day of the plenum, his speech yesterday at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and his meeting with servicemen delegates, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev noted that the way to boost the role of Army party organizations and political organs in building qualitatively new armed forces lies through renewing all party political work and democratizing the life and activity of military collectives. It was stressed that this is a difficult issue. That is indeed so, comrades. We comprehensively discussed it at the Defense Ministry Collegium, the Main Political Directorate Bureau, and at the conference of military council members and political directorate chiefs during the current plenum and Congress of People's Deputies. All the participants in these discussions unanimously advocated that party and political influence in the Armed Forces and in all spheres of our defense building continue to be a determining and effective factor.

Army and Navy communists reject the slogan about the depoliticization of the Armed Forces, which has been the main trump card for those who are trying to reduce to nothing the party's influence in the Army and Navy, to spiritually disarm Armed Forces personnel, and thereby to do unacceptable damage to the strength of the Army and socialism.

Created by the revolutionary creativity of the party masses during the Civil War years under the leadership of Lenin and the party Central Committee, political organs have stood the test of wartime and peacetime and have firmly and consistently implemented—and continue to implement—our party's policy in the Armed Forces.

But life moves on. The renewed party is transferring administrative, economic, and other functions to organs of soviet power. The statutes also clearly state that all party organs shall be elected bodies. This means that in the future the functions of political organs will have to be

differentiated into political functions implemented, on the one hand, by political departments and political organs up to and including the Main Political Directorate and headed by deputy political commanders and chiefs at all levels; and, on the other hand, by party organs from the regimental party committee to the supreme party organ of the Armed Forces vested with the rights of a CPSU Central Committee commission.

The Defense Ministry and Main Political Directorate will draw up appropriate proposals and submit them under the established procedure to the party Central Committee and the country's Supreme Soviet. As for specific timetables, the proposal by leaders of all major Army and Navy political organs that this work be done on the basis of the decisions of the 28th party congress during the implementation of military reform seems consistent and logical.

The experience of a number of East European countries should be a kind of warning for us against being hasty in implementing this reform. The abolition of political organs in those countries and the ban on activity by party organizations in their armies have led to a sharp exacerbation of the problem of military discipline, increased desertion, and, in certain cases, the moral disintegration of subunits and even military units and formations. The communist parties' "monopoly" in those countries is today being replaced by a monopoly by the political forces which oppose them.

Nor should we ignore the experience of military building in the United States and the NATO countries, in whose armies powerful political (ideological) structures exist and actively function in implementing the policy of the ruling political forces. Nobody over there is planning to abolish them.

Thus, comrades, in our country it is not a question of abolishing political organs and depoliticizing the Army, as certain "fathers of Russian democracy" insist so much. It is a question of fundamentally reorganizing them in a manner which presumes the creation of a mechanism for exerting party political influence over the personnel which would accord in the best possible way with the tasks of the current stage of Soviet military building, with the spirit of our military doctrine, and with the goals of the forthcoming military reform.

Comrades, perestroyka in the Army and Navy, as in society, is proceeding with difficulty. There have been considerable shortcomings in Army and Navy training, the effectiveness of political education work is poor, and we often find ourselves lagging behind people's politicization. Undoubtedly, we do have things to criticize and people to criticize. Each of us, if we deserve it, can be punished, discharged to the reserve, or forced to resign. But servicemen should never be belittled—they are the defenders of the fatherland. Currently some people are blatantly specializing in belittling the very vocation of servicemen, particularly officers and generals, and the prestige of military service in general.

A few days ago we held a conference of military commissariats' leading officials. People stated painfully that in a number of parts of the country the draft had become an arena for political struggle. Everything is being done to undermine the spring draft. I think that under these circumstances we need a decision at government level, if not Supreme Soviet level. Here's just one example, comrades. Following the 11-12 March decision by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet more than 50 Lithuanian servicemen deserted from the Baltic Military District alone in the space of three days. I cannot fail to note, unfortunately, that many republic acts of legislation of an anti-Soviet and anti-Army nature and which contravene union legislation have quite recently been signed by certain chairmen of republic supreme soviet presidiums and even by members of our party Central Committee. It is hard for us, comrades, to explain to people this irresponsible position on the part of certain senior officials.

Mikhail Sergeyevich, the Armed Forces learned with great joy and approval about the news of the state program for the social development of the Armed Forces. We ask to take control of its implementation so as to ensure the consistent and firm execution of this program.

One last point, comrades, While approving the draft statutes as a whole, we have made a specific proposal on paragraph 26 of the Statutes which also takes account of the prospects for reorganizing political organs. You have probably noticed, comrades, that the draft Statutes set out anew the procedure for relations between Army party organizations and local party organs. They emphasize that our ties will strengthen and acquire new content, and that the principle of unity between Army and people will receive vigorous new impetus. In this work we are counting on skilled comradely aid from republic communist party central committees, party kraykoms [kray party committees] and obkoms [oblast party committees], and their first secretaries.

In conclusion I would like to say that before the 28th CPSU Congress the Armed Forces will carry out a full-scale report-and-election campaign, and delegates to the congress will be directly elected from Army and Navy party organizations. We will do everything to ensure that political influence over the Army is never diminished but is strengthened still further. Thank you.

M.Sh. Shaymiyev (first secretary of Tatar CPSU Obkom)

Out of all the diverse problems discussed in connection with the preparations for the 28th party congress, I would like to dwell on some of them which, in my view, are of most concern to communists and nonparty people. Above all, this applies to the need to elaborate and implement measures which would make it possible to overcome communists' alienation from party politics and to really assert the power of the party masses as the foundation of our party's renewal.

The ideals and proposals stated in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform in this respect have, in the main, been approved by our republic's communists. Many people advocate reinterpreting the principle of the party's organizational structure and the principle of democratic centralism with a view to placing greater emphasis on democracy. I think it is entirely right that the draft new statutes envisage the right of a minority to defend its views even after a binding decision has been made.

Undoubtedly, the enhancement of the role of lower-level party components and communists will be promoted by the introduction of direct, contested elections for party committee secretaries at all levels and by delegating to higher party committees officials drawn directly from primary party organizations.

As for the procedure for electing delegates to the 28th party congress, many party committees and organizations, in discussing the published draft, are giving preference to elections of delegates from single-seat okrugs. Since this method is more democratic, it allows each primary party organization and communist to participate in shaping the corps of deputies.

In accelerating the perestroyka of all party components a great deal depends on the activeness of primary party organizations. So far, unfortunately, many of them have failed to take an active stance and have not found their place in the life of labor collectives. It has to be admitted that the CPSU obkom, gorkoms, and raykoms are largely to blame for this. We are clearly not doing enough in this area. However, we also cannot fail to state that the CPSU Central Committee has still not clearly defined the role and place of primary party organizations, which are the foundation of the party under the conditions of perestroyka. Nor do the draft new CPSU statutes fully remedy this defect. They provide no answer to the question of the role of the party and its primary organizations. It should be particularly stressed that the party is supposed to reflect and uphold the working people's interests, by organizing them. And that is why labor collectives are the main sphere of its activity. In our view, the new statutes should state the need to profoundly restructure the activity of primary party organizations and indicate ways to accelerate this process in order to ensure that the party becomes the political organization of the labor collective, rather than an appendage of the administration.

The new CPSU statutes should more clearly define the limits of a primary party organization's powers and the status of its secretary. It is necessary to reveal the nature and content of the relationship between the party organization on the one hand and the administration, organs of self-management, social organizations, and labor collectives outside of its framework on the other, without restricting ourselves merely to mentioning this in general terms, as the draft currently does. All this would enhance the role of the primary organizations and galvanize the activities of all communists.

I believe the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform justifiably raises the question of expanding the rights of kray, oblast, and okrug party committees. It might have been expected that the draft new CPSU statutes would fill this provision with new specific content. But, unfortunately, this was not reflected in the draft statutes.

In this respect I would like to say that the need has arisen to resolve the question of the status of autonomous republic party organizations. The Tatar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution, like others, declares the autonomous republic to be a socialist state. In accordance with the USSR and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Constitutions the republic has state organs—an ASSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers. But the party organization is called an oblast party organization: This entirely inexplicable and unjustified disparity is by no means merely a question of words, and that is why it should be eradicated by granting the organization the status of a CPSU republic organization and enshrining this in the new party statutes.

Talking about the questions linked with the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress, I consider it necessary on behalf of party veterans to raise yet another question—at first glance a personal matter but very important—which could be resolved at today's CPSU Central Committee plenum. I'm talking about party veterans who, although adopted as candidates in the late twenties and thirties, only became party members between five and seven years later owing to purges and various political anomalies. Thus, for instance, living in Kazan is the teacher Gumerova who became a party member in 1936 even though she was adopted as a candidate in 1927. It was not her fault that she spent such a long time as a candidate member. She has honestly done her duty all her life. During meetings with voters certain party veterans with similar cases were also revealed. It is obvious that for the country as a whole there could be several thousand communists in this position. They are all elderly. I think it would be right to define their party membership as beginning from the time they were adopted as candidates—all the more so as the draft new statutes envisage accepting members into the party who have not been through the candidate stage.

People today are profoundly concerned about the question of the party's ideological and organizational unity. We cannot claim today that all party members are united in their political philosophy, views, and aims. The party masses do not know, for instance, what attitudes the party Central Committee and higher party organs have toward the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU," which proclaims the freedom of factions in the party, the transformation of the CPSU into a parliamentary-style party, and so forth.

Rank-and-file communists are now finding it hard to choose their position. They cannot work out whom they should side with, since many slogans of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" are just as attractive as our own

general slogans. Yet the party Central Committee has still nonetheless failed to make a stand on these differences or, maybe, discrepancies. But reality is such that it is not just a question of pluralism and the freedom to express and contrast opinions—which is mentioned in the draft new statutes currently under discussion—but of a desire to destroy the party from within.

This is already a totally different situation. So is silence justified? Isn't it time for us to adopt clear-cut and firm positions on this question of principle and bring those positions to the notice of all CPSU members? If we want to have a party capable of leading Soviet society at this crucial time, we should do everything to ensure that we are not rent by intraparty strife. The party should be united, and all of its activity should be based on Leninist principles. The question of the mechanism for purging the party should be examined; it is necessary to rid ourselves of people who fundamentally disagree with party policy. These questions are being raised more and more persistently by many party members.

The "nationalities syndrome" has now become incredibly exacerbated. Under these conditions it is very important not only to prevent the destabilization of the situation in any part of the country—we all should also do everything possible to maintain and augment the age-old traditions of friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid among the peoples as defined by the decisions of the Central Committee September (1989) Plenum.

We cannot lose sight for a moment of the fact that the nationalities question and interethnic relations concern the world of feelings and the emotional sphere of people's lives. That is why we need tact and mutual respect in everything.

This undoubtedly applies to us and to party committees and organizations which are called upon to conduct daily work to provide international and patriotic education and to improve interethnic relations. But I would like to stress that particular balance and political wisdom are required from the mass media. Because at the moment any ill-advised word on ethnic relations or any inaccuracy of geographic terminology could lead to the most unpredictable consequences.

Recently a number of respected publications have been making importunate claims about the Tatar people's negative role in the country's history. PRAVDA has claimed that Russian obscenities are the result of the Tatar influence. SOVETSKAYA KULTURA has tried to convince people that Russian was the language of the ancient Tatar lands. IZVESTIYA made the following discovery: "Socialism is a Tatar-Mongol yoke in its Russo-Jewish form...." I have copies of these newspapers and all the extracts. I will make them available to people if necessary.

Such cases, comrades, are not so inoffensive. They whip up feelings and excite various forces. It has to be said, unfortunately, that they do not always receive a principled party assessment from the Central Committee departments which are directly involved with these issues.

The prestige of the mass media and their impact on the formation of public opinion is common knowledge. Their positions and their assessments of the ambiguous and complex problems of the day are becoming more and more important. But this means they also have an increased responsibility to society and the people to ensure that their output is objective and creative. At a time of deepening democratization and party renewal a mechanism for collaborating with the party press and the other mass media should also be worked out.

Today I also consider it necessary to recall—all the more as I have been instructed to do so on behalf of the Tatar ASSR Congress of Journalists—the need to settle the question of pay for mass media workers. This matter is now giving rise to contradictions against the backdrop of the salary increases for party, soviet, Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League], and trade union organ workers.

My numerous meetings, contacts, and talks at labor collectives and party organizations confirm that people increasingly recognize the need to pool all healthy forces in society and to strengthen discipline and order.

In conclusion, I want to state that the institution of the presidency in the country and the president's program inspire confidence and are a good basis for carrying out the precongress work and implementing measures aimed at stabilizing the situation in the country and moving forward. Thank you.

G.V. Sivets (Secretary of the "Izhevskiy Mekhanicheskiy Zavod" Production Association party committee)

Comrade communists! It is a cause for joy that the participation of secretaries of the country's primary party organizations in Central Committee plenums is becoming the rule. This is visible confirmation of the progress achieved along the path of democratization within the party. My speech reflects the opinions of a number of major industrial enterprise party committee secretaries attending this plenum, and also of the communists of these collectives. The communists and party organization secretaries waited for the decisions of the CPSU Central Committeee February plenum as if their lives depended on them, and they waited not only for the draft platform but also for the draft statutes, whose accelerated adoption has repeatedly been requested from the CPSU Central Committee by communists. But alas, another month has passed. Today many communists are waiting for the plenum documents in order to be able to embark on specific tasks in preparation for the 28th congress, and you are again dragging your feet as regards the adoption of decisions. The decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference are being implemented slowly and inconsistently, and therefore the gulf between

words and actions has not been eliminated. We are often in the position of trying to catch a boat that is already leaving. The all-union conference of party raykom and gorkom secretaries has not yet been held, and regular meetings with primary organization secretaries at the Central Committee have not become the rule. In the present situation this is no longer just a complaint, it is a vitally important demand aimed at reducing the gulf separating the Central Committee from party organizations at local level.

Comrade Central Committee members, immerse yourselves via regional meetings in the problems of primary party organizations, consult with them constantly, and do not keep us on starvation rations when it comes to the provision of information.

We believe that this work at local level must be organized in such a way as to involve all members and candidate members of the Central Committee and the Central Committee apparatus right up to and including the Politburo. It is possible to claim with confidence today that communists at industrial enterprises favor the unity of the CPSU ranks and the unity of the Soviet Union. However, simultaneously most communists believe that the time has come to dissociate themselves from those who would like to split the party and drag out perestroyka—as Yegor Kuzmich noted in his speech. The time has come to say to such communists without beating about the bush: Hand in your party cards.

Having inaugurated rally-type democracy, we are suddenly taken aback by the frenzied ravings and dishonorable behavior of a number of communists who, with reference to the CPSU Central Committee Platform, or without any platform at all, but clutching their party cards, are stubbornly trying to undermine the authority of the party or pin labels on honest communists. It is a source of joy that the dialogue which takes place with communists on the shop floor is a businesslike dialogue. While criticizing, communists pursue only one aim: Not to destroy, not to break up, but to improve the situation and strengthen and rally their ranks. On acquaintance with the draft CPSU statutes submitted to the plenum for consideration it has to be admitted that an effort to take communists' proposals into account has been made, although it cannot be claimed that the statutes are a cause for satisfaction. This is above all because in the statutes, just as in the platform, the ideological basis of the party has been eroded, its purpose has been lost, many provisions, just like democratic socialism, have been emasculated, while others are imprecise and obscure. The definition of the party as a sociopolitical organization in the preamble of the draft statutes is somewhat vague. We believe that the CPSU must be a political organization. The statutes in the shape in which they have been presented are not perceived as the statutes of a party which proceeds from Marxist-Leninist positions. You get the impression that the CPSU coyly avoids the term "Marxism-Leninism," although this teaching has been recognized as mankind's priceless asset. You get the impression that the party is some kind of a club, group, current, or parliamentary party—but not a militant, united army of Leninist communists.

We regard it as inappropriate to have in Section III—"Organizational Structure of the Party"—guidelines on the establishment of party clubs, theoretical seminars, discussion centers, and other forms which serve to group communists in accordance with their interests, because these are forms and methods of political and ideological work rather than structural levels of the party.

It is evident from the draft Central Committee Platform for the 28th Congress that the CPSU makes no secret of its desire to be the ruling party. Consequently it is openly laying claim to the vanguard role within the political system. However, this is not reflected in the draft statutes. While acknowledging that the primary party organization is the basis of the party, the draft statutes define relatively clearly and fully the role, place, and functions of party organizations of various levels with the exception of primary party organizations. Until we define the rights and obligations and the key task of the primary party organization within the labor collective and outside it, we will not be able to really uphold the production principle of these organizations which is being opposed more and more stridently by forces both outside the party and within the party itself. This has been raised repeatedly at various forums.

In our opinion it would be expedient to expand Point 18 of the statutes to include a provision stating that the primary party organization, employing political methods of work, acts as the organizer of the implementation of economic and social development tasks and ensures the observance of the principles of social justice. The statutes must define a provision on property and the material base of primary, rayon, city, and oblast organizations, which must act as legal entities. A list of spheres and forms of the party's entrepreneurial activities should be drawn up.

The main burden of the party's work is borne by secretaries of shop party organizations. It is they who today bear the brunt of the criticism for the mistakes committed by all higher-level leading organs.

What is needed today is a law on parties and social organizations defining the status of members of elective organs and secretaries of primary and shop party organizations within the framework of the USSR Constitution and the framework of labor legislation. We agree with Mikhail Gorbachev that the CPSU Statutes must be concise and meaningful as to their content. At the same time they must incorporate all fundamental principles so as to rule out the need for additional instructions after their approval by the congress, and if such instructions should become necessary they must, without fail, be approved by a CPSU Central Committee plenum after discussion in primary party organizations.

The party needs an intergrated youth policy, a consistent policy aimed at rallying young people around the CPSU, as a source of replenishing its ranks. As a source of life,

if you like. The CPSU statutes should include a special section entitled "The Party and Communist Youth Organizations."

Comrades! During the election campaign to the local soviets, which is still under way, a public opinion has been shaped—not without the involvement of the press—which has deprived a large group of honest, professionally highly skilled leaders of their electoral rights, which is banned under the Law on Elections. Under the pretext of pluralism and glasnost many mass media are running down the party and party, soviet, and economic leaders, often honest communists and workers. What is this? Have the press, television, and radio been taken over by informal organizations or the "shadow economy," or is this the result of flaws in the work of party organs? Most probably both.

We believe the time has come to resolve the question of the party's news media as a matter of urgency, media which would reflect the essence of the party's policy, work toward enhancing its prestige, and rally communists. As for the reports and elections in party organizations, in view of the prevailing situation at local level we propose that the right to resolve the question of reports and elections to primary party organizations be delegated to kray or oblast party committees.

Comrades! We have passed on all elaborations on the draft CPSU statutes and specific proposals and criticisms, with due account for the opinions of communists from party organizations, to the CPSU Central Committee commission. Thank you for your attention.

R.G. Yanovskiy (member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission and rector of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences)

Dear comrades! We have now been restructuring ourselves and our conditions for five years, implementing the far-reaching decisions adopted by the Central Committee April (1985) plenum.

Our party's proposed draft statutes sum up its long path of development and reflect its current position. A typical feature of this document is the considerable reduction in its size and its radical democratization. That is a good thing.

I want to remind you that at our party's third congress in 1905 Vladimir Ilich Lenin warned us against filling the statutes with a host of paragraphs transforming it into a collection of good wishes.

It must be said that the draft has avoided this. It is written in good, simple language. I believe we still have a little bit of work to do to render it truly intelligible to everyone.

Here are a few concrete proposals and comments. I believe that the paragraph about party members' rights should not confine itself to the idea that a party member can only bring up and discuss questions relating to the party's policy and internal life. The statutes should record more clearly a party member's right to participate directly and via representatives in resolving all questions of party policy, supplementing this with the right to obtain full and timely truthful information about party life and the activity of its leadership organs.

A provision enshrined in the current statutes—regarding a party member's right to criticize not only every communist but also any superior party organ—is not included in the draft program or is still only feebly registered.

It is advisable to insert a clause regarding incentives—particularly moral incentives—for party members alongside the clause regarding party reprimands.

Following our country's adoption of the Law on Ownership—and this has already been mentioned here—the clause in the statutes on party ownership has become extremely important. Everyone can see the ease with which we now hand over various buildings. Not mine! In this respect the loss of the sense of ownership and the recent more frequent attempts to abolish party committees' rights to own items of party property have effectively assumed an anticonstitutional character.

Buildings, structures, educational establishments, publishing houses, and courses set up using party funds—and it is well known how difficult this process was—belong to the people as a whole. We must uphold and defend them and, moreover, we must not treat what we own as follows: First building something for one purpose, then converting it, and finally moving someone else in. And so on ad infinitum. It is time to put an end to this practice. If medical establishments or various social amenities are needed, it is better to build them from scratch, otherwise this is more costly and—and this is the main thing—the questions are not resolved.

Next, I would like to talk about communists' struggle for the party's vanguard role. The situation has changed. I will be frank and say that I and every communist had difficulty in pondering how to grasp the dialectics of this process. I would like to support Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's view on this subject—a view which he voiced in his report on preserving the party's name and defining it as a communist party. This is very important, comrades. A change in the party's name would have caused definite problems in the theory of elaborating a concept for humane democratic socialism and the practice of building a socially just society. We cannot take such a frivolous view of this highly complex matter. We are simply amazed to learn that 450 years ago Thomas More, Lord Privy Seal, was executed for his communist convictions. But he suffered this calmly in order to uphold his philosophy. Scarcely had a light northerly wind begun to blow, scarcely had some disorderliness begun to emerge when some people began to flee and renounce their communist convictions. Let them go! New legions of young people will come along to build a society based on social justice.

Marxism is an international teaching. The whole world is watching us. If we renounce it, that may be seen as the revision of this teaching within the communist and national liberation movement. But we must not forget that there is another branch of the socialist movement, that we have all emerged from social democracy. We must seek allies in all branches of the left-wing movement when resolving the tasks facing us.

The party must strive to ensure its leading intellectual, spiritual, and moral position in society by political methods and constant work on itself. The Central Committee February plenum took a great step forward in this respect. The draft statutes rest on the new Central Committee Platform and accord with its democratic spirit. The party's intellectual thought is not suspended for a minute. The Academy and 15 higher party schools are being restructured along with with the party, by building up the scientific potential. But there are many problems and weak spots, too. We see that stagnation has hit party political education very hard and turned it into dogmatism.

Unfortunately, the press, radio, and television frequently give priority to negative phenomena portrayed from the standpoint of an unsophisticated awareness. Comrades, I can also see the other side here. The buildup of and pressure from an unsophisticated revolutionary consciousness confuses many journalists, and they sometimes lose their point of reference and make mistakes. In this respect we must help them and lead them to knowledge of theory.

The uncontrolled development of this negativism has not overwhelmed scientists, they are endeavoring to elucidate the revolutionary social process of perestroyka from Marxist positions, resolutely overcoming in theory the dogmatism and stereotypes of the stagnation years. It must be said that this is no easy question, and it is also hard for scientists to abandon the old and move on to the new understanding of the process.

Today we base our policy on the scientific analysis of real life, in the context of all social practice, knowledge of the laws of and the prospects for social development, and the historical experience afforded by the 20th century. All this necessitates the fundamental, radical restructuring and democratization of the system of party education. We must all take lessons in this context. We must teach both the trade union and the soviet aktiv. The democratization of party political education must be given broad scope.

The conscious working masses and the party, both armed with contemporary theory and the dialectical method of problem solving, are the human factor which can predetermine the future of humane democratic socialism. In society, Leninist traditions are being revived and enriched and the subjective dialectic is being mastered. I want to stress this particularly because the question of the subjective dialectic—Lenin pointed this out—is a very complex one. It is a question of how, amid all life's contradictions, to adequately learn to reflect the objective realities occurring in society. We must learn this and learn it with persistence. This is what the party is doing, finding its bearings and changing rapidly in the new political and economic situation, and reacting in a fitting manner to the changes in society by rapidly changing its tactics, slogans, methods, and modes of work. This is a great problem. The humanization and democratization of party political education and the training of the cadre reserve are important aspects of our pedagogical and scientific work. They act as the antipodes of technocratization and authoritarianism. The linkage between humanization, democratization, and education and the need for the party to master the formation of a rule-of-law state are the most important questions facing us.

I want to say a few words about moral problems. I am coming to the end of my speech. I was very pleased by a page in PRAVDA devoted to this question. Unfortunately, we have done a lot of talking about moral problems. But they must be solved practically and turned into a real factor for renewal. These questions need to be resolved on the basis of the party Central Committee's Platform and its new statutes. Moreover, as is well known, it is hard to shape morality—practical actions are needed, not just words. All these questions are awaiting scientific elucidation and resolution on the basis of the new program and the statutes' platform.

I believe it is advisable for the Central Auditing Commission and local control and auditing organs to increase their attention to communists' observance of moral-ethical problems.

Here is my last question. Now—and this is indisputable—the institution of the post of president is a major achievement and gain of political thought and human practice. We are delighted by the political victory won amid the hard struggle at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. But socialism does not simply borrow and inherit existing world experience. It creates something new and finds its own solutions. This question is rooted in the nature of the socialist system. At the same time I want to stress that the presidency and parliamentarianism are organically and dialectically based on our national form, our popular traditions, and the traditions of the soviets which were born of the Ivanovo weavers, the working class, and our country's people in the course of the revolutionary struggle more than 80 years ago. The main thing is to grasp this dialectic—soviets, party, president.

N.A. Nazarbayev (First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee)

Comrades! Communists in our republic regard the debate that has developed on the draft party Central Committee Platform as something entirely positive.

For the first time in a long while not just some, but essentially all communists are able to express their views openly and honestly on the future of the party, its place and role in society, and ways of radically restructuring

party work. But one cannot help noticing that the strong but very fair criticism of particular provisions of the Platform does not always have a positive origin. Some members of the CPSU would like to use the debate in order to negate any constructive actions geared to uniting communists in the political struggle. The are trying to weaken the party from within and deprive it of any hope at all of a vanguard role in society. What is particularly dangerous is that this, like much else that is remote from the people's interests, is being done under the banner of political pluralism, under cover of slogans of struggle against party conservatives. Certainly conservatism exists. But it is the militant radicals who are striving to throw the baby out with the bathwater.

You would have to be blind not to notice this desire in, for example, their thesis on the need for factions in the party. If we depart from the path of open, honest, but always comradely, dialogue in the party's interests, and turn off onto the crooked road of confrontation and leadership battles, there can be no question of the CPSU having any political authority. This is our profound belief.

It is obvious to anyone that the party, whose structures are tightly meshed with those of the state and whose internal life is far from democratic, must be radically reformed.

In our view, the new statutes should address the established notion of the relationship between party organizations and party committees. The existing statutes are mainly about joint subordination, about a vertical arrangement of links. But life is forcefully demonstrating the need for the development of horizontally arranged relationships and the elimination of such categories as "top," "bottom," "highest," and "lowest," which are an obvious flaw of the current version. It is the power of the party masses that should play the decisive role in shaping party policy.

We advocate independence for republic communist parties within the framework of the CPSU and we believe that they must have their own programs, based on corresponding CPSU documents but taking national and territorial peculiarities into account. Republic communist parties should be given the right to decide for themselves when to hold congresses and conferences and have party debates and referendums; to submit their own platforms and documents at all-union congresses and conferences, as well as questions on issues of public and party life and policy; to decide for themselves questions relating to their personnel structure; to delegate their own representatives to central party organs; to carry out cadre policy on their own territory; and to establish and maintain interparty links in the country and abroad.

There might appear, at first glance, to be no objections to this position of ours in the draft new CPSU statutes, submitted for the plenum's consideration. But it really only states the communist parties' independence, since many other articles in the draft totally reject it. It would be no exaggeration to say that they were created in the spirit of the famous State Agro-Industrial Committee orders, which pointed out, with an insistence that might have been better used, where one should plow and when, who should sow what.... What kind of independence is there when, for example, the draft fixes the percentage of membership dues that primary party organizations keep for their own needs? When they tell us that we are going to decide budget matters locally, there obviously has to be a discussion on what percentage we keep and what percentage goes to the center, and local party organizations must be given the chance to tackle this question. Or take the provision on elected party organs' term of office. On what grounds? Is it not the communist parties' own business?

The same goes for the question of control and auditing commissions. We believe that in conditions of the enhancement of the role of primary party organizations and democratization of intraparty life, and given a certain widening of the rights of existing party commissions, in our view there should be no changes to the established structure. I believe that this issue should also fall within the domain of republic communist parties.

The impression is that the authors of the draft find it very difficult to shake off their traditional distrust of republic party organizations and occasionally veer off onto the old path. Why, for example, are the communist parties given the right only to recommend candidates for party posts? Do the republics have a poorer knowledge of their own people's work and moral qualities?

In short, the CPSU statutes should not categorically tell party organizations—from primary to republic level—how to live and work, what organs to set up, and so on. They should merely stipulate the basic principles in accordance with which republic communist parties will create their own documents.

The mechanism of intraparty democracy requires serious scientific analysis and a radical overhaul. In our view, measures guaranteeing minority rights must be more clearly defined in the text of the statutes.

The statutes must contain a section devoted to relations among party members. It seems to us that it should be headed "On Party Comradeship." The section's contents would be—the democratization of internal party life and the norms of relations among party members on principles of trust. In particular, it must contain clear points on the inadmissibility of paternalism, dogmatism, servility to superiors, subservience, and party member's arrogance in our milieu and precise wordings on what is admissible and what is unacceptable in the political struggle.

Today we occupy the place of the ruling party. But under conditions of a multiparty system could there not be a likelihood that the party will find itself in opposition in some region? The statutes must take account of this situation too and clearly govern the activities of communists under conditions of a multiparty system.

The statutory documents of the emergent parties must not be ignored either. A detailed and critical analysis of them is needed. It seems to us that the new statutes must make creative use of the experience of all public movements which adhere to the positions of socialism. At the same time the new edition of the statutes must point unequivocally to the inadmissibility of communists' participating in formations the ideological basis of whose policy runs counter to the CPSU Program and Statutes and the USSR Constitution.

It is very important to point out in the statutes the provision on the role and place of the party's building in horizontal structures. At the beginning of March we had a conference with secretaries of the republic's primary party organizations, at which a republic council of "primary" secretaries was set up. It has been given extensive rights to participate in the work of the Central Committee and Bureau, in Communist Party Central Committee plenums, and in the selection of Central Committee apparatus cadres, and other rights.

I believe that similar councils should be set up at all levels. We consider the question of the inexpediency of a term as a candidate on joining the party to be an urgent question. The very procedure of admission to the CPSU, which now has too many stages and is too cumbersome, needs simplifying. A fundamental objection is aroused by the thesis of so-called free joining and leaving of the CPSU. In any case we believe that an application to leave must be examined in the primary party organization, and the very fact of leaving must be recorded as expulsion from the CPSU's ranks. Into what do we intend to turn the party, comrades, if everyone will be coming and going as he pleases? If you have left, this means you have been expelled from the party.

The final point. Vague declarative wordings must not be permitted in the statutes. Then there will be no need to interpret them or to explain them with the help of various instructions.

Thank you for your attention.

A.I. Zemskov (First Secretary of Voroshilovskiy Rayon Party Committee, Moscow)

I support the draft statutes and their thrust. They are consonant with the ideas of the platform of the party Central Committee and basically accord with the sentiments of a significant proportion of communists.

I have four brief suggestions. First. I believe that in finalizing the draft we must rely more widely on the opinion of primary party organizations. In general, the vector of power must be developed. Primary party organizations must define what funds they will send up above and to whom they will delegate how many authoritative functions. In this sense there is a certain indistinctness in the document under discussion. And this is precisely the most dangerous situation. Whereas everything in the current statutes is perfectly clear and distinct (given the deep-rooted understanding of democratic centralism)—the order has been given and everything done—an attempt can now be seen to strengthen the rights of primary party organizations and to strengthen the autonomous nature of republic party organizations. But this has not been seen through to the end or built up into a logical system, and a dreadful muddle could ensue because of a lack of clarity.

Second. About the principle of autonomization and federalism. It seems to me, comrades, that we should think about the fact that the creation of an independent Lithuanian Communist Party and, at the same time, of a Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU platform—perfectly possible processes of the detachment of a section of communists from the main CPSU for ideological reasons—and the apparently inevitable creation of a Russian Communist Party all require a new, broader approach. It strikes me as impossible to keep the situation within the framework of the CPSU and to turn everything back. It may be worth thinking about some new community like the Communist International. Incidentally, that was just what our country and V.I. Lenin did in 1922, when the free republics did not want to join the RSFSR with autonomous rights and sought to preserve their national character. It was then that a new community was born—the USSR.

Third. About the development of horizontal structures in the party. On this question I disagree with Comrade Nazarbayev, whom I deeply respect. The strengthening of the party's work at places of residence, in party clubs, and in self-management committees is an inevitable and, evidently, increasingly widespread trend in our party's practical work and in its organizational building. It seems to us (and we have discussed this question in the rayon party organization) that the communist's right to free registration in the organization where he will be able to work most effectively and creatively must be written into the statutes. Variations such as "double registration" or sending a communist from a production party organization to work at a place of residence will not save the situation. There must be a clear, distinct system of rights and responsibilities: A communist works in one party organization and elects and can be elected in it.

The fourth motif. The relationship between the elected party organ and the apparatus is a topic that has been loudly aired and in many ways distorted. It seems to me that the complexity lies in the fact that the party's Central Committee (like many other party committees) does not work in the intervals between plenums—in precise accordance with what is written in the existing statutes. The members of a party committee—in this case the party's Central Committee—gather for plenums, debate, applaud, and vote, but you, comrades, do not work in the intervals between plenums. Even at the very important and very necessary penultimate plenum of the party's Central Committee, when we were expecting Central Committee members to come at last, to explain things, to try to convince us of the correctness of the adopted platform, and to do practical work on

preparing for the 28th party congress, this did not happen, with the exception of a few ritual, decorative trips "to the masses" by the party's leaders. These trips are important, but they do not change the situation. A change can come about not by renaming the Politburo the Presidium, not by admitting some members of the party Central Committee to freed party headquarters. Members of the Central Committee—members of a special party committee—must work in the provinces, in the party organizations which elected them. For example, if there are several members of the party Central Committee elected, let us assume, from the Kuybyshev Oblast party organization or from a region, they must work locally. They must have under them one or two staffers of the party Central Committee apparatus, helping to maintain communications with the center and with primary organizations.

Otherwise, so it seems to me, everything will remain as before. I believe that it is inexpedient to keep more than 100 people of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus here, in Old Square, for otherwise everything will return to the way it was and there will be no decentralization of management of the party.

S.V. Rafailov (Secretary of the "Sovetskaya" Mine Party Committee, Makeyevka City)

Esteemed comrades! I am a representative of the communists of the mining city of Makeyevka. I was elected secretary of the party committee four months ago, from among the workers. The wave of rallies that swamped the country at force 10 hit the Donetsk party organization and made communists take a new look at their place in the life of society. But at the same time it also alarmed them. I have been entrusted with conveying this alarm to this forum. Communists are anxious about the party's fate.

The impression is now being created that in the parliamentary struggle and in the clashes for the presidency our party leaders do not have enough time to tackle party affairs. An example of this is the recently adopted draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th congress. Communists are unanimous in their opinion. The document is at least three years too late. It represents a set of slogans. In this connection the communists of the "Makeyevugol" Production Association's "Sovetskaya" Mine have entrusted me with voicing their dissatisfaction with the methods of political leadership on the part of members of the Politburo and the Central Committee.

Now a new document has today been submitted for discussion—the draft CPSU Statutes. There is a saying: "The army depends on its statutes." It extends to us, too. I cannot agree with Comrade Gorbachev, who said in his report at the first session of this plenum that the document submitted for discussion will combine the party's broad democratization with the growth of its organization and activity as the vanguard force of our society. Democratization—yes. But it will not add to organization.

Comrade communists, I do not wish to offend the draft's authors, but I believe that it was compiled by someone who does not have to work with the statutes every day. The entire draft consists of general phrases, and many concepts have been eroded. How is this? We are a party of communists, but the very word "communism" is missing. The idea of communism must be supported at least as the ideal for the building of society.

What is humane, democratic socialism? Forgive me, but in my opinion it is like this: Either it is socialism with no adjectives, or it is not socialism.

In light of what I have said, if everything is left as it is in the draft, will the question of renaming the party not arise soon? Another article is membership of the party. It might seem a trifle that the single word "fulfilling" has been omitted, but how the meaning changes. It is possible to be a member of the party but not fulfill its decisions.

Comrades, I am speaking honestly. The draft Statutes breathe on me as someone's wish to split the party and separate it into federations. We must clearly define our position: Either it is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or it will be a League of Communists of the republics?

What is the worth of the proposal to temporarily suspend membership of the party? It is as though we are being pushed toward self-disbandment.

I cannot fail to dwell on membership dues. The idea of leaving 50 percent of all the dues collected in primary organizations has been around a long time. Until recently, this would probably have been sufficient. It is now being suggested that we leave ourselves with 50 percent, but with due regard for the wages of the working people who have been released. But the compilers failed to take the changed situation into account. It is only at the Central Committee and in oblast, city, and rayon committees that property is owned by the party, while in more than 4,500 party organizations property is owned by labor collectives. Under conditions of a multiparty system it can be taken away. Primary organizations will be left in poverty. What kind of help is this for pensioners and veterans? Tables and chairs will have to be bought. This section must be finalized. Only don't think that I am concerned about my own wages. My hands have not yet forgotten the spade.

The combination of words "democratic centralism" has been excluded from the draft statutes to oblige the opposition, although the concept itself is present. There is no doubt that we have no need of the democratic centralism that existed hitherto, with its Stalinist interpretation. But democratic centralism according to Lenin has the right to life. If a place is found for this section in the draft statutes, it must be supplemented by the Leninist understanding of the real political responsibility of elected organs and their leaders before communists and of the procedure for holding debates on alternative

suggestions at the discussion stage and formulating unity of action and the highest responsibility for implementing adopted decisions.

The final point. This is the elections of delegates to conferences and the congress and the elections of leading organs. Above all, the statutes must separate power into legislative and executive power. Conferences and congresses are legislative organs, while elected committees are executive organs. It is definitely necessary to draw up the status of the CPSU congress delegate, to establish his rights and responsibilities, and to extend the term of the delegate's powers throughout the reporting period. The congress delegate must be a connecting link between the communists who elected him and the party's Central Committee. In our city of Makeyevka we believe that the elections of all leading organs for conferences and the congress must be direct and must necessarily have several candidacies, with direct delegating. And without fail in okrugs. Secretaries must be elected at conferences and congresses of the corresponding party organizations. It might occur to some people that I am speaking too abruptly but, believe you me, this is from the heart about something painful. Thank you.

B.B. Ponomarev (Secretary of the Party Committee of Irkutsk Polytechnical Institute)

Esteemed comrades! In my opinion, the weakest aspects of our party's draft statutes, which have been submitted for discussion, are its vagueness in defining the ideological basis on which the party must unite its members—this is the first point—and, second, the vagueness of the wording relating to the basic principles for building it.

We are discussing the CPSU statutes, but the very word "communism" is modestly ignored in the preamble and even in the subsequent text. So the question arises: Of which party are these the statutes? What is its ultimate aim? Are we not abandoning too soon under pressure from rally fever the chief idea for whose sake we united?

Today not one of the basic provisions in Marx' Manifesto has been realized either in our country or abroad, or it has been distorted beyond recognition. But our opponents and then we ourselves hastened to consider the very idea unworthy of mention in the most important party documents. Not without the participation of our social scientists and practical experts we have so "reworked and added" to this idea that we do not know today what kind of society has been created in our country. I believe that the ultimate aim must be formulated in the text of the statutes, while the way to realize it through the building of socialism in our country has already been given in the draft which we are discussing today. This is a fundamental question which must be reflected in the statutes. We are also abandoning too early the principle of democratic centralism in the party's organizational building. Essentially it is partly revealed and contained in the sections of the draft statutes but is not mentioned by name. What is this? Modesty or a fear of driving away from our party people who are not inclined toward discipline and responsibility?

But, in abandoning this principle, we are making a concession to our opponents and leading the party toward a split and toward its transformation into some voluntary society, not into a cohesive and strong sociopolitical organization. What is needed is not army centralism, where things are impossible without this, but Leninist democratic centralism in the party, which provides for the real political responsibility of elected organs and their leaders before the communists who elected them. Centralism which makes it possible to hold a debate on alternative proposals, to champion your own opinion, to formulate unity of action, and to achieve the greatest responsibility for the implementation of adopted decisions. What is needed is centralism which makes it possible to delegate responsibilities and rights to elected organs and apparatuses from bottom to top, not the other way around. Then everything will fall into place. Elected organs and their apparatuses will exist to give assistance to primary party organizations, not the primary party organization existing to seek work and to create conditions for the existence of the apparatus.

Under this democratic centralism there will be fewer individual union pensioners, who through their irresponsibility have contributed to the collapse of spheres and sectors of the national economy. The switch from forming elected organs by delegating electors to conferences and congresses to direct elections of party committees on all levels, including the CPSU Central Committee, will also serve to unite the party, to enhance the responsibility of members of elected organs, and to enhance the role of primary party organizations.

It is necessary to enshrine in the statutes a provision on direct, multiple-candidate elections not only of congress and party conference delegates but also of members of the CPSU Central Committee, the union republic communist party central committees, and party kray, oblast, and okrug committees. Elections must be held on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret ballot by communists in party electoral okrugs, according to the norm of representation defined at plenums. Members of union republic central committees and of party committees at all levels must be deprived of their powers only by means of a recall by the communists who elected them to this party organ. This will enable communists to believe that the party's fate and their fate are in their own hands and will make it possible to ensure that the party's leadership and the party mass itself—although this term arouses very many objections today—are united. This is probably the most important thing today.

To enhance the role and responsibility of primary party organizations, the right to nominate candidacies for election to congresses, conferences, and elected organs must belong exclusively to primary party organizations. This system of forming executive and, so to speak, legislative organs in the party will make it possible to

avoid a mass of negative phenomena which we have encountered in our history. We must decide on this difficult step even before the 28th CPSU Congress and form party committees on the most democratic basis.

M.M. Burokyavichyus (First Secretary of the Provisional Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee [on the CPSU Platform])

Comrades! In the life of a Communist Party the statutes are of special significance. The draft of the proposed CPSU statutes is more democratic and logical in substance than the current party statutes. It is very good that the section "Union Republic Communist Parties" has been introduced in it. I believe that the statutes should state that the CPSU is a part of the world communist movement. This is my first point.

Second, they should speak more clearly about the CPSU's aims. The ideas of the draft new CPSU statutes in particular are very important to Lithuania's internationalist communists. I do not know along which path my motherland—Soviet Lithuania—will develop or what fate awaits the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU platform). But I am profoundly convinced that the Lithuanian Communist Party will live and act even under the most difficult political conditions and will champion Lithuania's socialist path of development.

Lithuania is living through a political tragedy. In our Lithuania the nationalist conservative forces which secured an absolute majority of deputies' seats in the republic Supreme Soviet elections are seeking to use parliament to change Soviet Lithuania's state system, abolishing there the Soviet Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR adopted in 1978 and proclaiming the 1938 constitution of the bourgeois Lithuanian Republic, and they are establishing bourgeois state usages in Lithuania and changing the nature of the state system. This is putting Lithuania back 52 years in the sphere of the political system and returning it to the years of bourgeois conservatism, obscurantism, and occultism.

While extolling the capitalist system in Lithuania, the nationalist forces ignore the grave economic and sociopolitical position of the workers and peasants, the citizens' lack of rights, the repression of progressive people, the shooting of the Lithuanian Communist Party leadership in 1926 in bourgeois Lithuania, the unemployment in Lithuania, and the emigration of 100,000 people from Lithuania to other capitalist countries. They ignore the fact that with the active participation of Lithuanian bourgeois nationalists during the years of the Hitlerite occupation 371,000 citizens of Lithuania were annihilated, 70,000 citizens of Lithuania were transported to hard labor in fascist Germany, and 229,000 Soviet prisoners of war and more than 100,000 citizens from other Soviet republics and states of the capitalist system were annihilated in Lithuania.

I am opposed to a nihilistic view of Lithuania's past. History attests that the Lithuanian people are industrious, that their best people created splendid works of literature, art, and science, and that they fostered outstanding figures of the public movement in the past. The Lithuanian people regard other peoples with great respect and have always had an inherent love of their mother tongue, progressive folk traditions, and their positive historical and cultural past. I must say that the desire in Lithuania to restore bourgeois statehood and to return to the past contradicts the logic of history.

The nationalist conservative forces are trying to achieve their ends by skillfully manipulating the national feelings of a sizeable section of the Lithuanian people. But Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputies do not have the right to speak on behalf of the entire Lithuanian people, because they received 41.2 percent of the votes from the total electorate registered on the voting lists in the elections to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet. Where are the other approximately 60 percent of Soviet Lithuania's adult citizens? They, too, have their opinion.

Analyzing the reasons for the political events taking place in Lithuania, I must say that the separatist, nationalist forces, which have taken over all the news media—the press, radio, television—have met with no resistance from the leadership of the reorganized Lithuanian Communist Party. Moreover, its leaders, hiding behind the ideas of perestroyka, have merged with the separatist forces. I believe that there was a possibility of barring the accession to power of the forces which adhere to nationalist and antisocialist positions. There were many statements and resolutions condemning nationalism and separatism, but they were not fulfilled. Antisocialist forces took advantage of this. These forces, which felt the weakness of state power, carried out vile work in Lithuania against the USSR Armed Forces, sowing hatred for Soviet servicemen, urging young people not to serve in the Soviet Army's ranks, and seeking to create a Lithuanian national army for their own mercenary ends. It is difficult to understand Lithuania's functionaries who deny the achievements of Soviet Lithuania's working people during 50 years of development. But they extol everything that was anti-Soviet.

A few words about 1940. The point is that on 15 June 1940 the Lithuanian Army headed by General Vintsas Vitkauskas, its commander in chief, switched to the side of the people and joined the mass manifestations and demonstrations in Kaunas, the provisional capital. This act paralyzed the activity of Lithuania's bourgeois government and its repressive organs. Lithuania's people's government was constitutionally created 17 June 1940. The democratization of Soviet society in Lithuania has absolutely nothing to do with any breach of Soviet laws or any attempt to restore the system existing in Lithuania prior to 1940. After all, the operation of Soviet laws is totally suspended in Lithuania. This is said in documents adopted by the current Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. The aforementioned Supreme Soviet of the republic proclaims Lithuania to be a state which is not part of the USSR, and abolishes the name "Lithuanian

Soviet Socialist Republic." It is now called the "Lithuanian Republic." A series of laws contradicting the USSR Constitution are being adopted.

I think the time has come to adopt the necessary measures to safeguard the USSR's sovereignty, the principles of the USSR's national-state structure, and the Soviet Union's security and territorial integrity, to protect the rights, freedoms, and safety of Soviet Lithuania's residents who uphold the socialist system and Soviet power in Lithuania. On the basis of the Lithuanian SSR People's Seimas declaration dated 21 July 1940 and the USSR Supreme Soviet law dated 3 August 1940, Lithuania develops as part of the Soviet Union. Exceptional importance attaches to the strengthening of the USSR's constitutional system, including in the Lithuanian SSR.

The Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies adopted a resolution on Lithuania yesterday. USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev offered a scientifically substantiated appraisal of events in Soviet Lithuania. Lithuania's communists loyal to the revolutionary and internationalist traditions of the Lithuanian Communist Party which was created 1-3 October 1918 and registered 25 June 1940 will continue their struggle for the preservation of the socialist social system and the Soviet state system in Lithuania.

We will not be intimidated either by slander against the Lithuanian Communist Party or by harassment and persecution of communists by nationalist conservative forces in the republic. At the elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet, the communist-internationalists upheld Lithuania's all-around development as part of the USSR. They were opposed by all separatist and nationalist forces, their efforts were blocked by television and other mass media. The communist-internationalists are still in favor of Soviet Lithuania within the family of USSR peoples, of Lithuania's full socialist state sovereignty, of its independence from the capitalist world.

Lithuania's present Supreme Soviet may adopt a law banning the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU Platform). The Communist Party will nonetheless continue to operate but it will obviously become necessary to change its organizational structure and the methods and forms of its work. Yes, an especially complex political situation has developed in Soviet Lithuania, with progressive forces in Lithuania being persecuted. But I am not a pessimist. I think that it is still possible to restore a legitimate state Soviet system in Lithuania on the basis of the USSR Constitution. For this purpose it is necessary, first, to rally the ranks of Lithuania's communists. Second, to restructure the organizational structure of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the forms of its activity. Third, to work on the consolidation of Lithuania's progressive forces.

We are not surprised by what happened in Lithuania. We were prepared for it. From the very first days of the republic Supreme Soviet's work the nationalist and separatist forces felt the strength of communists standing on Marxist-Leninist positions. The communists went to the masses and started explaining the nature of what is happening in Lithuania. Our weakness lies in the fact that we lack a press organ, a newspaper. We are about to create one. We also need to create our television and to have premises from where we could work. But these difficulties will be overcome.

I would ask the CPSU Central Committee plenum to express its attitude toward the political events in Lithuania and to help explain the processes occurring in Lithuania through the all-union mass media. I would like to declare once more that the Lithuanian Communist Party, continuing its revolutionary traditions, is against the deformations of socialism and the consequences of Stalin's personality cult, against any restoration of the bourgeois system in Lithuania, and against any form of nationalism; it is in favor of a renewed socialist system based on the principles of humanism, democracy, universal human morality, and internationalism, in favor of the development of the Lithuanian and other peoples living in Lithuania along the path of social, economic, and cultural progress, in favor of their all-around spiritual development as part of the USSR. Thank you for your attention.

L.N. Zaykov (member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee)

Our plenum began its work on the same day as the Central Committee's March 1985 Plenum. Our perestroyka is five years old. All who took part in the work of the March and April plenums five years ago clearly recall the atmosphere in which they were held. That was an atmosphere of unanimity and hope. It was hope that we would finally stop living a lie, living with a double moral as it were—one for show and one for real. During these five years the cleansing icebreaker of perestroyka swept aside, together with the filthy scum of false values, the burdensome constraints of the administrative system which fettered the people's initiative and talent.

Unfortunately, during these five years we also became convinced that the consequences of the oxygen starvation of a society choked by the ecological neglect of ideology, the economy, and the social sphere had proved too heavy. We also came to realize that the course which our ship of state had taken abounded with many more underwater reefs of corruption and indolence, of reciprocal hatred and suspicion, than we could have imagined. These reefs slowed down the ship's progress, but it is nonetheless sailing on, even though not at the speed we had expected, breaking free from the captivity of apathy and indifference and reaching the clear waters of universal human values while following a course of humane and democratic socialism. Political and economic reforms have had to be implemented on the move.

The Congress of People's Deputies yesterday took a major new step in the renewal of all mechanisms of our

state structure. The congress decision to introduce presidential rule and the election of M.S. Gorbachev, initiator of perestroyka and leader of our party and state, as the first president of the USSR are among the important changes in the Soviet Union's political and economic system.

All the fears generated at times by our new laws are primarily associated with lack of faith in democracy and fears of any recurrence of the past. I believe that the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th congress and the draft new party statutes are additional guarantees that there will be no return to the past.

I am convinced that the Central Committee Platform, the statutes, and the other documents submitted for discussion by our plenum will help to rally the party's main forces and will make it possible to channel the congress debate along the tracks of a deeper and more constructive analysis of the problems existing within the party and the country, and to seek ways for the CPSU's further renewal.

If we were to briefly formulate the main essence of the criticism that was recently heard—and can still be heard now at our plenum—against the CPSU Central Committee, it boils down to the fact that rank-and-file communists were detached from the elaboration of policy and decisionmaking along the basic avenues of party activity. These obstacles across the path of the democratization of intraparty life are now being eliminated and have, on the whole, been taken into account in the draft new CPSU statutes. Another important factor is the fact that the draft enshrines the full autonomy of union republic communist parties. But the statutes are not written to last just a year or so. They are produced not for the benefit of an isolated group of communists or a territory, but for the entire CPSU. For the time being, some of the statutes' sections are declarative in nature, while the formulation of some paragraphs is reminiscent of the old-fashioned thinking.

It is obviously not sufficient to simply declare that the minority is subordinate to the majority. It must be bluntly stated that party congress decisions are mandatory for execution by all party organizations from top to bottom. The principles of the party's union nature [soyuznost] are also vaguely formulated.

I would like to dwell especially on the statutes' section which speaks about party organizations in the USSR Armed Forces. Comrade Lizichev, chief of the Armed Forces Main Political Directorate, submitted a series of constructive proposals today.

In my view, however, this section still needs further work in view of the prevailing situation. It is necessary to give a new meaning to the tasks of political organs. The main one among them should be not just the leadership of party organizations but primarily the social protection of soldiers and officers.

Sociological studies of the mood of the personnel must be actively applied in practical work by political organs. It would also be expedient to have appropriate psychological services and subunits dealing with problems of interethnic relations. This would also require a review of the system for training political staff cadres.

Quite a few calls can be heard today to altogether abandon political organs in the Army: The entire essence of their work is allegedly lost in the conditions of a multiparty system.

What can be said on this score?

First, nobody has abolished Marxist-Leninist ideology along with the former versions of articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution. Second, there is not a single army in the world without the institution of educators who strictly monitor the personnel's moral and political state.

It also seems expedient to make the main task of political organs the aim of educating the personnel in a spirit of Soviet patriotism, internationalism, loyalty to the fatherland, the Constitution, and the military oath, moral norms, personal honor and dignity, and the strengthening of discipline.

I think that the entire range of problems connected with improving party organizations' work within the Armed Forces, taking account of whatever concerns the interests of almost 2 million communists, needs to be worked out as quickly as possible, before the 28th party congress.

There is one other highly complex question which has so far only been mentioned in passing in the statutes.

I am thinking of mutual relations and collaboration between party organizations and the corps of deputies. What we sometimes see in the Supreme Soviet and at the Congress of People's Deputies is that the behavior and position of certain deputies who are party members is largely explained by the inadequacy of the existing statutes.

I am convinced that communist deputies are obliged when certain laws or resolutions are adopted to also observe party discipline. This procedure, incidentally, essentially operates in all parties around the world.

But we sometimes observe the entirely opposite situation: People not only fail to take account of their party's statutes but deliberately act in contravention of statutory provisions. In this connection the reasonable question arises: Why does the ruling party not control the work of its parliamentary representatives?

It must be bluntly stated that the people are tired of demagoguery—they will not accept the tactics of delay and disinformation.

Whatever "radicals" and "fellow-travelers," including those with party cards (albeit of a clearly obsolete variety), may say and however they may try to scare us, other ideas—the ideas of consolidating healthy forces in

society on the basis of the assertion in the country of the proper discipline, law, and order—are becoming ever more popular with the population.

A danger to democracy is posed by those who resort to slander and attacks on the party, those who strive to exploit perestroyka's difficulties in order to destabilize the situation in the country, to bring about the collapse of our federal state, and to eliminate the gains of Great October. We must not and will not permit this to happen.

'Top Priority' Discusses Gorbachev Election

LD2003201290 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 16 Mar 90

[From the "Top Priority" program]

[Text] [Goryachev] How do you do ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to "Top Priority," a weekly panel discussion of Radio Moscow. I am Sergey Goryachev. Mikhail Gorbachev was elected president of the USSR and immediately declared his intention to accelerate reforms in the Soviet Union. The election of the president came almost exactly five years after Mikhail Gorbachev was elected general secretary of the Communist Party in March of 1985, and it was then that he announced his policy of perestroyka.

Now during the debate on the presidency some legislators accused Gorbachev of actually bringing the country to a brink of civil war and economic collapse. I think this is a very crucial time, you will agree with me, Sergey Plekhanov and Andrey Kortunov, our panelists?

[Kortunov] Sergey, it seems to me that we have had a reshuffling in the higher echelons of power. How will that affect us, you and me, the people?

[Plekhanov] I think it's a terrible understatement to call it a reshuffling in the top echelons of power. I think we have passed a very important watershed in the political history of the Soviet Union. For the first time we will have strong power, executive power, which is based on democratic foundations. That is an absolutely crucial condition for further progress of democratization. You know the Biblical thing it's time to throw stones, it's time to gather stones? We've been throwing stones for five years, we've broken a lot of windows, and you know when you're in the stone-throwing stage, even when your intentions are absolutely unquestionable you're still apt to break a few windows which should not have been broken. If you get carried away with this business, I mean, it gets dangerous. So now we are at the, at a time when we will gather stones, when we'll look around, take stock and proceed onward with greater determination. The policy is clear. The problem is implementation, and this country needs a strong presidency able to push through the reform. Or rather to lead the implementation of necessary reform.

[Goryachev] Is that an illusion that one man can change the situation even if he is Gorbachev and even if he is president? Andrey do join us in the discussion.

[Kortunov] Well you know, my feeling is that this decision certainly will not change the situation overnight, and in fact I wouldn't even say that Gorbachev acquires more practical power because until now he managed to get from the Supreme Soviet almost everything he wanted to get. On the other hand his abilities will still be very limited because his real powers are limited. The country is disintegrating, the regional political forces are out of control and I think that the developments in the regions, not only in the republics but also in, you know, some regions of Russia itself will be probably more important than any decisions taken here in Moscow. But setting a precedent I think is very important and probably later, when the system of presidential power is established, it will have more significance [words indistinct].

[Goryachev] Okay. One of the arguments for the necessity of introducing presidential system was that the president should have more powers. I don't think that Gorbachev did not have enough powers. While he was....

[Plekhanov] I think he did have—he did not have enough power. I think that we have seen a gradual erosion of the traditional centers of power where most of the decision-making was concentrated in the Politburo. We have seen the growth of new institutions, but insufficient growth. In the past year or two we have had a growing vacuum of power. I think to anyone who has witnessed the way decisions were not implemented, the way there was confusion as to who is in control of work and who is responsible for particular decisions, I think the vacuum of power has become a crucial feature of the political situation. That created a danger that that vacuum would be filled by some forces or people who would like to go back to the times of Brezhnev or Stalin. (?They say) at least we had order at that time. So there was an objective need of a system which is huge, very complex, to kind of pull itself together around something. In pulling itself around Gorbachev and his program it's putting itself on a track which leads to further democratization, rather than back to authoritarian....

[Goryachev] Probably also distancing the presidency from the party structure.

[Kortunov] Yes, I think it is important that Gorbachev acquires a new source of legitimacy because until now his basic source of legitimacy was his position as general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and now he makes another step. He is beyond this party structure and I think that it creates additional legal and moral position for his (?act as) the leader of the country.

[Goryachev] In his speech after he was proclaimed the president I noticed that Gorbachev said: As a president I should not represent one or another political trend but rather the whole society, the population—so this is

another sign of probably his willingness to get aside a little bit from the party structures and become more independent.

[Kortunov] Oh, yes, I think it's one of his goals and it is his traditional line just to preserve consensus. Again the question is whether it is the time for a consensus and for compromises and I think that many people, especially from the Inter-Regional Group, were quite disappointed because Gorbachev during this congress also tried to balance between, you know, radicals and moderates and conservatives and [words indistinct]

[Goryachev] Yes, you mentioned this Inter-Regional Group of Deputies which is generally viewed as a group of the radically-minded deputies. It's interesting that a lot of these deputies voted against when the voting was in the congress, they voted against Gorbachev. How would you explain that, that most radically-minded people were against that radical step?

[Plekhanov] I don't think that....

[Goryachev] And it is a radical step.

[Plekhanov] I don't think you can legitimately say that most of the Inter-Regional Group voted against Gorbachev.

[Goryachev] Not most, but a lot of people.

[Plekhanov] Well, have you seen the list?

[Goryachev] Well, I know some of the names of the people, like Sergey Stankevich, Yuriy Afanasyev.

[Plekhanov, interrupting] [words indistinct] Right, but there are 600—there are 600 people in the Inter-Regional Group and before we can generalize about [how] the voting went in that particular part of the congress we must look at the names. I have heard a number of very influential spokesmen of the Inter-Regional Group like Nikolay Travkin, for instance, who carries much more weight than Stankevich, who urged the election of Gorba—to support Gorbachev.

[Goryachev] I am sure that there was a division in the ranks of that group because part of the vote against Gorbachev clearly came from the right wing. In fact, judging by some of the most abusive speeches against Gorbachev and the nomination process that were made, they came from the right not from the left. So I think you had something like an unholy alliance between the far right and the far left who were for different reasons very unhappy about the fact that only yesterday they kind of held Gorbachev by the coat tails and now he's free from there. Again, he was able to get out of a very difficult political situation with increased stature and with renewed ability, a renewed mandate for progressive reform.

[Kortunov] I think that many people, those of them who opposed this nomination, this election, were not against the presidency in principle but against the procedures, how it was done just now because they thought they should wait until the new constitution is deliberated and put this presidential powers in the framework of the new constitution. Besides, I guess that many people are not sure that there'll be a real balance of power between the Supreme Soviet and the president, especially because everybody knows that Lukyanov, who is the new chairman of the Supreme Soviet, is a close friend of Gorbachev and it is very difficult to [words indistinct] [indistinct interruption] Yes, and, you know, during last year [they] showed that they are very cooperative and nobody knows how he manages to preserve independence and even some kind of opposition to the president.

[Plekhanov] Well, my concern frankly right now is not how much independence the Supreme Soviet will have. My concern is that we have enough unity at this stage, because what we need now is consensus and unity. If we continue squabbles for the sake of squabbling, and I'm sorry to say much of what the Inter-Regional Group has been doing in the past few months was squabbling and personal power pursuits rather than concern about the fate of the country and the fate of democracy. [sentence as heard]

[Goryachev] I will continue along the lines that you spoke Andrey—one of the arguments at the Congress of People's Deputies was that the president should be elected on general elections, by the people of the Soviet Union, not by, not by the deputies, and Mikhail Gorbachev got 59 percent of the vote in the congress. How much do you think he would get had there been a general election?

[Kortunov] Well, I think that would depend on, first of all, the timing of elections, and then his possible rivals. I think at the moment there is no political figure in the Soviet Union that can expect realistically to win elections against Gorbachev, but if the economic situation deteriorates just in a year, or in two years, I'm not sure that Gorbachev will be able to win next general election.

[Goryachev] What do you think about it? How many votes would he get?

[Plekhanov] Well I'm sure that he would get a majority of the votes because I don't see any serious rival to Gorbachev. I mean, all the people who are sniping at him from their current political positions are able to do so only because they have never really squared with him in the same ring. It's one thing to be, you know, a deputy and criticize, and they say he's not doing this thing right and the other thing: It's another absolutely different situation when you actually go out and say I'm prepared to challenge him for the leadership. That is a tall order, and I don't see anybody who comes anywhere close to matching Gorbachev and his ability, wisdom and accomplishments, real accomplishments. If you compare to the list of Gorbachev accomplishments in five years to whatever the other possible candidates have to offer, I mean, do you, can you seriously believe that Yeltsin

could defeat Gorbachev for the presidenty of the Soviet Union? I mean I'm a little....

[Goryachev] Well, Yeltsin got so many votes in Moscow last year during the....

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Oh, come on....

[Goryachev, continuing] ...People may vote against somebody, not for.

[Plekhanov] Oh come on, this is not serious. Look, I voted in that election, I voted for Yeltsin because I know why I was doing it and I know that thousands of people voted for Yeltsin because they didn't like the way he was handled by the party apparatus. Okay? But that's a different thing from voting for the president.

[Goryachev] Alright, here is another question. There were two tasks—one was to get more additional powers and the second task I think is to get the support of the people. Now Gorbachev has that additional power, but many people may think that he was not elected democratically. What do you think about that?

[Plekhanov] Well, we'll see what people will think. I would not like to pre-judge the way popular opinion will work out. I think there was a lot of wisdom in what academician Likhachev said, who remembers the revolution in 1917 that, folks, we can have a civil war if we go into a presidential election on the basis of popular vote.

[Kortunov] Well, you know, my feeling is that in fact now Gorbachev is really in a way pushed into the corner, paradoxically, because he has nobody in front of him to, you know, to share responsibility. He is the person in charge, and I think that it makes his situation more difficult than it was for [the] recent five years, and if he fails to accomplish a lot in economic and social fields, I doubt that he'll be re-elected if we have a re-election.

[Goryachev] Yes.

[Plekhanov] Well, in a way, you know, it does make his position more difficult than in the past five years, but on the other hand it makes it easier because he's not the guy who likes hiding behind somebody's backs—he wants to push certain reforms. He has been frustrating [as heard] in his work, in his struggle for those reforms. Now some of that frustration will possibly be removed because he will have fewer constraints—he will have a real cockpital [as heard] power in the Kremlin to implement the reforms. So in a way I think he is now a freer man, but with greater responsibility on his shoulders, that's of course, and it's a challenge to him—let's see how he resonds to it.

[Goryachev] Yeah, let's see. Let me say that people these days are trying to compare the presidential system in the United States and in the Soviet Union and the press is now saying about 100 days in power of the new president. What do you think Mikhail Gorbachev as the new president should do first?

[Plekhanov] Well, his two priorities are the economy and the state of the union—relations between Moscow and the republics. Both of these issues are so complex and so difficult to tangle that they call for, not so much for boldness but for wisdom. He has both, of course, both qualities. He said he would push for radicalization of economic reform—that's very good because new legislation on economic freedom, if you generalize all the various laws that have been promulgated, requires somebody to really push that freedom through.

[Kortunov] Yeah, but the question is whether he's going to re-evaluate the economic programs of Ryzhkov's government.

[Plekhanov] Yeah, that's right. In the immediate terms, that is the question which needs to be addressed. I think that that is coming. I think that is coming.

[Goryachev] Sergey, you mentioned earlier that good decisions were not implemented in the Soviet Union. Do you think that presidential decree can be ignored now? Is there a possibility of that?

[Plekhanov] It's not a matter of signing another paper, it's a matter of mobilizing the executive mechanism of power. You've got to fire some people, you've got to kick some ass, you've got to be very persistent in forcing the apparatus of executive power to implement the laws which the legislature has voted. So far the, unfortunately, the apparatus has been dragging its feet and obstructing some of the reforms.

[Kortunov] The problem is what will be the structure of the presidential apparatus itself, because I know for sure that many people from the old apparatus want just to shift gears and to join the president's team, and the question is whether Gorbachev is persistent enough just to cut these people off and....[indistinct interruptions]

[Goryachev] ...to be in his presidential council.

[Kortunov] Yeah, well that's the question.

[Plekhanov] Well I think some of the people from the old apparatus should be there. Without them you will not have continuity.

[Kortunov] Yes, well, if continuity is what we need now, of course.

[Plekhanov] Well, continuity is necessary wherever there is any kind of change otherwise you are up in the air.

[Goryachev] Airight gentlemen, we've touched upon the problems, mainly internal problems, but how do you think the new presidency will affect the international behavior of the Soviet Union, say relations with the United States—will there be any changes in that because Gorbachev is now president?

[Kortunov] Well, I think that it should create a situation of greater confidence among the partners of the Soviet Union abroad because Gorbachev is now the person in

charge, and I think that our partners can be more sure that he's in the control of the situation. I think that practically his role can be very important, for example, in pushing the international treaties through the Supreme Soviet because the process of democratization can create a lot of obstacles. In this respect, and for example, I'm not sure that the START agreement is going to be easily ratified by the Supreme Soviet, so I think that the presidential powers give him another possibility to make his foreign policy more consistent.

[Goryachev] Alright, President Gorbachev is certainly confronted with a lot more problems than any other president in the world. Too much is at stake here. We can only wish him success and we'll see what is going to happen next. Thank you very much. That's it—Top Priority for today. Taking part were Sergey Plekhanov and Andrey Kortunov—the two political experts, and moderating was Sergey Goryachev. Thank you for listening.

Interregional Group Discusses Presidency

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[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] Burbulis and Travkin, representatives of the Interregional Group of Deputies, have held a meeting with the public in Moscow. The topic of the meeting was "The presidential form of government—for and against". In his speech, Burbulis pointed out the need to adopt democratic laws on the party, the press, and on referendums, without which no presidential power can be democratic. In his view, reorganization of the existing parliament is essential. Travkin expressed the opinion that the Democratic Platform of the CPSU is today the only serious movement capable of very rapidly forming itself into a party. It was announced at the meeting that the Interregional Group of Deputies plans to hold a meeting on 25 March, which will be the continuation of similiar democratic actions carried out in Moscow on 4 and 25 February, the INTERFAX correspondent reports.

Legislator Supports Presidential System

90UN1042B Moscow TRUD in Russian 25 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by Ye. Malkova, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet: "Tolerance and Responsibility"]

[Text] Analyzing the situation in the country, one cannot help but see that groups of people have formed recently that evaluate what is going on from equally extreme—but mutually exclusive—positions. Some believe perestroyka is undermining the foundations of socialism, betraying our ideals, and calling for capitalism. Others, quite to the contrary, do not see any changes at all under way in our country.

There are different ways of thinking, of course. It is something else which is alarming: The prospect of normal political argumentation in the country turning into confrontation, mutual intransigence on the part of people adhering to different views, and an unwillingness to use facts and argument to offer specific proposals in attempting to prove one's case. It seems there are people who do not understand that the transition to democracy is not replacing black-and-white concepts with white-and-black ones, one authoritarianism with another. Democracy presupposes not the supremacy of views different from those which preceded, but a different thinking, a readiness to respect other views along with one's own.

Yes, the situation in our country is complicated. We see no change in the consumer market; interethnic quarrels continue. But along with all of this, we cannot help but see that our country is taking up a path towards civilized development and that the foundations of a democratic, civic, and humane society are gradually taking shape. The USSR Supreme Soviet has been pursuing in earnest the adoption of radical laws which, I am certain, will transform the economic situation: The Law on Ownership, the Law on Land.

As a participant in this process, I can testify that drafts of the new laws are not being drawn up by "the apparatus," as some believe. Analysis of a most detailed and scrupulous nature is being conducted in committees and commissions regarding proposals and drafts—often the final text of a draft law differs radically from that which was originally introduced. A course has been set for offering maximum independence to the labor collectives, peasants, and local organs of authority.

I understand that the people expect a great deal from their deputies; but we legislators also want to do our work in an atmosphere of calm, a businesslike environment, and not one of an unreserved mass rally where emotions are supercharged. Is it possible there are people who need to cut short the democratic process which has begun, to once again tear it down "to its foundations...?"

I believe there might be people who adhere to other views, who propose other ways of resolving the problems which have accumulated; but they must aspire to power through democratic means, contending for the vote of the electorate. I recall A.D. Sakharov and his manner of addressing an opponent, choosing his words so as not to offend someone. It is impossible to imagine him screaming from the podium or calling for some kind of violent action.

I honestly admit that I am frightened not just as a deputy, but as a mother as well, by the aggressive spirit which is pervading the air, the intolerance for others' ways of thinking being shown by different social entities. Any rumor, any unfortunate scathing comment can—as

shown by the sad events of which we are all aware—cause a chain reaction of violence. Responsibility and humaneness, treating one another in guarded fashion—this is what is required now.

What I have stated here also defines my attitude toward the question of presidential rule. Democracy is not anarchy—it is strong authority formed by democratic means. It is quite evident that the CPSU's rejection of power monopoly resounding clearly at the latest Central Committee plenum and acknowledgment of the possibility of a multi-party system make it necessary to take a different view of the forms of highest state rule. The country needs a chief of state, a president who confidently coordinates the activity of the highest organs of authority and rule, and who bears responsibility for his actions and decisions before the people.

Active Reform Seen as Guarantee of Democracy

PM1303114790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Andrey Nuykin: "Are We Erecting the Barricade in the Right Place? Publicist's Fears on the Day the Congress Opens"]

[Text] It cannot be denied that it is pleasant to feel that you belong to the progressive camp, firmly and uncompromisingly defending democracy against encroachment by any person or organization that takes it into its head to forgo its sacred principles. Enough, we have forgone too much as it is! We still have not forgotten how the Bolshevik leaders underestimated Stalin's appointment to the strictly "clerical" office of general secretary and how that ended. Today, however, we are not talking about some technical office but about a state president invested by law with extraordinary powers—in the full sense of the word. Can this be some sort of joke? He is supreme commander in chief, head of the Council of the Federation, selects the Presidential Council himself, "proposes" who should be on the Constitutional Oversight Committee, can declare a state of emergency, has the right to start a war without parliamentary approval, can relieve government members of their duties.... To crown it all, it is proposed to carry out such a radical reform of power in haste, without even resolving the question of the Union Treaty, organizing the work of parliament so that it can be a guarantor against usurpation, working through the legal details, discussing the idea on a nationwide scale.... Can the response in any upright citizen be anything but an urgent desire to "use might and main" against undemocratic intentions, to "do battle" and "fight to the death?"

We are not dogmatists or formalists, we can forgo whatever we like—glory, plenty, even our own personal freedom—but not the fundamental principles which we first embarked on perestroyka to assert! Stop. Perhaps a similar slogan was used in the press not so long ago? Yes, but then it was a question of what were strictly bad principles, whereas ours are good principles: Go on, ask the world community, it will confirm this!

It would confirm this, of course, but that is the whole point: Despite this certainty, serious doubts are stealing into our hearts. I, for example, agreed with almost everything my friends and like-minded associates from the interregional group said at the Supreme Soviet session with regard to why we should not be in so much of a hurry to introduce the institution of presidency. They spoke very correctly, whereas the reverse was true of Mikhail Gorbachev: He behaved "incorrectly," was on edge, silenced dissenters, and violated the norms which govern any parliamentary discussion. They all spoke correctly in their subsequent speeches and interviews, logically, cogently, in full accordance with their principles, which must not be forgone (I am not being sarcastic: They really must not be forgone), but the sense of some great general incorrectness, in the face of which these individual correctnesses are not so significant, grew and grew. The nightmarishness of the situation was that, on the one hand, I clearly realized that the principles being upheld by my like-minded associates from the interregional group were absolutely correct and must be defended to the death, while, on the other, in defending them to the death I unfortunately began to feel like another Nina Andreyeva. The end result was a feeling of self-hatred. In the form of merciless questions. Such as these, for example.

If we really are so unreconciled to any deviation from democratic norms, why on earth have we been resigned so meekly and so long not only to undemocratic electoral laws but also to countless instances of arbitrariness, cheating, and falsification during elections? For some reason I cannot recall even one of our deputies' raising the question of bringing charges against those guilty of such serious crimes—crimes that are lethally dangerous to democracy—or of ruling void those elections where cheating by the apparatus has been established. If there are no free, honest elections, any talk of democracy can only be a joke or an attempt to mislead people.

If we are really concerned about preserving the prestige of the legislature, how can we allow the public prosecutor's office to ignore the commissions established at the heart of that authority? Why are we resigned to the fact that the Finance Ministry has in fact placed itself above parliament, openly and with impunity nullifying one after the other with its semiliterate verdicts our laws—laws which are designed to deepen economic reform?

Is parliament itself particularly concerned about its own prestige? Our main, most fateful law—the Law on Ownership—was born in great torment, in fierce battle, after a nationwide discussion. This law incorporates a great deal that is right and important, but.... In the last minutes of the discussion, our melancholic Abalkin proposed that the first section of the law include the point, already rejected together with the preamble, according to which "the exercising of any form of ownership must exclude the alienation of the working man from the means of production and man's exploitation by his fellow man." If we intend to observe the laws we adopt, then, according to this point, we must first of

all close down all of the country's collective farms and state enterprises. No one is going to do that, of course, but on the other hand any leaseholder or farmer who employs the services of his neighbor to milk his cow while his wife is ill could (if the authorities so desired) be declared a state criminal. But the Supreme Soviet had no hesitation in including this fantastic, speculative point in the country's main law. We democrats and people fighting for the prestige of the highest organs of people's power pretend that nothing remarkable has happened and that another major step has been taken in the task of building a rule-of-law state.

The list of examples illustrating our condescension toward ourselves is endless. On the other hand, our exactingness toward M.S. Gorbachev is growing not by the day but by the hour. We are becoming painfully suspicious and childishly capricious: You started all this, you dragged us into this, you must match up to expectations, if you please, otherwise we could get disillusioned!

It is true that, just lately, one sometimes gets the impression that we democrats, publicists, deputies, and foremen of restructuring feel that we have done our share of the work to transform society and that all that remains for us to do now is reeducate Gorbachev. That, as soon as he starts to obey us in everything, perestroyka will cheerfully swish its tail and gallop off with a happy whinny, free of encumbrances, along the path well trodden by Western democracies to the kingdom of universal contentment and prosperity. The problem is this: Our student is not very obedient—he keeps bad company, he's lazy about mugging up the textbooks, and he refuses to share his innermost thoughts in class.... The last point is particularly suspicious. The human heart is a mystery: What if, deep down, he suddenly wants to become a tyrant?

When someone voices suspicion from the podium of the Supreme Soviet that the interregional group is perhaps hatching a secret plot to seize power, this does not make the speaker look good. But when we ourselves—apparently totally forgetting what Gorbachev has achieved in recent years in the world political arena—start to suspect him of dreaming about undivided power, to be perfectly honest, it makes me feel sad. As if he could not have seized that power long ago by following the tried and tested, traditional path taken by previous general secretaries: Serving the nomenklatura? If he had done that, he and the apparatchiks would have had glory cast upon them while we, enjoying only a fraction of the glasnost we have today, would have worshipped him.

However, in our country as it is today—in havoc and reared over the abyss—"undivided power" is not so much to do with power as with undivided responsibility and the kind of burden that would be capable of driving Svyatogor himself into the ground up to his knees. Anyone who has a conscience should be hastening to place his shoulder under this burden, but we are just looking askance with suspicion and asking whether he perhaps wants too much for himself. **Not for himself, but on himself!** I have even heard the line that Gorbachev is introducing a presidential form of government so that the old apparatchiks can retain their power.

This would be simply risible if the logic of such stoking of suspicion were not pushing perestroyka in too dangerous a direction.

It is said that, if elected president, Gorbachev will concentrate "too much power" in his hands. "Too much" in comparison with what? And in the name of what is it concentrated "to excess?" Gorbachev would even now have sufficient power to finish off the sole achievement of perestroyka—glasnost—and drive us back to the kitchens with our revolutionary ideas (he would at once find swarms of very influential helpers in this!). In fact, all our new democratic institutions are still, alas, linked with the mechanisms of real power mainly through him alone!

But if you compare this "too much" with the forces of the rapidly uniting (unlike the democrats) alliance of antiperestroyka forces (which there is surely no need to decipher), then compared with them—even if you add the entire potential of our existing democratic institutions and associations to the extraordinary concentration of state power, as provided for in the law on the presidency—even then there might not be a "preponderance of forces." Only the involvement of the great masses of workers and young people in the process of active struggle for democracy (which, unfortunately, has not yet happened) is capable, I believe, of insuring our society against attempts to reverse history and, thus, also against a bloody civil war.

And in such a tense situation, when the fate of perestroyka continues to "hang by a thread," we democrats are beginning to behave as though we have basically completed the building of a rule-of-law state and perestroyka may now be brought to a victorious conclusion by holding ardent debates on the podium at the Supreme Soviet microphone, by displaying intractability in the polishing of juridical formulas. We explain the fact that the laws which we are fighting so hard to "win" do not function by saying that we have not yet found the right words and magic syntactical turns of speech.

Enraptured by these parliamentary games, somehow we fail to notice that the fate of perestroyka is actually being decided in quite different places—certainly not in public, not in verbal skirmishes, but in tense backstage political and economic struggles, where **the process of perestroyka is, alas, being "maintained" not by us deputies and publicists but still by him, the initiator of the reforms, Mikhail Gorbachev**, who is being attacked from all sides and being criticized with increasing irritation, who maneuvers to excess (so it seems to us), who craftily (as we are convinced) imposes his will now on the Congress of Deputies, now on the Supreme Soviet, now on the CPSU Central Committee plenum, who out of indecision (so we believe) does not stand openly beneath the banners of our democratic radical camp....

It already seems to some of us that Gorbachev is the "yesterday of perestroyka," that with his inconsistency and indecision he is already beginning to slow down its victorious swift run, and some of us, devoting ourselves entirely to the noble cause of reeducating Gorbachev, are already ready to switch from dialogue and opposition to confrontation and struggle. The idea of introducing presidential power has caused a new surge in this tendency. The impression is gained that we democrats are imperceptibly beginning to erect a barricade to "protect perestroyka against its initiators," as is being written for effect on some posters.

Is it not time we came to our senses and collected ourselves, before it is too late? There is no denying that a barricade needs erecting. A strong one. Without delay. But in quite a different place—so that Gorbachev does not suddenly find himself on the other side of it through our fault. We and perestroyka need him on this side. As a leader [lider]. We have no other and, I am convinced, need no other. There will be any number of people ready and willing to splash gasoline onto the fire of our flippant confrontation with the instigators of perestroyka. We must not make their task easier.

The presidency law contains a mass of flaws, there is no denying the fact. It must be criticized and, where possible, improved, at the same time not forgetting that it, like almost all the others, is a temporary, "transitional" law. There is no need to place Gorbachev beyond criticism. Only it must be criticism not by opponents but by like-minded people, by comrades in the common cause, the common struggle. This is obvious, but....

In criticizing our leader, giving him advice, and making complaints, we must still proceed not from abstract general schemes and fine principles removed from time and space, but from a sober understanding of the situation today and the role which the head of state and the leader of a party of almost 20 million members plays in the political process. I will venture to assert that, if Gorbachev had suddenly begun to obediently follow all our generally undoubtedly wise advice and to take note of all our perfectly fair criticism, he would long ago have suffered total defeat as a politician and a statesman. And we democrats along with him.

This is one view. There is also a second one. There is endless, excited guesswork on this subject: Do we believe Gorbachev or not? But there is also another, not so insignificant question: Does he have sufficient grounds for believing in us to do battle with an open visor?

We are afraid that the democratic form of power will be replaced by totalitarian power on the approval of the presidency.... It would be interesting to know what we understand by "democratic form of power." Our still ornamental parliament, which the bureaucracy has skillfully installed within its own edict-administrative system of power at no special danger to itself?

We demand guarantees that the presidential form of rule will not degenerate into dictatorship.... Of whom do we demand it? If you think seriously about it—of Gorbachev once again. We suspect him of dictatorial penchants and put our trust in him as the guarantor of democracy. It is even amusing.

If our parliament really possessed the power due to it under the law, it would not require guarantees against dictatorship. But if it still does not have this power then, no matter what we write into the Constitution, we will not get guarantees.

Recent party plenums convincingly attest that the leaders of perestroyka must be removed from the CPSU's control without delay. Whoever opposes this, even for the most democratic reasons, jeopardizes precisely our embryonic democracy.

You cannot win without taking risks. We, alas, still have absolutely nothing to lose but our aims. But Gorbachev has proved both in the country and in the world through his deeds that perestroyka is his life's cause, and it is quite vulgar and absurd to suspect that he will swap it for a special ration and a special medical center. But the "aggressively dutiful majority" which, it turns out, is to act as the guarantor of democracy in the proposed dilemma has not yet proved itself as such in any way, and I would not take the risk of entrusting the country's fate to its decisions.

As for guarantees.... Democrats must not waste time playing "true or false" but must go "to the people"—form democratic parties, revive free trade unions, awaken young people's activeness, dismantle the mechanisms of antipopular power at all levels, promote and defend the economic reform.... If we succeed in this real, profound transformation of life on democratic principles, we will fear no threat of dictatorship. If not, will it make any great difference to us what constitutional wording is given to the next clique's unchecked power?

PRAVDA Chides Conservatives, Ultraradicals

PM2003235390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Mar 90 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "The 28th CPSU Congress Lies Ahead"]

[Text] The very major political events of the past week, which are now crucial to the life of our country, are bound up in the closest possible way with the work of the CPSU Central Committee March Plenum. That is because the interest today in the processes of perestroyka and renewal under way in the CPSU is nationwide in character and because the party remains the leading [vedushchaya] political force in our society. The success of revolutionary perestroyka in the country, which was initiated and has been led by the CPSU, crucially depends upon how the party restructures its own ranks and how its democratization and search for new ways and forms of improving all facets of party life fares.

The plenum has fixed 2 July 1990 as the date for the 28th congress and defined its agenda. The party forum will

have to examine the progress of perestroyka, party tasks, and the reports of the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission and sum up the results of the discussion of the draft platform "For a Humane, Democratic Socialism", the draft of the new statutes, and the draft regulations on the CPSU Central Control and Auditing Commission, and elect central party organs.

Preparation for the congress is already in full swing. Communists and nonparty people are engaged in in-depth, comprehensive discussion of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform, treating it as a conceptual document which incorporates well-considered, critical analysis of the state of affairs in the party and puts forward very important guidelines for tackling the very acute socioeconomic and political problems and the fundamantal objectives of our society's renewal. The draft has become the basis and foundation for partywide discussion and has provided a powerful impetus for us in stepping up our collective search. The CPSU Central Committee, the PRAVDA editorial office, and other publications receive tens of thousands of letters from party members, workers, rural workers, and scientific and cultural figures containing assessments and comments on the basic provisions of this document and sensible suggestions regarding perestroyka and the renewal of the party. Readers may judge this for themselves, particularly from the pages appearing under the "Discussion Leaflet" rubric, where the editorial office seeks to present the whole diversity of opinion and standpoints and the wealth of ideas and approaches to solving the truly novel talks facing the party.

The differing assessments of the draft platform are natural and understandable: Given glasnost, pluralism of opinions, and the opportunity to express one's standpoint openly and boldly, it could not be otherwise. And this can only be welcomed. PRAVDA will continue to provide a forum for everyone who has something to say and who is really concerned about the party's future and proposes better, more effective ways of renewing the party organization's work style and methods. In developing ever more extensively free inquiry, unfettered by instructions and cliches, it is essential—and this is also noted by readers in their letters to our newspaper editorial office—to firmly defend the party's positions and not cave in when people try to erode the ideological and organizational Marxist-Leninist foundations of the CPSU.

Here one cannot fail to note that a number of party organizations, having focussed their main attention on discussion questions, do sometimes forget about the equally important task of explaining and propagandizing the fundamental provisions of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform and other precongress party documents and their innovative character. Explaining not in a perfunctory, formal way but so that every communist is able to define his stance consciously and grasp the point of alternative proposals which are also current in party organizations. After all, the advocates of extreme views on the role and place of the CPSU in our society are becoming more and more clamorous now as the ideological and political struggle heats up. It is pretty difficult for people—communists and nonparty people—amidst this mosaic of opinions and ideas to distinguish between a sincere desire in favor of choosing unorthodox decisions, and a desire to use discussion for the purpose of imposing one's own views, views which are remote from the interests of the party and the people.

Some party workers, and also a section of the party masses, who do not want radical changes see them as meaning a loss of political influence and party positions. There are also "card-carrying party members" who have no qualms about adopting standpoints which essentially reject the party and indiscriminately cancel out its history, reducing the whole route traversed by us to mistakes and distortions of the Stalin-Brezhnev leadership. Forgetting that it was the CPSU and its finest forces themselves which began the critical, ruthlessly honest examination of former structures and methods, when the party masses were essentially kept away from any involvement in developing party policy, forming its leadership organs, or monitoring their work. Today's perestroyka of the party, which aims to give it a new complexion in keeping with Lenin's ideas on the vanguard political force of Soviet society, is designed to eliminate those defects generated by the era of the cult of the personality, arbitrary rule, and stagnation. But this, as was stressed with absolute clarity at the Central Committee plenum, has nothing in common with claims that the main route in the CPSU's evolution lies in its conversion into a party of a purely parliamentary type, let alone some amorphous sociopolitical tendency with blurred edges and a purely formal membership. In other words, into a kind of motley, scrappy coverall "sewn" from the most diverse factions, groups, and tendencies.

Now, in the runup to the congress, which is just over three months away, it is essential to say a decisive "no" to those who are holding back urgent changes in the party's life and those who by adapting to the processes of its reformation hope to weaken our political positions. Both approaches are detrimental to the cause of the party. Particularly now, when the CPSU has relinquished the constitutional enshrinement of its leading [rukovodyashchaya] role and must by means of a vigorous, well-considered policy and skill express and uphold the interests of the working class and all working people and establish its own right to be the political vanguard of the progressive forces of society.

The CPSU Central Committee March Plenum, which was a direct continuation of the previous plenum in February, examined the draft new statutes and resolved organizational questions concerning preparation for the 28th congress. The main areas of precongress work for all tiers of the party and its political guidelines have thus been defined. At the same time the decisions of recent Central Committee plenums offer broad scope for creativity, for invigorating the actions of every party cell and every communist, for implementing the course of

real rule by the party masses, for democratizing relations within the party, and for overcoming crisis phenomena in the party.

Recent months have shown in very acute form that the authority of many party committees has suffered a sharp decline and that people will not put up with conservative-bureaucratic working methods, the absolute power of the apparatus, and its attachment to outmoded methods of leadership based on orders and coercion. This affected the results of the elections to republic and local soviets, when the electorate voted out certain party workers. The fact that quite often such defeats were the consequence of "rally pressure," the artificial heightening of passions, and attempts to create an "enemy image" out of some so-called apparatchiks will not do as an excuse. Today no one is guaranteed a peaceful, easy life. We have to learn how to stand up to our political opponents and not dodge keen debate.

This cannot be done by using yesterday's methods. As it is altogether impossible to win the trust of the masses by words alone, even by the most well-constructed and eloquent speeches. What counts is skill in getting things done and concern for people's needs. This may be a truism, but it bears repeating, because the people judge the qualities of a party worker and activist by his deeds. And additionally by his ideological and political stance regarding perestroyka, his moral outlook, and his responsiveness to another's pain. How often this is forgotten! Can people really trust someone who permits deviations from moral standards or is guilty of an improper deed?

The party's authority is not just the authority enjoyed by its policy and ideals. It is perhaps first and not least the authority of each party member, particularly the communist leader who enjoys his party comrades's trust.

This must always be borne in mind. Particularly now, when the nomination of candidates for the 28th party congress and the reports and elections in party organizations are in prospect. The success of the perestroyka of the party depends in many respects upon who will lead the primary party organizations and party committees at local level. The body of delegates will have a crucial influence upon its future, its authority in society, and the choice of the key areas of party policy. It is clear right now that a pretty keen contest for delegate seats is going to rage. It cannot be ruled out that conservative forces, accustomed to "lead" and wishing to hang onto their old posts, will try to exploit to their advantage certain loopholes in the new, freer procedure for elections to the congress. But there is also undoubtedly a desire on the part of "ultraradicals"—they talk about this openly, by the way—to win a majority at the congress and thereby realize their own political ambitions. Communists must learn to distinguish clearly who is seeking to gain their favor and why, and to establish what underpins the big promises and assurances of some "foremen" of perestroyka. It is necessary to be bolder in nominating truly creative, enterprising people who are capable of upholding the real interests of the people and the party in today's difficult conditions and uniting kindred spirits around them and to be able to conduct a dialogue with other public and political movements in favor of perestroyka.

Our party does not claim a monopoly of the truth or a monopoly of power. The new program documents submitted for precongress discussion are clear evidence of this. They direct communists toward the search for new and effective forms and methods of working under present-day conditions and in the atmosphere of political pluralism and toward the radical democratization of relations inside the party. But the CPSU—and this was repeatedly stressed at the March plenum—is abandoning neither the democratic struggle for political leadership in society nor its political responsibility to the people for the state of affairs in the country, the economy, and the social sphere, for ensuring the security, rights, and freedoms of citizens, and for strengthening the Soviet state and our socialist federation. It will continue to help establish new political thinking and the observance of our country's international interests in the world.

Preparation for the 28th congress will undoubtedly be a key stage in the work of CPSU party organizations. One must not expect at all, as happened in the past, that the supreme party forum will assemble and solve everything and that our job will merely be to execute what has been planned. Delay is unacceptable today. The proceedings and decisions of the February and March plenums provide a fundamental basis not just for discussion but for practical action, too. In other words, there is a need for action. A need for action on the part of primary party committees, whose rights and opportunities are being substantially increased, and rayon and city party committees, whose role today is particularly crucial. And action, too, on the part of the party press and the CPSU mass media, which must become authoritative, militant party organs and effectively influence public opinion.

The party's influence and fighting effectiveness—and consequently the success of perestroyka and the practical solution of the tasks of the revolutionary transformation of society—depend on the words and deeds of every communist and every tier of the party.

Poll Taken on Support for Government, Perestroyka

LD2702191890 Moscow World Service in Russian 1040 GMT 27 Feb 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] More and more Soviet people are becoming aware of the need for a consolidation of public forces in support of perestroyka. This has been shown by a public opinion poll conducted in the country.

About 34 percent of those polled said that the state is now living through a complicated stage in its development and is in need of support. This part of the population is prepared to make temporary sacrifices to ensure the success of the economic and political transformations which have begun in the country. At the same time, the poll showed that certain strata of the population have not yet abandoned their group egoism.

Government Submits Economic Reform Program

LD2003125990 Moscow World Service in Russian 1038 GMT 20 Mar 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to Interfax]

[Text] The Soviet Government has submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet commissions a program of economic reforms containing 17 mutually-linked documents. The INTERFAX agency reports that these documents were drawn up under the direction of Deputy Premier Leonid Abalkin. The reform program proposed by the government sets out to denationalize property and switch to a market economy. It will lead to demonopolization and de-ideologization of the economy. The government proposes in particular to carry out financial and banking reforms, to adopt a law on joint-stock companies, and to reform price formation. With the latter, forms of compensation for the population are to be introduced in connection with the switch to new prices for consumer goods.

Interdepartmental Council Meets On AIDS Threat

LD0503203490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 5 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] I don't know whether we can already speak of an AIDS epidemic in our country, but the figures of the disaster are growing. According to the latest data 426 people have been infected in the USSR, 23 are ill and 14 people have already died. In what way can this process at least be slowed down?

[Correspondent L. Zenina, identified by screen caption] Doctors, scientists, medical industry workers and journalists must unite their efforts in the face of the AIDS menace, and a session of the interdepartmental council has set itself precisely this task. Negligence by medical staff and the low general level of hygiene in hospitals—all this is undoubtedly the fault of the Health Ministry, but the situation is being aggravated by the poor material base for health care—the lack of disposable syringes, diagnostics and centralized sterilization centers. There were questions about this to comrade Kalinin, deputy minister of the medical industry. There was surprise, to put it mildly, at the fact that the Ministry of General Machine Building which supplies the needles for reuseable syringes was reducing production of them year by year. Incidentally, for some reasons its representatives were not at the council. Nevertheless, this complacency is dangerous, if only because last year the numbers of those infected with the AIDS virus increased fourfold and mathematical calculations predict 89,000 for 1993.

[Begin recording] [Zenina to M.I. Narkevich, head of the epidemics direc' ate of the USSR Health Ministry] The greatest proportion of those infected are unfortunately children. I know that parents are simply afraid to take their children for very important innoculations to be done. How will this situation develop in the future?

[Narkevich] The parents are right, if they are not convinced that the innoculation will be carried out with a sterile syringe—whether it is a disposable or a reuseable one. Of course, there are other infections as well as AIDS—Hepatitits-B or any other infections. Therefore, I think that we should, and we hope to in the very near future, literally do the following: That every dose of vaccine should be accompanied by a disposable syringe. Then all these issues will fall away.

[V.V. Pokrovskiy, chairman of the Association for Combating AIDS] It's my deep conviction that an all-union committee should be set up in the country to combat AIDS and that it should be headed by no one less than a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. [end recording]

Nationalist Forces Perform Well in Elections

PM2003165590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Roundup of correspondent reports under the general heading "The Election Campaign Continues": "The Elections in Latvia and Estonia. Runoff elections in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia"]

[Text] Latvia—The events in Lithuania, experts believe, have had an influence on the results of the elections to the Latvian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) Supreme Soviet. It was no longer just victory, but winning two-thirds of the seats that was announced as the main aim of the "Democratic Bloc," which included candidates from the Latvian People's Front, the Movement for National Independence, the Latvian Social Democratic Party, and the "Green" Party. That is the number of deputies' votes needed to change the republic's Constitution.

Elections were held in 201 okrugs. In many of these, mainly where the candidates were representatives of the Latvian People's Front, the candidates fought for victory singly. Fewer than 10 USSR people's deputies—Alksnis, Boyars, Tollezhnikov, Chepanis, and Plotnieks—decided to test the confidence of the republic's electorate. On the whole, they received it, with the exception of the defeated Vilen Tollezhnikov, a member of the movement for the National Independence of Latvia. Although as a whole candidates in the movement won an

unexpectedly large number of seats. The election marathon turned out well for the Union of Latvian Agricultural Workers candidates. Whereas advocates of the independent Communist Party suffered total defeat. Many more party secretaries on the CPSU platform got through. The Latvian People's Front definitely has the lead in terms of the number of seats won.

According to preliminary figures, 170 deputies out of 201 were elected in the first round.
I. Litvinova.

Estonia—There were 392 candidates contesting 105 seats. According to preliminary results, elections were made in all 46 electoral okrugs, and over 75 percent of voters participated.

By this morning, the first winners in the sharp electoral fight were established. V. Vyalyas, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee; A. Ryuytel, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium; I. Toome, chairman of the government; M. Lauristin and E. Savisaar, People's Front leaders; and L. Annus, V. Malkovskiy, N. Zakharov, and P. Panfilov, leaders of the Committee for the Preservation of Soviet Power and the United Council of Labor Collectives, were elected Supreme Soviet deputies.

The electorate has once again confirmed its support for these social activists. It will be known in a few days' time how seats are allotted within the parties and movements—after all, candidates from over 20 parties participated in the election struggle. Lists of candidates were put forward by three large blocs and associations. These were: the People's Front, the "Free Estonia" Association, and the United Council of Labor Collectives-Committee for the Protection of Soviet Power and Civil Rights.

There are no fundamental differences between the electoral platforms of the People's Front and the "Free Estonia" association. Their basic principle is the restoration of an independent statehood for Estonia outside the USSR. The United Council of Labor Collectives advocates a sovereign republic in a renewed federation. Even before the final vote count, it was clear that the People's Front and "Free Estonia" would win an overwhelming majority of votes.

"The election results cannot be identified as a referendum on the question of Estonia's secession from the USSR," P. Panfilov, secretary of the Tallinn Gorkom [City Party Committee] said. "The actual Law on Elections is biased and unfair. Judge for yourselves. In the rural okrugs, a deputy's seat is "worth" between 3,500 and 6,000 votes. A mainly non-indigenous population inhabits the cities. The value of a seat there is 12,000-14,000 votes. So even the population that is theoretically Russian-speaking cannot be proportionally represented in parliament according to their numbers, that is, they cannot defend their opinions and their rights.
L. Levitskiy.

Kiev—In the second round of elections in the Ukraine there were several okrugs where the results of the voting undoubtedly affected the future political balance of forces in the republic. Of course, the okrug in Kiev where V. Ivashko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, and A. Kvas, a teacher at a polytechnical institute representing a bloc of informal organizations, fought for a seat in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet attracted more attention than others. The leader of the republic's Communist Party won.

There is a different picture in other okrugs in the Ukrainian capital. Henceforth a large group of deputies who share the positions held by "Rukh" and the "Green" movement will represent Kiev in the republic's parliament.

The morning after the election, the central electoral commission still did not possess data enabling it to form an overall picture of the distribution of seats. There were many surprise results. For instance, V. Sologub, leader of the Ukrainian trade unions, and Ya. Pogrebnyak, first secretary of Lvov Obkom [Oblast Party Committee], were not elected....

The morning after it could be said with certainty only that virtually all of the more than 300 deputies' seats in the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet vacant after the first round of voting had finally acquired their legitimate owners.
S. Tsikora.

Minsk—Runoffs were held here in 42 of 48 electoral okrugs in the elections of Belorussian SSR people's deputies 17 March. Here are some preliminary results: In the second round 24 Belorussian people's deputies were elected here in the city. They included, in particular, M. Marinich, deputy chairman of the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee]; A. Gerasimenko and P. Kravchenko, secretaries of the party gorkom; and Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk and Grodno, Patriarchal Exarch of Belorussia. V. Mikhasev, chairman of Minsk Gorispolkom, and M. Misuno, first secretary of the party gorkom, failed to win the requisite number of votes.

On Sunday 18 March runoffs for the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet was held in other okrugs in the republic. Reports from okrug electoral commissions are currently being studied. But it is already clear that the elections of Belorussian people's deputies are not quite over.
M. Shimanskiy.

Bashkiria—The 17 March runoff has made it possible to fill another 146 vacancies in the autonomous republic's parliament. Taking into account the first round results, 267 of the 280 seats have been filled. Who has become a Bashkir ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputy? Some 53 first and five second secretaries of CPSU rayon committees and gorkoms, 27 rayon and city soviet executive committee chairmen and four deputy chairman, four heads of rayon and city soviet departments, two heads of CPSU obkom departments, 101 economic leaders of varying ranks, three trade union

committee chairmen, two—a rural and settlement—soviet executive committee chairmen, three Lenin Communist Youth League committee secretaries, one institute rector, and one secondary school director. Workers and women hold 17 and 14 seats respectively. The deputies include 20 medics, one cooperative worker, and... no ordinary kolkhoz members.

Repeat elections will be held in 13 okrugs.
A. Zinovyev.

Moscow—Muscovites were less active this time than on election day 4 March—approximately 60 percent of the electorate voted. However, despite this, the overwhelming majority of okrugs nonetheless succeeded in naming deputies. RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies include N. Vorontsov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection; "Vzglyad" television program presenters V. Mukusev and A. Politkovskiy; and V. Urazhtsev, cochairman of the "Shchit" public organization.

Even a very preliminary study of the list of Moscow Soviet deputies attests that the situation in the capital is changing radically: The composition of the municipal legislators has been virtually completely renewed. Candidates from the "Democratic Russia" bloc, which the newspaper has already mentioned, have an obvious advantage.

Yu. Prokofyev, first secretary of Moscow CPSU Gorkom, and V. Saykin, chairman of Moscow Gorispolkom, were among those who succeeded in winning enough votes.

The turnout proved to be less than 50 percent in a whole series of okrugs; repeat elections lie ahead.
A. Davydov.

Biryukova Interviewed on Social Issues

LD0203143190

[Editorial Report] Moscow World Service in Russian at 1030 GMT on 2 March broadcasts a nine-minute interview with Aleksandra Biryukova, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, by Gira Potaki. Biryukova relates the details of her biography, which she says is unremarkable, despite her achievement of high political office.

Potaki says Biryukova is very involved in women's issues. In reply to a question about work currently being done in this area, Biryukova says much attention is being paid to the position of women. Problems are interconnected with social problems and women's position can only improve if the social situation in the country as a whole improves.

In reply to the question of how she feels as the only woman in the Politburo, Biryukova says she feels quite comfortable with her colleagues.

Frolov Addresses 'Friends of PRAVDA' Club

PM2802145790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[K. Viktorov report: "Meeting of Friends of Newspaper"]

[Text] There are many people who read and respect our newspaper in the district adjoining the PRAVDA publishing house, Culture Center. There are workers and specialists from the "Kommunar" and "Znamya Revolyutsii" plants and veteran print workers. They met 23 February to mark the organization of a "Friends of PRAVDA Club." Its task is to propagandize the political line of the CPSU Central Committee organ and the newspaper's best materials and to conduct discussions and debates.

Members of the newly created club were addressed by I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA.

To Meet Soviet, Foreign Journalists

LD1903053390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Yet another report about a meeting which concerns our colleagues from PRAVDA. Today, in the building where this newspaper's editorial offices are located, a meeting for Soviet and foreign journalists has been announced with Comrade Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and editor-in-chief of the newspaper.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Editor Interviewed

LD0303000590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 2 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The first 50 editions of the new newspaper RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, the organ of the CPSU Central Committee, have been published.

[Begin recording] [A.P. Yurkov, chief editor of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA—identified by caption] We did not have a single central newspaper which was directly aimed at the working collective and, like it or not, it is the working collective which provides us with clothing, footwear, and food. Evidently a tribune for the working collective is necessary, and we are trying to serve as such a tribune.

[Aleksandr Barkhatov, identified by caption] We have been inclined lately to say that people's power has pushed the intelligentsia into running things and that the working class and the collective farm peasantry are yielding some of their positions. How is this phenomenon studied in the newspaper, and is it studied at all?

[Yurkov] It is studied. One of the main strategic directions is the study of the workers' movement which was born last year in the very dramatic events, as we still recall.

[Barkhatov] What precisely are you referring to?

[Yurkov] I am referring in the first instance to the birth of the workers' strike committees, to strikes, and how the working collective can influence the formation of power. Just look, if it is the master of the means which supports power then, evidently, one can pose the question of its having an influence on the formation of this power.

[Barkhatov] At present there are quite a lot of informal organizations in the workers' environment. We do not say that these are led only by the intelligentsia. What is the newspaper's attitude to this?

[Yurkov] We have a unique approach to this. Right from the first edition we have given the informal organizations an airing. We have even created a special column, "Who's Who Among the Leaders of the Informals." And we regularly, no less than once a week, present one of the informal movements. We believe that in principle it is incorrect to shut ourselves off from them. On the contrary, it is necessary to consolidate. And we bring in all informal movements which adopt socialist stances and become friendly with them and invite them, from the pages of our newspaper, to express their own point of view on what is happening on perestroyka, and, in general, to propagandize their ideas. [end recording]

Shalayev 'Satisfied' With Response on Auctions

PM2702160390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report under the "Official" rubric: "What Can Be Sold At Auction. USSR Council of Ministers-Trade Unions: Solution Found"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has examined the appeal from the trade unions to the government on questions of auctions and commercial trade in consumer goods.

It was noted at the session that the organization of auctions and commercial trade was supported by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies in the context of the government's economic recovery program for the country. However, after discussing the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] appeal and labor collectives' proposals on these questions, the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium allowed a number of items to be withdrawn from the list of commodities permitted for sale at auction. These included "Volga" automobiles, fourth-generation color televisions ("Rubin," "Elektron," and "Gorizont"), refrigerators, and two-compartment freezers ("Minsk" and "Biryusa'-').

S.A. Shalayev, chairman of the AUCCTU, told a TASS correspondent that, in view of the AUCCTU proposal, foreign automobiles, antiques, national and folk works of art and literature, along with expensive luxury items containing diamonds, gold, and precious stones, and valuable fur goods (with the exception of headgear) have been added to the list of goods proposed for sale at auction.

No decision has yet been taken on the question of commercial prices. In view of the discussion an accord has been reached to the effect that children's goods, foodstuffs, and Soviet goods in mass demand should not be authorized for sale in commercial stores. Specific lists of goods for sale at commercial prices will be determined by the union republic councils of ministers by agreement with republic trade union councils. But it is intended that mainly luxury products and particularly fashionable prestigious foreign and Soviet-produced commodities should be sold in specialized commercial stores.

The AUCCTU's opinion regarding the inadmissibility of territorial Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] organizations selling the population coveralls, protective clothing, medical equipment, summerhouses, construction materials, and some other kinds of goods at auction, S.A. Shalayev pointed out, also won support. Moreover, the Council of Ministers Presidium went further, completely abolishing the previous list of industrial and technological output to be sold to the population via Gossnab organs. At the same time the government and the AUCCTU deemed it advisable to create all the requisite conditions for expanding sales of essential commodities, semimanufactures, and equipment from available above-norm stocks in enterprise stores. Enterprises can conduct these sales both independently in accordance with legislation and via the Gossnab territorial network.

The AUCCTU is satisfied with the government's prompt and radical resolution of these questions, the chairman emphasized.

Public Order Situation Termed 'Very Difficult'

LD0203145190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1845 GMT 1 Mar 90

[From the "Topical Interview" program; statement by V.A. Yanchenkov, chief of the Department for Cooperation With the Media at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs]

[Excerpt] Good evening, comrades. I think you will agree with me that the mass rallies attended by large numbers of people, which took place in Moscow and other towns and regions of the country on Sunday, 25 February, were the main event in the country's sociopolitical life over the past week. The press, television, and radio have reported on this in a fairly detailed way, so I will not go into it at length.

I just want to say that, according to different figures, the rally in Moscow's Zubovskaya Square was attended by either 500,000 or more than 300,000 people. The

speakers called for solidarity in the campaign for democratic changes in society and urged people to vote in the USSR Supreme Soviet elections for people who can solve the problems that have accumulated in society. I would like to stress that thanks to the well-organized and what I would describe as professional and democratic actions by the militia, the situation in the capital and the country was calm and devoid of serious excesses or breaches of the law.

Nevertheless, the situation in the country remains very difficult. I refer to the crime situation. It is being made even worse by the actions of extremists who put their own interests—I stress, their self-serving interests—before those of the people. The evidence that such actions are far from innocuous is provided by numerous USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs reports from various parts of the country, and particularly southern areas. For a start, unsanctioned meetings are continuing in Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, and many other regions. These rallies are diverting an enormous number of people from their work and are causing tangible economic damage.

Much economic harm also is being caused by a strike that has been taking place for a lengthy period of time—effectively two months—in the Transcaucasus, in Azerbaijan. Since 18 January the losses caused by the strike have amounted to around R700 million. This is an enormous figure; and it is a blow not only to the Azerbaijani economy and the economy of the country as a whole, but above all a blow to the material situation of the strikers themselves.

Reports of extremist actions continue to arrive from the Transcaucasian region. Naturally, there are fewer and fewer such actions, but they still do occur. Let me read you several such reports: In the Azerbaijani town of Martuni on 22 February, an unidentified driver in a Zhiguli car failed to stop when ordered to do so by a military detail. He fired a shotgun at the servicemen. On 23 February a checkpoint in the town of Gadzhilar in Azerbaijan's Lachinskiy Rayon was fired at from the direction of the village of Khoznavar in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic's Gorisskiy Rayon. On the border of Noyemberyanskiy and Kazakhskiy Rayons, which are in Armenia and Azerbaijan, respectively, a meeting between representatives of the Azerbaijan People's Front and the Armenian National Movement took place on 25 February. The Armenian side issued an ultimatum that if Arutyunyan and (Mkrtchyan), who were detained on 18 February for possession of arms and explosives, were not released, hostages would be taken.

Such phenomena, of course, are very seriously complicating the battle against crime. They divert the energies of the militia and the other law-and-order forces and create conditions for a growth in crime. [passage omitted on crime statistics] [video shows footage of 25 February demonstrations, shopworkers' hoarding and speculators' looting, people being detained for drug offenses]

Governmental Body Approves Ecological Bill

LD0503174290 Moscow TASS in English 1429 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 5 TASS—The commission on emergency situations of the Soviet Council of Ministers approved in general the draft state programme for environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources.

The programme specifies steps for the next five years and outlines a plan until 2000.

The document provides for urgent measures to improve the environment in cities with a consistently high level of atmospheric pollution and to terminate dumping sewage into water reservoirs by 2000. It also dwells on the protection and rational use of land, forests, flora, fauna and mineral resources.

The Soviet Union will participate in solving such major international ecological problems as the preservation of the ozone layer and the prevention of negative climatic changes.

The draft project will be discussed by the Soviet public.

The commission also considered the fulfilment of the 1988 governmental programme for the improvement of the ecological situation in the Aral Sea area and noted that the sanitary, epidemiological and ecological situation there remains critical.

The commission instructed the governments of corresponding union republics and union departments to provide for the immediate construction of drinking water supply facilities, to expand the use of underground waters and to speed up the delivery of packed drinking water to the population.

Federation of Independent Trade Unions Announced

LD1903222190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] It has been decided to set up a federation of Russia's independent trade unions at the constituent congress which will open next Wednesday at the Grand Kremlin Hall. This was reported today at a press conference at the all-union central council of trade unions.

Radio, TV Workers Union Planned

LD2802113590 Moscow World Service in English 2100 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] We hope that in the future our listeners will notice an improvement in our broadcasts. These hopes stem from the coming formation of a Union of Radio and Television Workers. One of the main pruposes of the new organization is to raise the skills of people working in this important medium. The union plans to cooperate with numerous independent studios appearing in many Soviet cities and to establish broad international ties.

The organizing committee, consisting of popular analysts and producers, is preparing a founding congress that is expected to be held in April.

Forum-90 created at Youth Organizations Committee

LD0503211490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Excerpt] In Moscow an association of growing leaders called Forum-90 has been created at the USSR Committee for Youth Organizations. It includes people's deputies of the USSR and union republics, well known journalists, representatives of party and political circles, the church and public organizations. [passage omitted]

Army Groups Appeal to Komsomol Central Committee

PM2702152790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Appeal by Participants in Enlarged Plenum of All-Army Council of USSR Armed Forces' Komsomol Organizations to the Komsomol Central Committee and the 21st Komsomol Congress"]

[Text] The USSR Armed Forces' All-Army Council of Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] organizations plenum approves the efforts of those Komsomol organizations which are making a weighty contribution to educating the rising generation in a spirit of civic-mindedness, patriotism, and readiness to defend the motherland.

We are grateful to the Komsomol Central Committee and the main local Komsomol organizations for their sponsorship assistance to and interested participation in the affairs of the Army and Navy Komsomol.

At the same time, the plenum notes that in a number of republic and oblast Komsomol organizations recently, this work has been wound up or is purely formal in nature—sometimes to suit the prevailing political situation. The defects in this work promote the erosion of socialist ideals and growth in pacifist and nationalist sentiments, infantilism, and moral deformations among a certain section of young people. All this influences the results of the work of Army and Navy Komsomol organizations and exacerbates the problems of military young people's collectives.

The plenum participants were indignant about the attempts by certain politicking circles to drive a wedge between the people, the Army, and generations of Soviet people; to besmirch the glorious combat history of the USSR Armed Forces; and to distort their mission. They condemn the cases of discrimination against servicemen and their family members in a number of parts of the country. The plenum participants note with alarm the growth in anti-Army sentiments, particularly in the Baltic, the Transcaucasus, Moldavia, and the western Ukraine.

While advocating glasnost, we note the negative role of some of the mass media in shaping public opinion with regard to the USSR Armed Forces. We demand that coverage of Army subjects in the mass media be correct and respectful toward the Army and the military service of officers and men.

There have recently been calls from Komsomol rostrums for the Army to be depoliticized and for Komsomol organizations in the USSR Armed Forces to be disbanded.

The plenum participants state that it is wrong to put the question in this way. At the present stage, Army and Navy Komsomol organizations are pursuing youth policy in military collectives and are reflecting and defending the interests of young servicemen.

Noting with growing alarm the increase in tension based on interethnic relations, the plenum participants express dissatisfaction with the absence of any clear and accurate positions and actions on the part of the Komsomol Central Committee, union republic Komsomol Central Committees, and local Komsomol committees with regard to Komsomol members and young people participating in illegal and extremist actions.

The plenum participants appeal to the Komsomol Central Committee and the delegates to the 21st Komsomol Congress to make a political assessment of all these phenomena.

With a view to stepping up political education work among the rising generation, we advocate examining at a Komsomol Central Committee plenum questions of further improving the patriotic education of young people and shaping in them a readiness to defend the fatherland. This is of particular educational importance in the year of the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War.

We propose including in the work of the 21st Komsomol Congress a discussion of these issues at a special discussion center.

Taking into account the Armed Forces cuts that are being carried out, the implementation of the military reform, and the forthcoming withdrawal of Soviet troops from abroad, we propose elaborating and adopting at the 21st Komsomol Congress a comprehensive program to provide social aid to young servicemen and their family members.

Major assistance in resolving this issue could be given by USSR people's deputies from the Komsomol. The plenum advocates that the 21st Komsomol Congress listen to reports on their work.

The plenum participants approve and support the efforts of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Soviet Government to reduce international tension, ensure qualitative parameters in Soviet military building and implement our defensive military doctrine. Our position on questions of educating

defenders of the motherland presupposes above all that local Komsomol organizations participate in ensuring that all young people are raised as patriots, citizens, and active participants in perestroyka. Society needs people of high intellect who are morally and physically strong and prepared, if need be, to defend their motherland and socialist ideals.

'Democratic Platform' Postures Discussed

PM2003125990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[Anatoliy Salutskiy article in the "Discussion Page" feature and under the "Polemical Notes" rubric: "'Flies Biting a Horse'"]

[Text] I noticed this curious image of "flies biting a horse" in a LITERATURNAYA GAZETA article where the writer, taking part in a discussion about the "iron hand," recognized the usefulness of left-wing "sniping" at M.S. Gorbachev in order to urge on the horse pulling the load. The image was indeed remarkable and staked a claim to becoming part of current political parlance, since it allows us to ponder the consequences of such sniping—consequences which could vary from slight encouragement to complete torture.

I automatically remembered this image at the Moscow "Democratic Platform" [DP] conference held in the capital's party school on Leningrad Avenue. Needless to say, I will not propagandize this platform nor take issue with it since, now that it has been published (PRAVDA, 3 March this year), everyone can form their own opinion of it and thereby, as it were, legitimize discussion with the DP—and that is a good thing. After all, "informal" arguments about the party too often are reminiscent of a dialogue of the deaf in which it is impossible to get to the heart of the matter and very easy to keep quiet and just shake your fist. But I would like to think about what happened that day (and is happening in general!) in the very majestic and huge columned building of the Higher Party School—a building of classical Stalinist architecture.

The large assembly hall on the fourth floor has in its time heard many fiery speeches about the coming universal victory of communism. Many past leaders whose names now discredit the party have stood on the solid oak rostrum there. Decades have passed, leaders have come and gone, but the "graphic agitation" in this hall with its wide theater-style balcony has remained unchanged—only the figures in the slogans have changed. So it is that the front of the balcony is now hung with the classic—this time classically Brezhnevite!—slogan "Implement the Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress!" What is new about that, aside from the number written in Roman characters...? There is another slogan over the stage: "Long Live Marxism-Leninism!"

Outwardly, in short, everything is the way it was before. In long-simplified terminology it would be called red. But the speeches in the hall were quite different. By the same terminology they were white. Whatever our attitude toward these terms, however ironic we may be about them (and that irony is largely justified!) it is nonetheless impossible to get away from the impression that this is an example of the well-known political "radish effect"—red on the outside, white on the inside.

I have already stated that the creation of DP can only be welcomed, even though I disagree with many of its ideas. But why is the consolidation of a new movement taking place on the basis of the party school? Why is it headed by those very people who have dogmatically passed on the faith and the truth to many generations of party functionaries? Have they become hotheaded? Have they changed their minds...? Or perhaps this is some kind of new situation, some new stake on some new, still emergent, and as yet not fully recognized leader?

I will not go further than asking the question, since only time will tell the real intentions of everyone now entering the political arena. But one thing seems beyond doubt to me. There have probably always been conscientious people working at the Higher Party School, people who honestly disagreed with the stagnation-era setup but were forced by circumstance to submit to it—after all, as Remarque said, not everyone has to be a pioneer. But, on the whole, party schools have always been the first to pick up on changing trends from on high, and the educational system has itself wholly suppressed teachers' independence in this area. The particular haste currently shown by some Higher Party School workers in combating the monopoly of the party... how can I put it... let's just say: It's not very ethical. It would be better for somebody else to get involved with this at the moment—there would be fewer doubts about their sincerity. Not for nothing has Russia never spared unfrocked priests throughout its history; on the other hand, it has always respected people who repented and withdrew from the world in order to warn their countrymen against new misfortune not by fighting for power but by using wise, penitential, and confessional words.

However, there is another aspect here too. Nikolay Fedorovich Marchenkov, first secretary of Ferzikovskiy party raykom [rayon party committee], who has worked all his life in the backwoods of Kaluga, told me in surprise how at a recent Higher Party School course he had heard a lecture given by M. Malyutin, an active figure in the People's Front. No, it was not the lecture itself that was surprising—we need to listen to everyone, including the People's Front. But Malyutin, a lecturer at the Higher Party School, received a bonus on the basis of last year's results along with 350 other colleagues for "active and fruitful work in training and education." It was this bonus that annoyed the students most of all: Is it right to reward and even encourage such efforts from the party classroom? Is it moral?

Again I would add the rider: Although I do not accept many of the front's theses, I do believe that members of

the People's Front are entitled to legitimate expression of their ideas. But should they be concealed under the mask of the Higher Party School?

I am writing this because Malyutin's speech at the Moscow DP conference was probably the most attractive, since it contained not ideological theses but a strategy for action. "We need to try to win a majority if not in the CPSU, then in a Russian Communist Party," Malyutin said. "It is difficult in the CPSU, the setup there is that you either toe the line or resign. Things are better in Russia, particularly in Sverdlovsk and Leningrad. Until we get a majority, it is inexpedient to raise the question of a divorce [razmezhevaniye] since we would leave without money, a structure, or individual people. But if we win a majority, why should we leave? Let them leave."

Those are the kinds of flies that are around nowadays. As the people would say, if they don't torture us, they will madden us.

At the PRAVDA "roundtable" (4 February this year) I said that it is time to legalize the emergent multiparty system in our society, and I proposed that people who hold extreme positions in the DP leave the CPSU and criticize it from outside, which would be more natural and in accordance with the norms of democracy. Because there is nothing more dangerous than intraparty dissension, as attested by the tragic experience of the VKP(B) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] in the twenties and thirties.

It is clear that it should invariably be a question of some kind of division between party property—this was even noted at the discussion with DP writers during the meeting at PRAVDA before the platform was published. However, Malyutin thought differently: He is eager to have it all! Hence the unnatural attempts to destroy the CPSU from within.

Here is what is curious in this connection. The Moscow DP conference in no way struck me as being a rally of extremists demanding the immediate seizure and rebirth of the CPSU. When discussion of the draft resolutions began, substantial differences in view immediately emerged. Party organization secretaries, while sharing the main theses, were in general far more moderate—or, to be accurate—more democratic than the conference organizers. Not for nothing was there indignation in the auditorium with the fact that the organizers had resorted to ordinary raykom bureau methods in order to push through their resolution. In response there were demands that those who disagreed with the organizers should leave the auditorium.

I saw nothing reprehensible in these rather stormy skirmishes between speakers—it was the normal political process. However, one cannot fail to take account of the heightened extremism on the part of the DP founders—an extremism which could involve its rank and file in an illusory and dangerous contest to take control of the CPSU's structure and property. Today's "flies," which have built up their strength unhindered in recent months, are biting more and more fiercely. But, on the other hand, it would be a no less dangerous delusion to believe that they can be gotten rid of with one swish of the tail. We should not get rid of them, and there is no reason to strive for this, since such an attempt would be tantamount to a "mirror image of Malyutin." It seems to me that our society today has sufficiently matured and that the temperature of political processes is so high that there is one way out—forestalling events rather than impeding them. We need to bear in mind that an attempt to simply dump any communist minority would inevitably lead to bitter consequences.

In my view, the main question today is no longer what we should do but how we should do it. Members of the Interregional Group and left-wing radicals seeking to exploit crowd emotions at rallies are proposing their own recipes on this score. The essence of these recipes, as is well known, is to implement a so-called "opposition 'roundtable'"—in opposition to the current leadership of the party and the country. It seems to me that it is simply impossible to imagine anything more dangerous at this political moment. The danger lies by no means in a conflict between the opposition and the authorities, but in the fact that left-wing radicals loyal to the Stalinist-Brezhnevite principle of the rejection of dissidence want to simply rule out any other social forces that may oppose them.

The same situation is also emerging in the DP, which is straining for power. Meanwhile, another platform known as "Communists for Popular Consensus" is actively taking shape in the party. It is made up of many of those who advocate the creation of a Russian Communist Party....

A "roundtable" is necessary. Absolutely and immediately! However, today it should be a question not of an "opposition 'roundtable'" but of a "roundtable" which would attract representatives of various sociopolitical trends with a view to dialogue and the elaboration of a range of measures ruling out extreme forms of confrontation. It is by no means a question of some kind of consolidation. Consolidation is a false slogan of the Stalinist-Brezhnevite era. In a truly democratic society it can only be a question of equal opportunities for a political dialogue on the basis of which popular consensus can be achieved.

'Civic Action' Platform Published

PM2802191690 Moscow NEW TIMES in Engish No. 8, 20-26 Feb 90 p 25

[Platform of the newly formed Civic Action Movement: "Civic Action"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] A new movement seeking to promote democratic reform has been set up by the Moscow Tribune, the Memorial Association, the Moscow Federation of voters and other democratic organizations.

The crisis that has struck at our social system is assuming increasingly dangerous proportions. Tensions in the economic and social spheres and inter-ethnic relations are growing and have already flared up into outbreaks of violence and bloodshed.

Though the past year was not sterile, while paying due to the first steps taken to democratize legislative authority, and to the achievements scored in our foreign policy and while highly assessing the oncoming stream of rapid fundamental change in the East European countries, it behooves us to ask ourselves why we today are beginning to lag behind them and why we have found ourselves unprepared to meet the trials to which the past year has subjected us and which the new year will no doubt bring still more.

The answer is manifest. The incompetence the governing political structures reveal in the effort to accomplish basic reforms and check the country's slithering into an abyss, has been made plain with ruthless clarity. The efforts of a range of People's Deputies of the U.S.S.R. and the rapidly mounting public movements and "informal" organizations, are in effect stymied by the machinery that invariably exists for adopting and implementing political decisions, and the retrograde property relationships.

On the other hand, forces spurning basic human values are uniting. The neo-stalinists are blocking with the black hundred, the venal bureaucracy and the overweening underworld. We deem as fully justified the demand of social justice and order emanating from within the depths of the people. However, forces seeking to return the dictatorship and equal poverty for all play on these sentiments.

Russia's destiny gives us cause for particular alarm. Selfishly egoistic, venal people who seek to wall off the country's future from the tried and tested road of world civilization and sow strife between the Russian and other peoples, want to speak for the people of Russia and in her name. They are loath to acknowledge that Russia may become a really sovereign and prosperous land, only if she meets in the way the aspirations of all the peoples of the U.S.S.R. for national renascence and cooperates with them.

Russia's breakthrough into a better future is quite feasible. Like Germany's and Japan's postwar miracles whch the Asian countries now emulate, Russia too may achieve an economic miracle.

Yet the time for averting a Chinese or Romanian trend of development is slipping away. No one knows when the sands of time will run out. Hence today it is vital for all democratic forces, prepared to act in one monolithic civic movement to rally. The citizenry must take the responsibility for the future they themselves must shape.

We the undersigned proclaim the establishment of the Civic Action Movement.

We exhort all opponents of totalitarianism, whether citizens, public associations, popular fronts, voters' clubs and federations, workers' and srike committees or parties, to join this Movement. Solidly united in the effort to achieve a civilized civic society, we, pooling our efforts, can stave off a fateful reactionary turn in the destinies of the peoples and ensure the country's peaceful extrication from the crisis and a normal decent life for everyone.

Civic Action seeks as priorities:

1. The signing of a new federal treaty envisaging the free union of sovereign states and peoples.
2. The ending of every monopoly especially by the state over the means of production, and the transition towards a modern market economy based on competition between diverse forms of property ownership and an effective system of social protection.
3. The giving of the land to those who wish to work it as their property and that of their heirs.
4. The detachment of the CPSU and Party ideology from the state and the economy, the creation of a multiparty system with all other political organizations enjoying the same rights as the CPSU.
5. The ensured multiplicity of forms for spiritual and social life.
6. The democratic reform of the army.
7. The removal from the KGB of secret political police functions.

All the citizens and organizations associated with Civic Action:

- develop and implement civic initiatives seeking to accomplish the Movement's goals;

- jointly participate in elections of bodies of power and actively back adherents of radical reform;

- organize civic resistance to reactionary actions and decisions by gathering signatures, holding rallies, processions and demonstrations and, in extreme cases, by organizing political strikes, civic disobedience campaigns and other nonviolent actions.

All organizations associated with Civic Action remain independent and autonomous. The Movement's activities are directed by coordinating centres created from among representatives of associated citizens and organizations. The Movement's Programme and organizational structure are to be clarified at is Constituent conference.

Citizens and groups and associations of citizens,

Join the Civic Action Movement!

Signed by the following People's Deputies of the U.S.S.R., scientists, cultural and religious personalities.

Sergey Averintsev, Yuriy Afanasyev, Leonid Batkin, Sergey Belozertsev, Larisa Bogoraz, Vladimir Vasilyev,

Mikhail Volkenshteyn, Yevdokiya Gaer, Soltan Dzarasov, Vladmir Kirillov, Sergey Kovalev, Yekaterina Maksimova, Arkadiy Murashev, Bulat Okudzhava, Eldar Ryazanov, Andrey Sebentsov, Vasiliy Selyunin, Vladimir Smirnov, Anatoliy Sobchak, Sergey Stankevich, Stepan Sulakshin, Vladimir Tikhonov, Petr Falk, Rodion Shchedrin, Gleb Yakunin, Yuriy Shchekochikhin.

Murders of Local Party Officials Described

90UN1130A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 7 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA special correspondents Yu. Kozlovskiy and R. Tell: "A Shot in the Gorkom (Why Those Who Wanted to Live and Work the New Way Die)"]

[Text] **There was a mention in the newspapers of the murder of Charygelgi Atalyev, first secretary of the Geok-Tepe Raykom [rayon party committee]. He was killed in broad daylight, during his lunch break, at home.**

Later I heard the speech by Sergey Mikhaylovich Nesterenko, second secretary of the Turkmenian Communist Party Central Committee, at the Congress of People's Deputies of the country. As it happens, this was not the only murder of a party official in the country. A. Valiyev, first secretary of the Mary Gorkom [city party committee], was shot in his own office. How could this happen?

[Signed] P. Voytenko, Klimovsk, Moscow Oblast.

The people of Turkmenia still remember the death of Kh. Rozybayeva, a Chardzhou Obkom [oblast party committee] instructor. Khalima Dzhonayevna, a professional lawyer, was following up on a complaint. In doing so she touched upon a thread that brought her to the wasp nest, or, rather a family nest. The criminal who was shamelessly taking bribes for concealing various unsavory deals turned out to be the acting Kerkinskiy interregional procurator, A. Dzhepbarova. Her husband, a police colonel, Kh. Soltanov, could foresee the destruction of their clan which had terrorized the whole area. So he decided to break the thread and to kill Rozybayeva.

The emotions of the spring of 1988 seemed to have calmed down: The sentence became known—15 years in prison for the husband, 10 for the son, and 9 for the wife. But as it turns out the criminal's bullet is still aimed at party officials.

We flew to Ashkhabad from different cities. One of us came from Moscow, the other from Tashkent. But we were thinking pretty much alike. What kind of people were these two party secretaries? How did they live, what did they believe in? Were their deaths the results of more criminal plots or were they caused by the actions of some lone maniacs?

Our first visit in the capital of Turkmenia was to the procurator of the republic, V. Vasilyuk. The criminal case file was put on his desk.

"The murder of the Geok-Tepe Raykom secretary," we read there, "was committed by M. Muradov, a supplies engineer from the everyday services combine. He had applied to Charygeldi Atalyev several times to become the manager of the combine. He did not receive a positive answer and then, in April and May of 1989, he started sending anonymous, slanderous letters to higher party and soviet organs. In the letters he tried to smear the reputation of the raykom first secretary. On 16 May the rayon procuracy started criminal proceedings against M. Muradov for defamation of character. The hearing of the case is scheduled for 2 August at the Supreme court of the Turkmenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]."

But there was no hearing. On 30 July Muradov stabbed the raykom secretary to death with a knife, then he wounded his son. Then, while trying to escape, he jumped into a canal and drowned.

Here is the story of another crime, the one in Mary. A certain V. Safronov, a railroad loader, came to the gorkom building at approximately 6:30 PM. Without any difficulty he made his way into the office of A. Valiyev. From his tote bag he then pulled out a homemade gadget with a piece of 16-caliber metal pipe attached and used it to shoot the first secretary.

From the letter of the Mary city clinic we learn that they have Safronov on their books, diagnosed as having paranoid schizophrenia. He had been hospitalized for it twice.

This is the whole story and we could have stopped here. One criminal perished, the other is a schizophrenic. They cannot be punished further, it seems. But still, we decided to conduct our own, journalist investigation.

A conversation with the Turkmenian Party Central Committee secretary, S. Nesterenko, helped us clear up the situation. We talked about a lot of things with Sergey Mikhaylovich, but here is what we were most interested in. Atalyev had not worked in Geok-Tepe for a very long time. What was he aiming at? How did he behave? What sort of a set-up did he inherit? What did he have the time to do?

"Charygelgi came to a rayon," says Nesterenko, "where negligence reigned supreme, where there had been plenty of leaders capable of embezzling the people's money."

From the investigation materials it transpired that the new first secretary replaced 29 leading officials in the rayon. The personnel changes caused some animosity and not just approval.

So, the atmosphere in Geok-Tepe was far from calm, which can be seen from the following incidents, too. Six tons of pure alcohol were stolen from the wine-producing factory. Embezzlement of a considerable degree was

uncovered in the local jewelry store. One night somebody desecrated the monument to V.I. Lenin.

Another problem that we got interested in: What about false reporting in the rayon? If there was such, did Atalyev fight it? There was no information on that in the capital of the republic. We have the information now, after our visit to Geok-Tepe.

Just after he started on his new job, Atalyev began preparing to discuss at a bureau session the problem of "serious violations in the rayon of the regulations on fighting false reporting in the state-run economy." He requested the "Turkmengiprozem" institute to do test measuring of the areas under crops. The picture turned out to be rather interesting. Forty five hectares of land used for melons and watermelons, for instance, appeared to be unaccounted for.

We asked the new rayon procurator, A. Kuliyev, how many melons a hectare of land yielded in Geok-Tepe. Annamukhamed Atayevich inquired and learned the answer—150 metric quintals. If you multiply this figure by 45 and then by the market cost of a kilo of melon, you arrive at a nice round figure that was disappearing into somebody's pocket.

Soon Charygeldi suggested that the raykom bureau discuss another problem: "To better combat bribery, false reporting, and defrauding the state government." They disclosed the fraudulent increases in the reports of work completed by the Repair and Construction Administration of the Municipal Services Ministry, and in the reports of the carpet factory.

That was the way Atalyev used to work in Tedzhen where he declared a relentless war on swindlers and thieves. It was also there, in Tedzhen, that his son was killed under very strange circumstances.

There is no one answer to all of these questions. But the whole chain of events brings us to certain conclusions. Some criminals stabbed the wife and the 11-year old son of D. Bayramov, the Charshanginskiy Rayon procurator, in broad daylight. A. Khodzhadurdyev, the deputy head of the investigation department of the Nebit-Dag city administration for internal affairs, was stabbed twice in the doorway of his own house.

We cannot forget about the Mary incident either. According to the papers, the murderer of the gorkom first secretary is not a normal person. But he managed to find the time when there was no one in the reception room of A.Valiyev's office. He knew how to cover up his home-made gun in an old tote bag. He loaded the gun, loaded himself with half a bottle of vodka for courage, and he did not forget to take a spare cartridge. After the shooting he ran out of the building and tried to escape.

Of course, it is possible to agree with the idea that the criminals acted single-handedly. But one thing here is hard to comprehend. One person makes up his mind to commit a murder and stabs someone eight times with a knife simply because he was not allowed to become a public services combine manager. The other one claims that he lived with mortal hatred of the gorkom secretary who "failed to familiarize the party organization with the CPSU Central Committee decision on prevention of crime."

We understand that events are always more complex than their description, especially the tragic ones. But we would like to say just one thing. It became fashionable to blame all of our errors on the party, for which, unfortunately, there are reasons. But then the party committees choose those who want and can work in a new manner, for the good of the people. And the party officials, as we see, have to run the risk of being shot or knifed.

Further Reportage on 25 February Moscow Rally

PM2802155990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by TASS Correspondents B. Grishchenko, L. Kislinskaya, M. Panovko, V. Petrunya, Yu. Soltys, and B. Shestakov: "Path to Democracy in Unity"]

[Text] Accelerate the pace of the democratic transformations in society, ensure social justice, and support the candidates of the "Democratic Russia" bloc in the forthcoming elections—those were the main demands of the Muscovites participating in the mass procession and rallies in the capital 25 February.

...At about 1100 hours columns of demonstrators carrying the most diverse banners, placards, and slogans began to assemble near the main entrance to Gorkiy Park and on Uprising Square. Their varied nature reflected the diversity of the reasons which brought people here from virtually all the city's rayons. Speeches by a number of USSR People's Deputies and members of the organizing committee at the assembly points were a prelude to the main rally on Zubovskaya Square. The crowd filled the entire square and a section of the Sadovoye Koltso beltway adjoining it.

Politically speaking, the appeals conflicted with one another. Mutually exclusive demands were often seen side by side. However, we saw no attempts to use force, putting it bluntly, to prove who was right. And that is one of the positive outcomes. That means that the years of perestroyka have not been wasted: The people are successfully learning the difficult lessons of political culture.

There was plenty of criticism at the rally. Criticism of the party, its Central Committee, the soviets, which are in no hurry to accept the full range and responsibility of power, and the law enforcement agencies, which at the moment are incapable of effectively combating the upsurge in crime and the eruptions of interethnic strife. But in addition there were appeals to normal, pure human feelings—to kindness, mutual attention, and mutual trust, the lack of which is so keenly felt in society. There were also appeals in support of T. Gdlyan and N. Ivanov.

The meeting ended with the adoption of a number of resolutions. Representatives of all the democratic groupings present on the square voted for them. Perestroyka, the rally's main document asserts, is at a standstill. The renewal process must get its second wind, and that depends on each person, which is why there is nothing more important than the consolidation of society on a democratic basis. It is necessary to accelerate the real transfer of power to the soviets, the adoption of the most important laws ensuring the building of the rule-of-law state, the progressive development of the economy, and the restructuring of the principles of the Soviet Federation. It is vitally important to organize dialogue among all true supporters of reforms and resolutely rebuff those who are urging society toward violence.

The rally participants thanked the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee and militia staffers for ensuring order and showing tact.

There was great work behind that evaluation: After all, a large area right in the city center was prepared for the rally. Road transport had to be rerouted promptly and the work of trade establishments had to be flexibly reorganized.

In conclusion, the organizers told the crowd about the procedure for leaving the square and at the same time issued a demand to the leadership of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting to show on Central Television the full video recording of everything that happened here. Admittedly, it was not made clear who would finance this broadcast.

Clearly, not everyone was pleased with the prudence and sobermindedness of the Muscovites who support perestroyka and the deepening of democratic transformations in society. On the eve of the rallies certain forces tried to fuel passions by means of various provocative rumors and fabrications. For example, one informal organization announced that the mass media had already prepared... a "coordinated" account of the rallies. The only thing left was to transmit it via TASS, it was claimed. With a readiness worthy of better use, All-Union Radio hurried to broadcast this "canard." Meanwhile, London's SUNDAY EXPRESS even predicted "the greatest popular unrest since 1917."

The troublemakers' efforts, however, were not crowned with success.

Estimates of Rally Size Differ

PM0203152090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 6

["Own information" report under the rubric "Rumors and Facts": "Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee Main Administration of Internal Affairs Explains"]

[Text] So how many people went to the rally in Moscow? Many people are asking this question now. The point is that there are significant differences in the central newspapers' accounts of the rallies held in Moscow last Sunday. Thus KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, for instance, gives a figure of 50,000-60,000 people. We quote TRUD: "About half a million Muscovites assembled for the capital's rally, which took place in Zubovskaya Square and the adjacent streets of the Sadovoye Ring." REUTER reported: There were about 50,000 demonstrators. In situations like this, obviously, no one can claim absolute accuracy; and even the organizers of the event mentioned different figures from the platform—from a few hundred thousand to a million.

IZVESTIYA, in its provincial [periferiynyy] edition published on Monday, 26 February, stated: 50,000-60,000, adding that these figures are approximate, a visual estimate. In the Moscow edition of IZVESTIYA on the same date, the figure was excluded entirely, since at that time they could not check the reliability of the information.

So we turned to the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee Main Administration of Internal Affairs. "According to our estimates," V. Bondarev, deputy chief of the Main Administration of Internal Affairs Administration for the Protection of Public Order, says, "around 250,000-300,000 people assembled that day."

But not even these figures are absolute. The only advice we can give to those who are not satisfied with our estimates or the official estimates is to calculate the area of asphalt between Krymskiy Bridge and Smolenskaya Square. And then to multiply the number of square meters by four, because, according to eyewitness accounts, that was the number of people standing on each square meter of the Sadovoye Ring on 25 February this year.

Leading Cadre Training Regulation Changes

90UN1042C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by V. Romanyuk: "Cadres for Reform"]

[Text] A whole series of USSR Government decisions on matters concerning enhancing the qualifications of and retraining leading workers and specialists in the economy has been invalidated. Amendments and additions have been inserted into other resolutions and instructions on these matters.

Who does not remember film hero A. Papanova from the movie "Belorussian Terminal"? Working as a chief accountant, this somewhat older man confronted the young director who did not want to follow old directives. "If the directives are poor, fight them," the accountant says, "try to get them repealed. But while they are in effect, I will not permit them to be violated."

Proceeding according to directives, and government resolutions more so, is the basis of order. In repealing old directives, we introduce a new order. Just the mere listing of USSR Government decisions which have become invalidated comprises 168 points. Just imagine:

Until quite recently a ministry official would be able to justify his inactivity referring, let us say, to a resolution of the USSR Sovnarkom [Soviet of People's Commissars] dated 8 March 1927, "On Organization of the Academy for Training the Highest Key Personnel in Industry, Under the Supreme Council of the National Economy," or to instructions of the USSR Council of Ministers dated 18 June 1949 regarding material support for those taking courses and the length of their training, or to the 22 June 1959 resolution "On Additional Matters of Economic Construction Submitted for Decision of the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics," and others.

Looking over this huge listing, in which resolutions are followed by "trains" of directives, one can divine the features of the old administrative-command system with its multidepartmental approach. Each branch had its own regulations regarding cadre training and retraining. And the person who found his bearings in all these great many regulations and "references," in the thousands and millions of points and formulations, had a good deal of power concentrated in his hands. It was always possible to quote a directive and qualify any manifestation of independent activity as "violation," "disregard," and so forth. For example, the 6 June 1967 USSR Council of Ministers resolution "On Perfecting the System of Professional Improvement of Leading Workers and Specialists of Industry, Construction, Transportation, Communications, and Trade" established regulations for each branch, which were then given concrete expression in government directives and split out into innumerable departmental instructions and orders.

Following the adoption in 1988 of the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers "On Restructuring the System of Professional Improvement and the Retraining of Leading Workers and Specialists in the Economy," a huge layer of departmental instructions reflecting the bureaucratic creativity of the departments over many decades lost its meaning in principle. But many months of scrupulous research effort were required merely to repeal these. A. Panferov, chief expert in the Department of Culture and Public Education of the USSR Council of Ministers, stated that changes touched specifically upon such questions as the conditions under which material support is provided for students at the Professional Improvement Institute, length of training, cadre retraining, enhancement of cadre qualifications, and the number of professors and instructors engaged.

These matters can seem routine only at first glance. Quite a few instances have come to light in which departments have tried to be "thrifty" in education, have established miserly support for students at the Professional Improvement Institute, and have assigned inadequate numbers of qualified instructors. It has now been established that students should receive their average wage during the training period and that the number of instructors should comprise at least 75 percent of the level existing at a comparable type of institution of higher education.

The training of qualified cadre for implementing reform is directly related to bringing the entire set of documentation which regulates this process into conformance with new normative measures. But the dynamics of our time are so great that the 1988 resolution already needs amendments to stay in tune with today's requirements. This applies to the restructuring of interrelationships of ministries and enterprises, both at the center and at the republic level. We cannot help but note that new forms of rendering services to enterprises are being actively developed as a supplement to the state system of training leading cadres and improving their professional qualifications. These include economic accountability centers, schools for managers, regional continuing education centers, and scientific-technical cooperatives. They combine flexibility and mobility of forms and use energetic instructional methods and consultation services. All of this must be adopted and put into operation. And we must discard even more resolutely everything bureaucratic and uncreative in the system of training a new body of cadres for the economy.

Illusion of 'Collective Leadership' Seen

PM0903124190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Mar 90 Morning Edition p2

[Washington-datelined article by Melor Sturua: "Three in the Kremlin; Is 'Collective Leadership' Democratic?"]

[Excerpts] Nowadays, when there is so much talk and debate in society over the institution of presidential power, a note of caution is sometimes sounded with regard to the loss of collective leadership. Well, let us ponder the question of whether this is a great loss.

The expression and concept "collective leadership" are strongly associated in our minds with something highly desirable, positive, and progressive. This truly "Pavlovian reflex" is perfectly obvious and understandable. Whenever the latest "leader" dies or otherwise departs from the scene, the people who step into his shoes brand him retrospectively and promise to destroy the "personality cult" and "replace it with collective leadership."

A curious coincidence is that, as a rule, this "collective leadership" extends to just three people—and no more. After the death of Stalin the "collective leadership" consisted of Malenkov, Beria, and Khrushchev. Following Beria's arrest and the routing of the "antiparty group" the leadership was made up of Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan. After Khrushchev's overthrow, the Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Kosygin trio became the "collective leadership." Even after Lenin's death, the "collective leadership" was a three-man effort: Zinovyev, Kamenev, and Stalin.

The figure "three".... Why? Perhaps it is modeled on the triumvirates of ancient Rome and postrevolutionary France?

This one, two, three has always signalled the start of a long marathon conducted on a knock-out basis. The first across the finishing line has always dissolved the "collective leadership" (in the best instances) or destroyed it. "May the loser pay," as Germann said in Pushkin's "Queen of Spades."

It was shameful to see Khrushchev drag Bulganin and Voroshilov with him wherever he went and then see Brezhnev do exactly the same with Podgornyy and Kosygin. They were evidently afraid of leaving them at home....

But that is not really the point. On assuming power, the "collective leadership" seemed to cause the whole country—and the bureaucratic and party apparatus first and foremost—to freeze. Instead of getting on with what they were supposed to be doing, people passively waited to see which of the three would gain the upper hand, frightened of making the wrong choice and playing up to "the wrong one." When the sole leader eventually broke away from the "collective leadership," everything went back to normal and a new cycle began—a cult cycle this time.

It is said that during the Yalta summit meeting Stalin and Churchill struck up a conversation on the comparative value of the two systems: socialist and capitalist. Churchill is alleged to have said: "The main difference between our systems is that, under ours, laws hold sway, while individuals hold sway under yours." The nerve of the problem lies in this definition. While bourgeois democracy is based on the division of the three power functions—legislative, executive, and judicial—"collective leadership" was a kind of "pie" of power based on three people, waiting to be snatched by the most cunning. As the "pie" was seized by using the forces of the party apparatus, the latter gained real power, crushing everything else beneath it. This process was also governed by a definite law: the law of the bureaucratic jungle.

The Brezhnev constitution imparted legality to the one-party system, which, in its turn, propped up the sole leader. It is both revealing and significant that when in Ancient Rome after the struggle between the three consuls—Julius Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey—the former emerged the victor and proclaimed himself emperor, he and his descendants left Western civilization the legacy of Roman law. When Napoleon gained the upper hand among the three republic consuls of France, he not only left his descendants the rapier and three-corner hat, he also left them the Napoleonic Code—the same Roman law modified by 19 centuries of mankind's historical development. Our "revolutionary legality" produced nothing comparable, as a result of which Soviet man remained without rights or anything of his own, no matter how we dignified him with the epithet "new".... [passage omitted]

The personality cult—however much we denounced and destroyed it—still forced its way upward, stubbornly and inevitably, like grass through asphalt. According to the rules of the game, albeit unwritten, the country's sole supreme leader also proclaimed himself to be its main theoretician. I still remember how L.F. Ilichev, head of the press group under N.S. Khrushchev, repeatedly instructed us speechwriters to "drop in something theoretical." This was said perfectly seriously, albeit not without some cynicism. And Brezhnev's trilogy, put together by my writer colleagues! I am sure that they, like myself, had no pretensions to being classical scholars of Marxism-Leninism, not even anonymously, hidden behind the pseudonym "L.I. Brezhnev."

But let us leave the "collective intellect" in peace and go back to the subject of "collective leadership." As the history of our state has shown, "collective leadership" is a troubled period, when political time appears to freeze until the "victor" emerges.

But the struggle for victory also makes the victor powerless: He is so "indebted" to the apparatus that he in fact repays this debt by transferring power to it. None of the victors—since Stalin—have dared to assume the title of ruler [vozhd]. Brezhnev came closest to this. When Kirilenko reached the age of 70 and Brezhnev personally awarded him another Hero of Socialist Labor gold star, the deeply moved birthday boy called the even more deeply moved leader—both giver and receiver are always so generous!—our "great ruler."

In our officialese, which is about as rigid as a straitjacket or bulletproof vest, improvisation is as rare as organic life in outer space. When the press reproduced Kirilenko's award ceremony, we old stagers decided that the command had come from above to make "eminent personage" into "great ruler." To our great surprise, this was not the case at all. Evidently the trial balloon launched by Kirilenko had either burst or someone had deliberately punctured it. It could not be ruled out that this "someone" was Suslov. In any case, it was in his name that instructions were sent to the newspaper kings to stick to the old formula when giving Leonid Ilich his title.

Any theatrical performance has its finale. The gigantic tragicomedy of "collective leadership," which has been played in our country for decades and has long developed into a tragedy of collective irresponsibility, is coming to a close. That is why "collective leadership" must—there is simply no other alternative—cede place to constitutional presidential power, and "collective intellect"—to parliament. There is a glimmer of hope that even our clocks will finally begin to show the start of the nineties of the 20th century. But there is absolutely no reason to believe that this will happen to the sound of universal applause. Even if Politburo members move

from the presidiums to the the floors of congress halls this is still no guarantee. The only guarantee is if the congress halls cease to be auditoriums and the country is governed not by individuals but by laws—laws protected and implemented by legal representatives of legal power.

Poll Cited on Foreign Travel Availability

PM1203151590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by L. Sedov, senior scientific associate of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, under the rubric "Public Opinion: Poll and Sociologists' Commentary": "Freedom of Choice and Freedom of Travel"]

[Text] Half our country's population believes that everyone has the unconditional right—one that needs no restrictions—to travel outside the motherland wherever and whenever he wishes. These are the data of a poll conducted by specialists of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion at the end of last year.

A person's right to freedom of travel is enshrined, I will remind you, in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is all the more interesting to see which categories of our country's population "ratified" this article in their consciousness. Fortyeight percent were women and 52 percent men. Less than half of those polled were over 40 years old and, accordingly, more than half under 40. One-third of those who participated in the poll were collective farm members and rural workers. Forty five percent of members of the CPSU and of ecological movements [favored freedom of travel]. Seventy seven percent of members of people's fronts, and 83 percent of members of political discussion clubs and other public organizations. The firmest supporters of unlimited freedom were readers of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA—67 percent; the least firm was PRAVDA's readership—40 percent.

The poll showed that religious convictions have a great influence on the feeling that one should be able to live not only in the motherland, but in any country of the world. Less than half the Muslims and nonbelievers polled advocated full freedom of travel. This indicator is higher among Christians—50 percent; for adherents of Judaism and Buddhism—66 percent. Of the national groups the greatest desire for open borders was displayed by Lithuanians (other inhabitants of the Baltic region did not participate in the poll), Azerbaijanis, and Russians living in union republics. The least desire was shown by Uzbeks and Russians living in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

In my view, no less food for thought is provided by an analysis of the replies of the second half of those polled, who did not unconditionally support the idea of freedom to travel abroad. Precisely 2.7 percent of the respondents generally advocated a categorical ban on trips abroad. Who are these people? Their numbers rise to six percent among persons over 50 years old, as well as in relation to a drop in the level of education. Their proportion is higher than average—3.2 percent—among members of people's fronts and certain national groups: Russians living on RSFSR territory, Uzbeks, Moldavians.

Quite a sizeable group is represented by those who permit restrictions on travel for military-strategic and other reasons associated with the country's security. The replies "restrictions are necessary if this threatens defense capability" and "not just anyone can be allowed abroad" gathered 29 percent of the votes. These are most characteristic of the 40-49 years age group, with higher education. Naturally, the first reply gathered many votes from servicemen and, strange though it may seem, members of various creative unions. Students and, accordingly, members of the Lenin Communist Youth League are least concerned to preserve military secrets, as well as believing Christians. Forty percent of Uzbeks and 23 percent of Ukrainians recognize the threat to defense capability as an important reason for banning travel abroad. This reason is supported most seldom by Georgians and Armenians—3.5 percent.

In conclusion I will add that 23 percent of the second half of those polled believe that all factors must take a back seat if travel abroad is necessary for treatment or to see sick relatives. In emergencies they unconditionally switch to the stand of supporting full freedom of travel for everyone.

Economic

Leningrad-Moscow-Caucasus Rail Link Discussed

PM0503105390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[Article by A. Streltsov, staffer at the Ministry of Railways Press Center: "21st Century Line"]

[Text] The Ministry of Railways Collegium has examined a scientific plan for a high-speed line linking Leningrad with Moscow, Kharkov, the Crimea, and the Caucasus.

Scientists and specialists from the Ministry of Railways, the Ministry of Transport Construction, the Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Building, the Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry and Instrument Making, the Ministry of the Aviation Industry, the USSR Academy of Sciences, and other organizations took part in its elaboration.

The plan envisages the construction of a separate high-speed line for passenger trains traveling at speeds of 300-350 km per hour. Total length of the line would be around 2,900 km.

By increasing train speeds, switching some passenger travel from air transport to rail transport, and saving passengers' time, all the spending would be recouped within eight years.

The first phase of construction of the new line on the Leningrad-Moscow stretch could be complete by the year 2000.

Public Opinion Poll Taken on Property Law

90US0604A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by N. Popov, doctor of historical sciences, and S. Shpilko, candidate of economic sciences: "The Law on Ownership: Possible Versions"— first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] IZVESTIYA continues its series of articles on the results of research conducted by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion. Materials published to date have already elicited widespread reader response.

Studies with respect to population attitude towards the draft Law on Ownership have been conducted in the main geographical regions of the country among the urban and rural populations. In all, 2,597 people have been polled, representing various socio-demographic segments of the population.

Private ownership is associated in the minds of many with the property of citizens which is traditionally viewed as personal property. With respect to the means of production, used with hired labor, almost half the population either completely fails to identify these with private ownership or has no clear concept whatsoever in this regard. It is also characteristic that about a third of the population relates to private ownership the property of cooperatives and means of production bought from the state by labor collectives.

Regarding attitudes towards private enterprises, of all types of enterprises that have appeared in recent years or that may arise in the near future, the "rating" of enterprises belonging to particular individuals is the lowest.

It is apparent that, formulated in this manner, the question on enterprises under private ownership sounded too abstract for many. But once it is rendered specific and the scope of enterprises which might potentially appear under the ownership of private individuals is shown, for example, the picture changes drastically. Whereas the existence of small private enterprises is considered necessary (or at least permissible) by almost three-fourths of those polled, only one out of four survey participants had the same attitude towards the emergence of large-scale enterprises in private ownership. In this regard, among those who believe the existence of small private enterprises is necessary, responses to the question which sought to discover their attitude towards private enterprises without specifically identifying size were positive from only 56 percent of respondents. Negative replies were given by 17 percent. Among those who believe the existence of small private enterprises is permissible, the figures were 21 and 44 percent, respectively.

In this light we can more readily understand the distribution of responses to this question: "Will the emergence of enterprises which belong to individual citizens improve or worsen the economic situation of the country?" Almost half (47 percent) are inclined to believe that the appearance of enterprises in private ownership will improve the economic situation. Only 15 percent maintain the opposite point of view.

The attitude of the population towards the existence of private enterprises in various branches of the economy was also cleared up. As might be expected, views were sharply polarized.

Survey participants expressed their most positive attitude towards the emergence of private enterprises engaged in the production of consumer goods. The greatest level of objection was raised with regard to the appearance of such enterprises in "Group A" branches, especially the defense industry.

Opinions concerning the possibility of using hired labor were distributed as follows. The hiring of manpower at private enterprises is considered impermissible by 42 percent of those polled; 12 percent believe it would be allowable to engage a small number (not more than 10, let us say) of hired workers; 13 percent believe it permissible to engage a significant number; and 13 percent—that hired labor can be used at private enterprises without any substantive restrictions. One out of every five individuals found this question difficult to answer. Thus, opinions were divided almost equally—38 percent in all consider the use of hired labor permissible at private enterprises, and 42 percent—impermissible.

The desire to open up one's "business" (enterprise, shop, cafe, store), if the law permitted, was expressed by 32 percent of those surveyed; 45 percent stated they would not do this; and 23 percent found it difficult to respond.

Responding to the question "How do you relate on the whole to the prospect of private ownership in our country?", 47 percent of poll participants replied they view this positively; 24 percent—negatively; and 29 percent—neutral. This fact by itself, however, does not yet in any way mean that almost half of all Soviet citizens are staunch proponents of private ownership. In the first place, a lack of understanding on the part of a significant portion of those surveyed as to the very nature of private ownership has played a certain role here. Suffice it to say that among those who expressed a positive attitude towards it, one out of four was convinced that enterprises belonging to individual citizens which utilize the labor of hired workers cannot be termed private property. Secondly, even among supporters of private ownership, there exist various opinions as to the form and scale which would be allowed in the emergence of economic relationships. For example, 45 percent of those who expressed a generally positive attitude towards private ownership consider the appearance of

large-scale enterprises in the property of individual citizens to be impermissible; 23 percent object to the use of hired labor in private enterprises.

The survey showed that proponents of the development of private ownership comprise about 35 percent of the adult population of the country. These are people who actively support or consider permissible the emergence of private enterprises in the country and their use of hired manpower. The share of staunch opponents of private ownership is two-fifths of this entity, amounting to about 14-15 percent of the adult population.

Two-thirds of the supporters of the development of private ownership consider its development permissible only within the framework of small-scale production. This again goes to show that if private enterprise activity is permitted by law, development of the ensuing economic relationships must become the subject of well thought-out state regulation and be evolutionary in nature, envisaging gradual expansion in the scope, forms, and spheres of private ownership as it emerges.

Analysis of the survey data and the results of a number of prior studies conducted by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion provide grounds for presupposing that a deepened property stratification caused by the development of private ownership could significantly reinforce the negative attitude of the population towards private enterprise activity. If permitted under the law, therefore, the development of private ownership should be accompanied (or possibly surpassed) by the development of collective forms of ownership based on leasing, purchase of fixed assets by labor collectives, creation of joint-stock companies and joint enterprises, etc. The survey shows it is their rating which is today the highest.

Gospriyemka To Operate Only Where Needed

904A0223A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 9, Feb 90 p 20

[Report on telephone interview with V.V. Sychev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Output Quality Control and Standards, recorded by T. Penkova; date and place not given: "Gospriyemka: What Do People Expect From It Today?"]

[Text] Recently there has been fierce debating on the question: Should there or should there not be gospriyemka [state standards]? What problems should it solve today? Will its functions change? How possible is it to change these services over to contractual relations with enterprises? These and other questions are bothering many specialists. At our request, V.V. Sychev, chairman of the USSR Gosstandart [State Committee for Output Quality Control and Standards], expresses his viewpoint on some of them.

Indeed the range of questions is very broad just as the range of evaluations of gospriyemka itself is broad and ambiguous. Let us simply recall that at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet certain deputies made suggestions to abolish it everywhere, which would make it possible to save R309 million. Others objected: This would lead to a situation in which the wide stream of defective products being held back by gospriyemka would reach the consumers. The resulting losses to society would greatly exceed the savings achieved.

Today the application of state control is being placed on a basis of rational expediency. It is being used only as it is needed. In general we think that gospriyemka is an extraordinary and extreme measure which must be introduced only at those enterprises where it is necessary for the "quality police" to intervene and it must be removed as soon as the proper order is restored.

Unfortunately, the practice with which we began was not altogether correct: Gospriyemka services were created most often not at enterprises that were in arrears, but at those that were doing quite well. For the list of them was submitted by the ministries and departments and they naturally wanted to avoid extra trouble and unpleasantness. And thus the discrediting of gospriyemka began from the first days of its existence.

We are now rectifying the situation. Gospriyemka has already been removed from almost 250 enterprises which have good results today and fairly good prospects for the future. Proposals have been received to remove gospriyemka from approximately 350 more enterprises. I recall that up until recently these services monitored the work of 2,700 production collectives.

Now along with the ministries we must attentively deal with all the enterprises where gospriyemka is in effect and in each concrete case make a decision about the expediency of continuing its activity, the more so since expenditures of maintaining gospriyemka have been cut by a third. We shall abolish gospriyemka under two mandatory conditions. First, the labor collective must make a commitment that the quality of their products will regularly meet the established requirements (in GOST's [All-Union State Standards] and other documents) and these commitments must be backed up by the results of the corresponding tests. Second, with the abolition of nondepartmental control it is necessary to take into account the opinions of the main consumers of the products. If any of the conditions are not met, the work of the state controllers of the USSR Gosstandart will be continued.

Will gospriyemka be introduced for the first time anywhere? Yes, and this is envisioned by the corresponding decisions. And this right has now been granted to the USSR Gosstandart (previously it was the prerogative of the USSR Council of Ministers). We shall introduce gospriyemka at the request of the consumers if poor-quality products are produced and this causes harm to the national economy. They can be associations, enterprises, and organizations. As concerns the individual buyers, their rights are represented by consumers' societies. Gospriyemka will be introduced temporarily, for a

particular period of time, and it will be implemented by specialists of territorial USSR Gosstandart organs. When the state of affairs at the enterprise improves, gospriyemka will go as well.

Azov Sea Pollution Figures Detailed

LD1103185190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1540 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Summary] Almost 30 percent of the outflow of rivers into the Azov Sea is taken for economic needs. Of 42 cubic km of fresh water about 28 cubic km enters the sea. Every day more than 18 million cubic km of sewage, 5.5 million of which is completely untreated, flow into the sea. Each year more than 12,000 tonnes of petroleum products flow into the sea. Over 10 years the economic cost, from the death of fish alone has been about 10 billion rubles.

The sea's salinity was 10 parts per thousand in 1951, now it is as high as 14 per thousand in places. Annual surface evaporation amounts to about 34 cubic km and annual rainfall represents about 14 cubic km.

Pesticides are another major pollutant of the sea, which could go the same way as the Aral.

The amount of heavy metals such as copper, chromium, lead, nickel, and manganese pumped into the sea every day reaches hundreds of kg; in the case of iron the figure rises to approximately 15 tonnes.

Scientific

Khazakhstan Objects to Rocket Fragment Pollution

LD2103092590 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by correspondent V. Nikolayev: "Metal from Heaven"]

[Text] Dzezkazgan—KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 18 February this year printed the demand of residents of Dzhezkazgan and the deputies of the town soviet to discontinue the operation of the military radar station, and also the complaints of the population about the pollution of the territory with the remnants of space rockets. Now for the first time, the military and space departments have responded to the demands, having abandoned the false secrecy.

First, representatives of the defense ministry arrived in Dzhezkazgan. At a meeting in the oblast executive committee they spoke about the purpose of the radar station, and about their readiness to stop its operation and to transfer it somewhere else. It also became known that the local soviet authorities have been struggling to achieve this for some 10 years. It is true, this was a secret struggle in the form of exchange of letters, and netiher the deputies of the town soviet nor the public knew anthing about this. Now, thanks to the determination of the town residents, deputies of the local soviets, and of Sh. Shardarbekov, chairman of the oblast executive committee, mutual understanding has been reached.

A few days ago representatives of the space department headed by space pilot G.S. Titov came to Dzhezkazgan. He spoke frankly about the launching of space rockets and about its consequences. There are quite a few unpleasant consequences. Here are examples: The territories of Dzhezdinskiy and Ulytauskiy Rayons are strewn with 890 complete and exploded stages of space rockets, which have contaminated the soil with toxic substances. This prevents the livestock from grazing and the feed from being cropped. The point is that for 30 years the military have been exploding almost every spent rocket stage that has fallen on the ground (to ensure the secrecy of their design, they say). The fragements flew in all directions and turned the pastures and hayfields over an area of millions of hectares into a dump of metal scrap. According to the estimate of the local authorities, the damage caused by this to agriculture amounts to R14 million annually.

Having admitted all this, G.S. Titov spoke of the measures now being taken. It has been decided, in particular, to limit the areas where metal may fall from the air, to reduce the toxicity of the fuel used, to change the method of exploding the stages, and to collect all the fragments into one place. For this purpose a group of 150 people is being set up, equipped with the required technology.

He also spoke about the problems which have not been resolved so far, such as, for example, how to recycle this metal. Scientists, managers, and trade personnel have been approached with a proposal to work out a method of dismantling the rockets and to using the valuable scrap metal. However, nobody paid serious attention to this. Moreover those stages contain extremely valuable pumps, including some, for example, which, according to G.S. Titov, can operate till communism comes. And these pumps can be used for pumping any toxic fluids, but our rich departments and enterprises turned their back even on this. Cooperatives have offered their services, but since the case of attempting to sell tanks abroad, they are not trusted any longer. G.S. Titov appealed to state enterprises to work out a method of dismantling rockets and utilising the valuable metal; those who need it could buy it at scrap metal prices.

An agreement was reached that the oblast will be cleared of the fragments of space rockets this year.

Cosmonauts Continue Space Experiments

LD2003204890 Moscow TASS in English 1408 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—TASS special correspondent reports from the Mission Control Centre:

Cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyov and Aleksandr Balandin are examining, in accordance with today's programme,

the functioning of the aggregate control system during dynamic operations using the station's orientation engines.

According to the medical control programme, the cosmonauts underwent a medical checkup, including a comprehensive assessment of the cardio-vascular system in conditions of weightlessness.

A biological experiment, started on March 4, continues to study the impact of weightlessness on the organism of birds. A Japanese quail with an incubation period of three weeks was chosen for the experiment.

The flight of the Mir orbital complex is proceeding normally.

Plant Starts Production of Satellite TV Dishes

PM1303154790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 1

[V. Zaykin, PRAPOR PEREMOGI editorial office staffer, and correspondent A. Kleva report: "Fifteen Television Channels Via Satellite"]

[Text] Akhtyrka, Sumy Oblast—The first dozens of parabolic antennas for receiving television signals from orbital communications satellites have come off the production line at the Akhtyrka "Promsvyaz" production association.

The antenna was developed 18 months ago as a special order for embassies and departments. While people "at the top" were pondering whether it was feasible to permit our people to watch 15 world television channels, local designers headed by V. Ozerov, V. Sakhoshko, and I. Sheludko perfected the equipment with the help of coleagues from the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic Republics. The compact antenna can now even be installed on a balcony.

It is planned to supply trade with up to 800 sets of this equipment before the end of the year. And in two years' time the association will be producing some 20,000 dish antennas. Inhabitants in remote and high-altitude areas of the country where good reception of signals is not possible will have first claim on these antennas. The price of the system is still high—up to 10,000 rubles.

Baltic Republics

Vilnius Radio Carries 21 Mar Supreme Council

Government Law Debated

LD2103105890

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0800 GMT on 21 March begins a live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius. Deputy Kazimieras Motieka is in the chair; 129 deputies are present; Deputy Algirdas Abisalas is assisting the chairman of the session.

At 0802 Motieka states that a draft appeal to militia workers has been drawn up. The deputies decided to include this item in the agenda.

At 0805 a report on a draft government law is presented by Deputy Kazimieras Antanavicius. He states that this law will be only provisional, because when the republic reorganizes its economy and other affairs, the number of ministries will be reduced. This draft law was thoroughly examined yesterday by the commission responsible for its preparation and by the presidium of the Supreme Council. He then describes proposed amendments and corrections to individual articles in the draft law.

At 0922 debates on the draft law start

At 0931 the session is adjourned until 1000.

Government Structure Debated

LD2103121890

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1000 GMT on 21 March resumes its live relay of the Supreme Council session in Vilnius following the announced break.

At 1002 Supreme Council President V. Landsbergis delivers a political statement.

At 1115 a deputy from Klaipeda makes a statement on the introduction of Lithuanian currency. He hopes that it would speed up the transformation of enterprises in the republic and their taking over by Lithuania.

At 1020 debates resume on the government draft law.

At 1051 debates on the status of government officials in progress concern mainly whether government officials can be engaged in any other kind of private enterprise, running a business, farming estates, and so on.

Prime Minister K. Prunskiene speaks in detail on the structure of the government departments. On the role of the prime minister and deputy prime minister, she says that from now on the work of the cabinet will not be divided into spheres of responsibility; deputy prime ministers and the prime minister will work closely as a team sharing all the responsibility equally because currently there was an abundance of problems, each of which must be solved at that level.

At 1107 K. Prunskiene concludes her report. Deputy Prime Minister Brazauskas takes the floor. He fully supports Prunskiene. He speaks about future functions of ministries saying that from now on ministries will have to make their own decisions. He notes the importance of education and culture as the basis for Lithuanian society and, therefore, the importance of the Ministry of Education. He says he is against merging the Ministry of Culture with the Ministry of Education. Speaking on the functions of the Ministry of Material Supply, Brazauskas says that this ministry should not be merged with other ministries.

At 1125 Deputy Prime Minister R.Ozolas takes the floor.

Role of Ministries Debated

LD2103140590

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian continues its live relay of the Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

At 1127 GMT continuing his speech, Romuladas Ozolas says that the right spiritual environment should be created in order to achieve material goals. He stresses the importance of a Ministry of Environment Protection and notes that there will be eight ministries in Lithuania. Next, he says that the old thinking is still in existence, as expressed by the attitude to ministries, regarding them as before as a tool for suppression. Therefore, it is only natural that their destruction is regarded as something like a heroic deed.

At 1144 Z. Vaisvila says that reports from Klaipeda and other places say that General Taurinskas, chief of the Lithuanian DOSAAF [Union of Societies and Organizations Promoting the Defense of the State], transferred part of the property of the Lithuanian DOSAAF to the Soviet Armed Forces. It is decided to summon General Taurinskas to make a statement about these allegations.

At 1147 the session is adjourned until 1300.

At 1300 the session resumes work. Deputy Antanavicius proposes the Editing Commission. Following this, the debates on the government draft law continue.

At 1320 Deputy Ilgunas voices his objections concerning the merging of some ministries.

At 1330 Deputy B. Rupeika speaks about privileges granted to government officials which are still in existence, such as special clinics, rest houses, stores etc. Rupeika proposes that the law should include a clause which would not allow the government to carry on with the old Soviet tradition. The chairman of the session tries to stop him, saying he is not speaking to the point.

No Tanks, Disturbances Reported in Lithuania

PM2003232190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Mar 90 p 1

[Correspondent V. Zarovskiy dispatch: "There Are No Tanks or Disturbances"]

[Text] Vilnius—A colleague who telephoned from Siberia asked for assistance in getting a relative, the wife of a member of an airborne assault force [desantnik], out of Lithuania. Every morning I have to answer telephone calls from acquaintances by saying: "There are no tanks or disturbances."

And why should there be? In recent years we have grown accustomed to the fact that where some kind of extraordinary events occur there must be bloodshed. On Saturday 30,000 people were chanting "Lietuva!" [Lithuanian for Lithuania] outside the republic's Supreme Soviet building, while the following day 100,000 beside the Palace of Sport were chanting "Soviet Lithuania!" Is that pluralism of opinions? In Kaunas, which has grown languid in the March sunshine, soldiers are peaceably eating ice cream on the little benches in Lajsves Avenue while nearby young men from "Siauliu Sajungos" [the Union of Fusiliers], a resurrected youth organization of bourgeois Lithuania, are engaged in making music. An idyll? Will it be so for long? Appeals for civil disobedience and the creation of workers volunteer militias to protect socialist property at enterprises and institutions in the republic are categorical and uncompromising. There are appeals coming from the other side at an equally high pitch. "There is no other way," you can hear people say. But maybe there is, nonetheless. A couple of young men from Sneckus, crane operator S. Alimov and installation worker Yu. Shapoval, whose acquaintance I made recently at a plenum of the Ignalina Rayon Communist Youth League Committee think otherwise. And not just them. Well then, what is going to triumph? Reason or emotion?

Baltic Commander Says Army Activity Planned

PM2003171790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Mar 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Colonel General F. Kuzmin, commander of the Baltic Military District, by Captain Third Class V. Yermolin: "Meeting at the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] There has been a meeting at the Republic's Supreme Soviet between V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet; and Colonel General F. Kuzmin, commander of the Baltic Military District. Our correspondent Captain Third Class V. Yermolin asked the commander to talk about the substance of the conversation.

[Kuzmin] The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet chairman was asked a number of questions: Will the decisions of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies be carried out; in what way will the rights of labor and war veterans be safeguarded; what does the Supreme Soviet think about cases of desertion from the USSR Armed Forces by Lithuanian citizens; how are the instances of surveillance of military camps and troop movements to be assessed; what is the republican Supreme Soviet's attitude to the spring draft?

V. Landsbergis gave evasive answers to direct questions. For instance, the fate of war and labor veterans can be decided, Landsbergis believes, only by means of intergovernmental negotiations. As for desertion, after the traditional arguments about the "occupation army," the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet chairman confirmed his previous statement to the effect that republican citizens serving in the USSR Armed Forces must continue to perform their military duty until the question of their service has been legally resolved. Answering the question about surveillance of military units, Landsbergis said: "Observations are taking place; we are concerned about the nature of military subunits' actions, and we do not know their plans." His reply to the last question, about the spring draft: "Evidently, young people will not be joining the Soviet Army in the spring." We were also told that in the very near future Internal Affairs Ministry organs in the republic will be reorganized and turned into a municipal police force. Their numbers will be significantly increased. Subunits are being formed for the economic protection of borders. I believe that the following information speaks volumes: There are 15,000 weapons in the republic's criminal investigation service.

[Yermolin] Fedor Mikhaylovich, not for the first time sittings of the Supreme Soviet session have discussed "suspicious activity" by military subunits on the territory of Lithuania.

[Kuzmin] All I can say to that is that district subunits and units are acting in accordance with combat training plans.

Report Seeks Volunteers To 'Protect' Lithuania

LD2103104690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0940 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Sajudis news agency report]

[Text] Registration of young men aged between 19 and 40 who wish to serve as volunteers in the system of the protection of the country is continued by the Sajudis restructuring movement.

If you think that you could help protect the entire territory of Lithuania or its borders we ask you to fill in the forms and register at the nearest headquarters of Sajudis.

Information is supplied by Vilnius Sajudis headquarters, telephone 224665.

Soviet TV Carries Rally 'Cut Off' Earlier

LD2103094990 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 21 Mar 90

[From "News about Lithuania" program presented by Edvinas Butkus]

[Summary] Yesterday, when the rally opposing Lithuanian independence, that took place last Sunday, was being shown by Leningrad Television, seen here in the Vilnius area, the relay was cut off.

Today the same rally, which had been well advertised in advance, was shown by Soviet Central Television. This time the relay was not cut off.

Landsbergis Addresses 20 Mar Supreme Council

LD2003142490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1019 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Statement by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, at the 20 March Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Among the political events which were widely commented on yesterday evening the most important was a statement by the Soviet Government. [passage omitted] I have assessed this statement as a sufficiently constructive response, although indirect, to our statements. [passage omitted]

Foreign news agencies were asking all night about the significance of the fact that the State Security Committee has been additionally instructed to supervise the work of the customs offices on the territory of Lithuania. As you know, we have taken some steps and adopted resolutions on checking at some border checkpoints whether material wealth is not being taken away from Lithuania, and we intended gradually, probably in cooperation with the border guards, to start taking over control of the border checkpoints. Maybe, it is only being stressed that the Republic of Lithuania will not be allowed to do this. It seems some practical contacts will explain the meaning of these instructions. [passage omitted]

In any case, I would assess this statement as a certain beginning or stage of negotiations, an exchange of opinions, propositions which in some cases are contradictory, demonstrating the incompatibility of the positions, and in some instances, showing the positions coincide.

Yesterday, at the end of the day, persons delegated by us met Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow. This happened at 1800 hours. Vaidotas Antanaitis and Egidijus Bickauskas conversed for half an hour with Mikhail Gorbachev and presented to him a reply signed by me and known to you. The delegates say the Soviet Union's president read it with attention—maybe a government message with the same text which we dispatched at noon had not yet reached him. He read it closely, and the conversation with him was calm and businesslike. Our delegates drew attention to the fact that when accusations were aimed at Lithuania because its solutions are radical or hasty—I understand the conversation this way—Egidijus Bickauskas recalled the great inflexibility of the Soviet leadership in their attitude toward the Republic's interests during all of the previous two years. And the remark made by one of them, that Mikhail Gorbachev had poor advisers on national problems, was not negated, in the same way, as a year ago in Moscow during a similar unofficial conversation when we stated that we trust Mikhail Gorbachev, but that he received very poor advice. [passage omitted]

The reaction of foreign states could already be foreseen yesterday and today. It seems Secretary of State Baker has already spoken to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze asking him, and, in what way we will know later, and warned him about the meaning of large movements of troops in Lithuania. Canadian Foreign Minister Clark also put this question to the Soviet Union's Embassy. Today we see that the planes do not fly anymore. Maybe the task of the exercises has been fulfilled.

Mikhail Gorbachev mentioned in his conversation with Lithuanian delegates that the problem of Lithuania would be examined last night in the President's Council. Unfortunately, we know nothing concrete about the results of this meeting. [passage omitted]

Now, about the situation in Lithuania. We have information; you have seen fragments. Yesterday, Leningrad television was showing the entire Yedinstvo meeting in Vilnius and this broadcast, quite justly, was stopped according to a decision by our Television and Radio Committee. It based this decision on the press law which speaks of statements of an inciting nature.

The question may arise as to what to do when such inciting activity is shown on the central television channels, on Moscow programs. There are certain elements there that we have seen and criticized more than once, but it may happen that we will have to refuse the broadcasting of such programs. As for Leningrad television programs, about which there have been many doubts, maybe we should now discuss whether it is expedient to use this channel in the easiest way.

Maybe, we would not mind watching Polish television. Maybe we should think about the use of this program time, maybe not a mechanical use, not only taking Polish television programs. We have discussed this in the past with the leadership of the Lithuanian Polish Union and with the television people as to how to do this so that a part of the time is used in this way, and a part of the time, maybe, for other purposes supplementing this only Lithuanian program. [paragraph as heard]

The requirements of other national communities should be taken into consideration and a wider use made of the world, cultural, information and educational material. This is an idea which could be debated here, or a corresponding commission instructed to submit proposals directly to the Council of Ministers or to the

Supreme Council. But, I think that it would be more expedient for us to view a Polish program from Warsaw which is not hostile to Lithuania than a hostile program from Leningrad.

It is true, there have been programs from Leningrad favorable to Lithuania describing the state of affairs objectively, but we are familiar with this situation anyway. We can thank Leningrad when it more objectively informs the Russian people.

The participation of many people of Polish nationality in the demands by Yedinstvo and their support of those demands that Lithuania or some of its parts should remain in the Soviet Union separated from the Republic look strange to me. When compared with the congratulations of the Polish political forces and ordinary people of various professions in Poland—we did not receive a single opposing message or letter—one has an impression that there are two Polish nations in the world. I do not wish to say this about all Poles in Lithuania, and I would not like to create an impression that they are Yedinstvo supporters. I think that the part played by our colleagues, Polish deputies in the Supreme Council, should be more soothing in this situation, and not to make bitter the real or only artificially inflated [word indistinct]. But, if these people, and there are no such people here among us, demand that a certain part of Lithuanian territory be attached to Belorussia, how do they compare the situation of Poles in Belorussia and Lithuania? Do they really wish the Poles well? To my mind, this is difficult to understand. A part of the Poles residing in Belorussia, maybe not speaking Polish, moved to Lithuania—this local emigration was not small. They moved to Lithuania because there are Polish schools here. Would they like to go back, taking our land with them, with a gratitude that the conditions for Poles were better in Lithuania?

Today there are many disturbances in those parts, many misleading [word indistinct] and I would like very much to invite the colleagues here present, and other influential persons, to contribute so that incitements that would benefit the third force, the name of which is explicitly expressed, would be without results. [sentence as heard]

In Russian society, as we have seen in organized events and in our relations, there are those who are very favorable toward our decisions and those who are very hostile. It is strange that these hostile persons use obvious untruths in their arguments, even educated and titled persons. It seems they understand ethics this way, but there are a sufficient number of sensible people.

One expression of the sensible way was yesterday's extraordinary session of deputies in Snieckus where demands were made by some of them. According to information I received on the telephone, reason prevailed there. Extreme and provocative demands were not supported. The only constantly repeated word remained: referendum. If this is the attitude of all Lithuanian inhabitants; if there are opportunities created to conduct a referendum under conditions free of occupation and military threats, there can be talk about it. [passage omitted] There is no need for a referendum to confirm our resolutions. [passage omitted]

I invite you once again, all present here and those who listen to me, to have more civic consciousness. Do not add to interpretations that, allegedly, there is a political or some other disorder in Lithuania, since this is not the case and this creates great annoyance among the enemies of our decisions. Thank you for your attention.

Reactions to Lithuanian Independence Reported

LD2103025690 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] What law is Lithuania living by? At a time when its new leaders consider it independent, the Soviet Government regards it still as a union republic. The national government has confirmed in a statement the predominance of union legislation in this Baltic republic. [passage omitted]

The statement Prime Minister Ryzhkov signed certainly does not mean a step toward a war of nerves between Lithuania and Moscow, as the UPI agency claims. Throughout last week Lithuania was demonstratively refusing to follow any of the Soviet laws. [passage omitted]

Member of parliament Viktor Alksnis [people's deputy from Riga City] had this to say:

[Begin Alksnis recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] Frankly I question the decision of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet because according to the official information of the Lithuanian Central Electoral Commission, the deputies who decided on Lithuania's withdrawal represent about 40 percent of Lithuanian voters. How can they decide the fate of the entire republic? The only way out would be a referendum. [end recording]

[Announcer] Other members of parliament however took the Lithuanian decision with more tolerance. The popular weekly magazine OGONEK editor in chief Vitaliy Korotich:

[Begin Korotich recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] This is a good reflection of the Lithuanian people's dignity. I believe we must take into account the will and dignity of every nationality. We have not yet worked out the mechanism of any republics moving out of the union but we must do this. Lithuania I believe will be able to be within a Soviet confederation if it wholeheartedly supports the goals of this confederation. If it doesn't, it has the right to chose. Everything depends on whether or not we'll have dignity and patience enough to give up our imperial way of thinking. [end recording]

[Announcer] Lithuania however chose not to await either any dramatic and democratic reforms to come from a Soviet Federation or a law on how republics can withdraw from the Soviet Union. Incidentally, a law of this kind is coming. [passage omitted]

The two sides stated they want dialogue but is dialogue possible in these conditions? The Chairman of the USSR Constitution Supervisory Committee Sergey Alekseyev believes if there is to be a dialogue two things are required—one, common sense; the other, no escalation of unilateral actions:

[Begin Alekseyev recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] The situation is complicated indeed. The worst would be for unilateral actions to take a spontaneous course. We must respect the will of any nationality as much as the law and rights of all nationalities. Spontaneous and rash actions are very dangerous today. [end recording]

[Announcer] And that was material on the situation in Lithuania today prepared by a member of our staff, Irena Solovtsova.

Lithuania Appeals to Residents for Calm

LD2103105790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] The government of the republic appeals to all the residents of the republic not to give way to any incitement caused by irresponsible people aimed at destabilizing the situation in Lithuania.

The current situation is regarded by the government as the transition period. The government declares that it is seeking and will seek with all responsibility and understanding to normalize external relations and implement the measures for meeting the necessary social needs, and will do everything to ensure that the vital interests of the people are protected.

The government urges the people of Lithuania not to take part in actions directed against the decisions adopted by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania and the decisions of the government. People who disagree with them place themselves beyond the bounds of Lithuanian society and become unprotected against negative legal, economic, and social consequences.

Esteemed people of Lithuania, we call upon you for concord and unity, and most of all we call upon you to work for the welfare of the independent Republic of Lithuania.

Landsbergis on Ryzhkov Appeal on Economic Links

LD2003154890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1453 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Vilnius, 20 March (ELTA-TASS)—Today chairman Vytautas Landsbergis spoke at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic which is under way here. He commented on yesterday's statement of the USSR Government signed by Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Vytautas Landsbergis gave a positive appraisal of Nikolay Ryzhkov's appeal not to upset the existing links between Lithuania's enterprises and enterprises of other union republics and expressed hope that mutual agreements, both for supply of raw materials and for supply of output for fulfilling the 1990 production program, will be respected. "On this point the position of the Governments of Lithuania and the USSR fully agree," he stressed.

In Landsbergis' view, however, there are no grounds for asserting that Lithuanian enterprises are going to undermine economic links with the USSR. He asserted that "the allegation about the transfer of state enterprises to private ownership is unfounded, too."

In the given situation, Landsbergis agrees, it is possible that it makes sense to ensure greater security for the operation of the Ignalina Nuclear Electric Power Station in the east of Lithuania, which is stated in the Soviet Government statement. Lithuania also has an interest in the uninterrupted operation of transport communications, and here its opinion entirely coincides with the opinion of the USSR Government.

Landsbergis noted that as of today the intensive flights by combat aircraft over the territory of Lithuania have ceased. He assessed this to be the end of Soviet Army maneuvers.

Informing the Lithuanian parliamentarians about the presentation to Mikhail Gorbachev of an official reply to his telegram, which took place on Monday [19 March], Landsbergis noted that "a half- hour calm and business-like conversation" took place between the president of the USSR and the delegation from Lithuania.

Landsbergis Interviewed on Independence Process

AU2003161790 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 15 Mar 90 p 7

[Interview with Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, by Wojciech Swidnicki; date and place not given: "Freedom Has To Be Paid For"]

[Text] [Swidnicki] Is there a real possibility that the Soviet Union will impose an economic blockade against Lithuania?

[Landsbergis] We are taking such a possibility seriously, but if that is the price that has to be paid for independence, Lithuanian society is ready to pay it. The Scandinavian states have promised to help us. Fortunately, we have a nuclear power station; the one whose construction we protested for many years. It has now come in useful. We have discovered oil deposits of our own, and we are about to begin exploiting them. They will cover

about 30 percent of our needs. Moscow may block deliveries of some raw materials, but the goods that were produced with them were shipped back to the USSR anyway.

[Swidnicki] How have the Soviet forces and the security apparatus in Lithuania reacted to independence?

[Landsbergis] The Army is complying with our instructions. The militia already declared its loyalty to the Lithuanian state a long time ago, and the security is, at least partially, in the hands of our people.

However, some groups connected with the Soviet authorities may cause problems. A protest rally in the center of Vilnius has been announced for 18 March. It is being organized by "Edinstvo"—an organization of Russian language speakers—and the Committee for the Defense of Socialism, which groups together Soviet party functionaries. I hope that Poles will not take part in it.

During the vote on independence, Polish deputies behaved very loyally toward Lithuania. The fact that none of them voted against independence, and three of them voted for it, is something that the Lithuanian people will not forget.

[Swidnicki] On Tuesday [13 March] international press agencies published the statements by Algirdas Brazauskas and by Ruytell, head of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, announcing the rapid commencement of Lithuanian-Soviet talks....

[Landsbergis] I cannot give you a concrete date for a meeting, but we will definitely hold talks, and I think that they will take place soon.

Whether the negotiations are speeded up largely depends on what position the governments and societies of other states adopt. Moscow has problems of its own, and it is particularly sensitive to world opinion at the present time.

[Swidnicki] What will the talks be about?

[Landsbergis] We know that despite the formal proclamation of independence, the actual realization of it will be the product of a long-term process, and the conditions for it should be discussed with Moscow. However, we have to agree on the basis for talks beforehand. I think that the Soviet side is afraid that the commencement of negotiations with an official delegation from the Lithuanian Republic will signify de facto recognition of our sovereignty. We do not reject unofficial contacts, but we can only assume commitments as recognized representatives of the government of an independent state.

Supreme Council Decides To Mark Borders

LD2003195390 Moscow TASS in English 1839 GMT 20 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius March 20 TASS—The Lithuanian parliament today instructed the republican government to begin preparatory work to mark the borders of the Lithuanian state.

It also passed a resolution to change existing regulations and give the Lithuanian public prosecutor the right to oversee the observance of laws on the republic's transport.

The parliament—the Supreme Soviet—formed an ad hoc commission to deal with the problem of eastern Lithuania, which is inhabited mostly by non-Lithuanians. Some of them disapprove of the parliament's decision to proclaim Lithuania independent and suspend both the Lithuanian and Federal Constitutions.

The session also endorsed standing parliamentary commissions and examined issues connected with a bill on the Lithuanian state emblem.

The parliament will continue its work on Wednesday.

Landsbergis on Withdrawal of Soviet Forces

LD2003145690 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] [Announcer Edvinas Butkus] Recently, Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, met high-ranking military servicemen from the units of Soviet Armed Forces stationed on the territory of Lithuania. The meetings also included leaders of the Baltic Military Region.

Yesterday, in his interview with Lithuanian and foreign journalists, Vytautas Landsbergis gave the following account of these meetings:

[Begin Landsbergis recording] Recently, perhaps three or four delegations of military men and individual high-ranking military leaders visited. One can assume that their coming here to the building of the Supreme Council and seeing the chairman is a part of the same psychological pressure to prevent Lithuania from making any brave and final decisions that Moscow will not like. Attempts are made to exert this pressure through rallies, military exercises, and redemarcating the borders.

It must be said, however, that the military leaders who visited me are indeed concerned. We had a long, friendly, and concrete talk. Their concern is caused by the fact that young soldiers, most often of Lithuanian nationality—although this could be said about Lithuanian citizens of other nationalities—are deserting the places of their military service and returning home to Lithuania, or if they served in Lithuania, they have gone home to their parents. Another more simple case is when soldiers go home on leave and do not return to their military units.

According to the law, the law which is binding in the military, such soldiers are regarded as deserters if they

fail to return to their military unit within three days. Criminal proceedings must be carried out against them.

According to the genuine international legal status of Lithuania and especially according to special laws and decisions that have recently been adopted in Lithuania, these soldiers are not required to do military service in the armed forces of an alien state. They cannot be taken to court for this. Even relevant articles in the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania have been cancelled so that there can be no reproaches or pretexts [words indistinct]

We have found ourselves in a two-fold situation, just like very many other issues today in Lithuania. When the Third Congress of the USSR People's Deputies in Moscow declared that our laws and decisions were invalid, we declared that the entire USSR Constitution with all its laws is null and void on the territory of Lithuania. Of course, this also applies to any decisions adopted by the Third Congress of the USSR People's Deputies because these are not decisions made by our state. The state has expressed the full sovereignty of the people and the nation. This is a recognized principle; we expressed it and confirmed it. The USSR declared that this was not so because the sovereignty of the USSR also includes Lithuania. In this case, the world will have to recognize that any state that is capable of invading and occupying another state also has the right of sovereignty in the occupied country.

Of course, this is the level of international law that existed in the Middle Ages. I do not think that the USSR wants to look like a medieval state.

Going back to the visits by the military officers, they said that their concern is these young soldiers and what to do with them. Of course they do not want this desertion from the Soviet Army to take place on a massive scale because their problems would just increase and they are reproached by their superiors for allowing the soldiers to desert the military service. They also voiced their concern about society's attitude toward the servicemen and their families who live in Lithuania, as well as the soldiers who do their military service in Lithuania. In other words, this is an alien army on an alien soil. When they are referred to in that way, soldiers and officers feel insulted. We can understand this. They did not come here of their own free will. Therefore, when somebody in the street or anywhere else calls a Soviet officer an occupant, it is done in vain.

I had to explain to these officers that the advance of their army units, their predecessors' advance into Lithuania, was a real occupation and that their dislocation in Lithuania without any agreement with the government of Lithuania, without any regard to the opinion of the Lithuanian nation and the public of Lithuania, is arbitrary and at the same time is equal to the presence of an occupational army [word indistinct]. It was not easy for them to understand this. I believe that they will come to understand it gradually and perhaps it will not take a long time.

So the ground is being prepared in this sphere as well as in other spheres so negotiations can begin with the USSR both concerning the status of the Armed Forces and the time for its complete withdrawal, as well as all other political and economic issues. Perhaps this will not be done immediately, but after some defined period of time. [end recording]

Vilnius Rallies, Army Service Plans Viewed

PM2003122990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 90 First Edition p 4

[Special correspondent Captain Third Class V. Yermolin report: "On Rallies, and Not Just Rallies"]

[Text] Vilnius—**USSR Citizens' Committee Set Up**

The rally held 17 March in support of the "Landsbergis line" drew around 30,000 people to the square beside the republic's Supreme Soviet. This was by no means the largest demonstration organized by "Sajudis." But times change, and rapidly too. It is one thing to support noble slogans devoted to the desire for freedom, democracy, and economic prosperity. It is another thing to support specific steps by the authorities, steps which can abruptly change your destiny and that of your people. It seems that this is starting to be understood in Lithuania today not just by the fundamental opponents of "Sajudis." The 200,000-strong rally in support of the resolution of the extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies in connection with the 10-12 March 1990 decision of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet was confirmation of that. The rally was held Sunday in the square beside the Vilnius Palace of Sport.

Of course, it is not a question of making an arithmetical comparison between these two mass demonstrations. But the very fact that such diametrically opposed views of the political situation in the republic have been aired shows eloquently that the attempts by the chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet to make out that opponents of secession from the USSR are a bunch of malcontents are absolutely without foundation.

Lithuanian, Polish, and Belorussian could be heard being spoken at the Sunday rally held following an appeal from a number of social organizations, including the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform. The numerous banners called for unity to be indissoluble and demanded a referendum. People of different nationalities, professions, and ages took the microphone to essentially state a single idea: "We are Soviet people! We want a sovereign Lithuania within a renewed USSR!"

The thousands-strong will of those present was reflected in the following resolution:

"1. To support the resolution of the extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies in connection with the 10-12 March 1990 decision of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"2. To continue to be guided by the USSR Constitution (Basic Law) and the Lithuanian SSR Constitution (Basic Law).

"3. To set up a USSR Citizens' Committee in Lithuania and charge it with defending the representation of USSR citizens in the USSR Supreme Soviet and in Lithuanian SSR state and social organizations. To charge the committee to protect the property interests of USSR citizens, enterprises and institutions under union and union-republic jurisdiction, and social organizations.

"4. To categorically reject attacks on the Soviet Army and to express solidarity with and support for its officers, warrant officers, and men..."

Representatives of the Vilnius Garrison took part in the rally. In particular, a protest was read out from the Baltic Military District Military Council, which stressed the subversive nature of the legislative acts passed by the republic's new supreme authorities, and gave an assurance that the district's personnel would continue to "carry out their tasks in ensuring the armed defense of the USSR in accordance with Soviet law."

It is typical that none of the Lithuanian Parliament deputies took the opportunity to air their views at this highly impressive coming together of citizens concerned at the prevailing situation in the republic. The previous day V. Landsbergis had proposed that deputies refrain from taking part in the rally, arguing that hard-line supporters of unity with the Soviet Union would assemble in the square outside the Palace of Sport and that there was allegedly no point in entering into a dialogue with them. Landsbergis' advice was considered reasonable by absolutely all the deputies, from which we can conclude that at least 200,000 citizens in the republic do not have a single representative in the current Supreme Soviet.

Yet the real disposition of forces in the arena of the republic's political life is such that the new Lithuanian government will nonetheless have to take account of the opinions of those whom they are trying not to notice. If, of course, Landsbergis and his apparatus maintain the same level of democratic freedoms which currently exists in the Soviet Union.

Both the rallies mentioned were held in the correct and restrained atmosphere typical of Lithuania.

"Demand For... Army Training"

Leaflets have appeared in Lithuania's cities and villages stating that registration has begun of "men aged between 19 and 40 who would like to serve as volunteers in the country's security system." If we disregard the new terminology, it is a question of a kind of public draft for emerging armed forces.

The specimen forms attached to the announcement contain a paragraph granting the volunteer the right to choose as he wishes between draft service or service in a professional army. Judging from the form, preference will be given to those who have already had Army or Navy experience and a military rank.

For the time being the volunteers are choosing the period for which they will join the ranks of the country's armed defenders (the length of service can also be chosen—from three months up to 12 months and more). V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, having heeded a warning from the Military Prosecutor's Office, was forced to issue the following appeal to Lithuanian SSR citizens serving in the USSR Armed Forces: "We call on all citizens to remain at their places of service in expectation of a resolution through talks with the Soviet Government of the question of your return to Lithuania."

Lithuanian Party Official Urges Referendum

LD2003233490 Moscow World Service in English 2110 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Correspondent Peter Vasilyev report; remarks by independent Lithuanian Communist Party spokesman A. Zukas and by lawyer Oleg (Fomin) are recorded in Lithuanian, fading into English translation]

[Text] The Lithuanian president, Vytautas Landsbergis, has addressed parliament in Vilnius now in session [as heard]. The president commented on the statement the Soviet Government published last Monday. Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, signed the statement. Vytautas Landsbergis welcomed Premier Ryzhkov's appeal to keep ties between the enterprises of Lithuania and those of other Soviet republics. He hoped agreements would be honored, both for raw materials and for production to meet the 1990 targets. More from Peter Vasilyev.

[Vasilyev] On Tuesday the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet discussed what several deputies described as quite trivial questions—the determination and marking of the border line and placement of check points. Besides, the head of the Lithuanian parliament, Vytautas Landsbergis, made a statement on the political situation in the country in the world in and outside Lithuania [sentence as heard]. (?He actually) replied to the statement of the Soviet Government that drew attention to the danger of unilateral destruction of the existing economic ties by Lithuania.

To put it into a nutshell Landsbergis said the republic intends to keep its chosen course and decision to secede from the USSR. Earlier the Congress of Peoples' Republican Deputies and President Mikhail Gorbachev

declared Lithuania's decision invalid. This is a complicated situation and the way out of it can be found only on the road of a constructive dialogue.

Here is what a spokesman for the Central Committee of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party, Algimantas Zukas, told me on the phone.

[Zukas] I would describe the situation as a stalemate for both sides. It's a paradoxical situation that can develop in various ways. One thing I'm certain is that our parliament won't revise its decision. However it's indisputable that [the] unilateral decision of the Lithuanian Parliament cannot be the last word in the republic where the population is far from being unanimous on the issue.

[Vasilyev] By the way, last Sunday 180,000 opponents of the secession rallied in Vilnius. It's clear that a referendum must be held. Only a referendum can serve as an indicator of the true feelings of Lithuanians and the Russian-speaking population of the republic. Algimantas Zukas once again.

[Zukas] The question of a referendum hasn't been dropped. There is a possibility that it will be held. Everyone says that the question must be decided by the entire population.

[Vasilyev] A prominent lawyer Oleg (Fomin) also told me that only a general referendum in Lithuania can demonstrate the true attitude of the population to the future.

[Fomin] The present leaders of Lithuania are urging Moscow and President Gorbachev to start talks. But they are out of the question now, primarily because the present leaders and parliament of Lithuania were elected by merely 41-42 percent [as heard] of voters, and thus do not represent the entire population. Only a referendum can show how many people in Lithuania stand for independence, for secession from the Soviet Union.

[Vasilyev] Meanwhile the Soviet Government has declared that all facilities in the jurisdiction of union ministries and agencies in Lithuanian territory are the property of the USSR and will be managed only from Moscow.

Lithuanian Party Spokesman on Fears for Future

LD2003165190 Moscow World Service in English 0810 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Excerpts] [Unidentified announcer] President Mikhail Gorbachev has received a reply from the Lithuanian leadership reporting the attitude of that Republic's Supreme Soviet to the decision of the third special Congress of People's Deputies, this country's full parliament. The Soviet news agency TASS notes that, as is evident from the reply, the demand to adopt measures to put the Congress' decision into effect has virtually been ignored. [passage omitted]

[Second unidentified announcer] Over the weekend there was unusually high activity in Lithuania by all sections of the population and their interests were displayed to avoid the lot of passive observers of the coming dialogue between Lithuania and Moscow over the problem of this Republic's sovereignty. Multithousand-strong rallies were held in Vilnius. First there was a rally by supporters of secession, organized by the Sajudis Popular Front. Then there was another rally sponsored by the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party that upholds the platform of the CPSU. It was attended, among others, by representatives of the Russian-speaking population who reject the idea of secession. Obviously, it cannot be expected that a fast, unequivocal solution will be found. The answer to this question might be a referendum since it alone can take into account all the points of view that exist in society. And this view is shared by the Central Committee of the recently formed Communist Party of Lithuania. Its spokesman Gediminas Kirkilas said the following:

[Begin Kirkilas recording in Lithuanian, with superimposed English translation] A compromise is a long way off, I think. A compromise is now taking shape only on the very idea of holding talks. We now have to agree on starting the talks. As for the contents of the talks it's very difficult to answer where compromise may be found. [end recording]

[Third unidentified announcer] Some time ago the USSR Customs Board issued instructions on setting up checkpoints and on inspecting all the cargoes imported and exported by Lithuania. Do you regard this move as a forerunner of possible economic sanctions against the Republic?

[Kirkilas reply, read by announcer] Not only we, but many enterprises in the Soviet Union that we're linked with will suffer from economic sanctions against Lithuania. The USSR Bank has frozen our funds and this month we'll have no money to pay wages and salaries. There is a certain panic among the population. People have started buying up goods. With our goods shortage you can realize what that can bring about.

[Third announcer] And what do you fear most in this situation?

[Kirkilas reply, read by announcer] We fear most of all that our internal situation will be affected. The new parliament and the new government do not yet control the situation and the party no longer controls it. A number of industrial facilities that work for the whole of the Soviet Union are already at a standstill almost. So far it's difficult to say what the reason for that is. Is this being done deliberately or due to our common mismanagement, plus the complicated political situation, or is this due to the subjective attitude of our partners?

[Third announcer] The situation is very complex and resembles a chess game when one has to make a move but there is nowhere to move. The decisions taken by Lithuania were unilateral, but on the other hand, there

were pressing [word indistinct] sentiments dominated in the republic and they could not be ignored. Besides that, the very idea of sovereignty appeared not so much for the sake of gaining independence as such, though such sentiments are very strong, but rather because many people don't believe it is possible to stop the further economic decline within the framework of the Soviet Union. It is easier to cope with the problem on the scale of our small republic. So are the Lithuanian members of parliament set to look for a compromise, and if they are, what will be the most likely compromise?

[Kirkilas reply, read by announcer] I would say the Lithuanian parliament has not quite realized to the end the seriousness of the situation. Its first moves were largely euphoric and indicate that the members of parliament avoid solving concrete serious problems. They've tackled television and the Ministry of Culture as the easiest spheres, but they don't deal with law and order, with the economy, so far. They possibly hope for the new government, but it's so far difficult to say when the government begins to function in real terms.

[Third announcer] I know that military exercises, not announced earlier, have begun in Lithuania. Is that true, and if it is, is this a display of muscle?

[Kirkilas reply, read by announcer] I would personally refrain from such a parallel, although it's difficult to say what the things really are. Combat aircraft, including those for paratroopers, constantly flew over Vilnius on Sunday. It's clear that the political response to the exercises has been vast and negative, noted the spokesman of the independent Central Committee of Lithuania's Communist Party, Gediminas Kirkilas. [passage omitted]

Lithuanian Party Supports Congress Decision

LD2003174390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1653 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Semen Novitskis]

[Text] Vilnius, 20 Mar (TASS)—A plenum of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee on the platform of the CPSU Central Committee, which took place in Vilnius today, discussed the situation that is taking shape in that Baltic republic following the decision of its Supreme Soviet on "the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state" and the abolition of the effect of the USSR Constitution.

It was stressed at the plenum that the present leadership in the republic has adopted antisocialist positions and has embarked on a path of reviving the main clauses of the bourgeois constitution of 1938.

A participant in the plenum, Vladimir Khodunkin, secretary of the Vilnius Town Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania on the platform of the CPSU, described the situation in the republic in this way: "A polarization of political forces is taking place. On the one hand there is the forced propping up of a shaky declaratory Lithuanian independence with more and more new laws, and on the other hand, more and more mass and organized nonacceptance of these decisions as unconstitutional and undemocratic. One week was enough for an abyss to begin to form between the leaders of "Sajudis" who have become legislators, and a significant part of the population."

A statement was adopted at the plenum "On the Political Situation in Lithuania": which says in particular that the decisions of the Republic's Supreme Soviet on "the Restoration of an Independent Lithuanian State" and on the abolition here of the effect of the USSR Constitution, are leading to a further whipping up of political tension in Lithuania. The orientation of the present Lithuanian leadership for the republic to leave the composition of the USSR, says the document, places the real sovereignty of the republic under threat.

The statement says that the plenum of the temporary Central Committee on the Lithuanian Communist Party on the platform of the CPSU fully approves the decision of the special Congress of USSR People's Deputies which deemed the decisions of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet to have no legal force.

The only way to take the Republic out of the sociopolitical crisis that has emerged is, in the view of plenum participants, the path toward the development of state, economic, and cultural independence for the Republic within the composition of a renewed Federation.

Landsbergis, Brazauskas TV Debate Reported

PM2103095390 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Mar 90 p 1

[V. Zarovskiy report: "Roundtable's Sharp Corners"]

[Text] Vilnius—Back in May last year the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet's conference hall was equipped with electronic voting buttons. The innovation was greeted with enthusiasm, in that it spared the tellers commission the tedious counting of raised hands. One thing technology did not provide for was the roll-call vote. The new parliament found a solution. The deputy supporting a document stands up. That is also how deputies of the Lithuanian Republic's Supreme Soviet adopted the appeal to the Lithuanian people. It is distinguished from a number of previously adopted appeals in that deputies attempted for the first time to make peace among themselves and announce it to the voters. The appeal says: "All of us must now overcome together many different difficulties, therefore the emerging futile disunity of Lithuanian people and the collections of signatures for an evaluation of the valid decisions of the Lithuanian Republic's Supreme Soviet, give cause for concern. Dear fellow countrymen! It must be understood that the elections are over. We urge you not to engage in the collection of any signatures."

But over 300,000 signatures have already been collected. On 13 March Supreme Soviet Chairman V. Landsbergis expressed the hope that when A. Brazauskas returned from the Congress of USSR People's Deputies in Moscow, he would not refuse "to appear on the television screen" together.

The meeting took place 15 March. What was the debate about? About the situation in the republic and in the country. Both sides appealed to the republic's population to remain calm and restrained. In particular, Brazauskas said: "Lithuania is now experiencing its most difficult days. Certainly, we have not yet got a good idea of how events will begin to develop, although we are ready to resolve anything which might impede our progress. Of course, people have differing opinions. I am even accused of being very cautious, even cowardly, although I do not think I am... I am profoundly convinced that it is necessary to approach talks with the Soviet leadership in a more active manner. Their results will largely determine world reaction—to recognize or not to recognize Lithuania's independence, insofar as many people look to Moscow."

The television meeting can be regarded as a roundtable between the supporters of Landsbergis and Brazauskas, and also between the parliamentary factions of Sajudis and the autonomous Communist Party of Lithuania. Some people at the session have already indulged in an attack on the communists.

Thursday the republic's Supreme Soviet deputies broke off the sitting and toured their electoral okrugs [national district]....

The session, which will continue its work Saturday, must still consider what is obviously the most important question—the resolution of the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies. I take the liberty of concluding these notes with the words Brazauskas uttered during the dialogue with the republic's Supreme Soviet chairman: "When the talks begin, there is no need to make any hasty decisions or resolutions which could hinder or halt the process."

I would like to hope that the appeal for mutual understanding will be heard.

Sajudis Member Interviewed on Independence Issues

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[Interview with Sajudis member and USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Sigitas Kudarauskas by Irina de Chikoff—date and place not given]

[Text] [De Chikoff] The Lithuanian parliament has just declared independence. Mikhail Gorbachev's answer is that this resolution is illegal and that the parliament is not competent to pass it. He refuses to negotiate on such bases. How do you intend to break this deadlock?

[Kudarauskas] First, I would like to explain to you the sudden speeding up of Lithuania's independence process. The adoption of a presidential regime in the USSR may ultimately help bring about democratization, but it also presents a number of dangers. In Lithuania, this constitutional change has prompted a wave of suspicion because it is accompanied by a whole series of worrying measures concerning the proclamation of a state of emergency in the Soviet Union's republics. It seemed urgent to us to make a radical decision and parliament immediately voted for the restoration of Lithuanian sovereignty. We are aware that this course of action will make things more difficult.

We offered Mikhail Gorbachev a bilateral agreement on independence for our country, to which he seemed fairly resigned. But the Soviet head of state has not responded in a positive way. He made a law on the methods by which a republic can secede; a precondition for any negotiations. However, this law cannot concern us. We have never legally been part of the USSR. Lithuania, like Estonia and Latvia, were arbitrarily joined to the USSR. We are the victims of the German-Soviet pact whose legality was officially questioned last year.

[De Chikoff] But how can you make Mikhail Gorbachev go back on his statements to the Supreme Soviet and persuade him to open preliminary negotiations?

[Kudarauskas] If the USSR really wants to become a democracy and eliminate all the consequences of Stalinist policy, Mikhail Gorbachev cannot halt the process of democratization at the Soviet Union's gates, unless he is willing to risk jeopardizing the whole edifice of perestroyka and raising doubts about his own sincerity. It is obvious that Lithuania could not withstand force. But I think that Moscow will see that it is in its interests to open negotiations. I also hope that the Western countries will make Gorbachev understand that recognition of Lithuania's independence—a gesture of historical justice—will ultimately benefit the Soviet Union itself.

[De Chikoff] Moscow has said that if Lithuania separated from the USSR, the Soviets might demand material compensation of around R21 billion. Is Vilnius preparing a bill to counter that?

[Kudarauskas] In my view, these accounts are not justified. When has an occupied country ever owed money to the occupying country? Is it moral to make the victim pay compensation to his aggressor?

But, leaving morality aside, Lithuania can indeed present the USSR with a bill. By participating in the Soviet Union's common budget, Lithuania has invested in the republics which comprise it. We have also carried out work in different regions of the USSR. We could draw up a list of such work. We could also evaluate the work of hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians who were deported, not to mention the question of compensation due to the families of the victims of Stalinism, and an

estimate of what those hundreds of thousands of slaves contributed to the Soviet Union.

[De Chikoff] Can Lithuania survive if it turns its back on the USSR?

[Kudarauskas] We have often been told that we would be lost without the Soviet Union. We have been told repeatedly that Lithuania receives more than it gives. We have even been threatened with an economic blockade. We hope to have good-neighborly relations with the USSR. At all events, we live and will continue to live side by side. It is in our mutual interests to maintain economic ties. It is true that the USSR can do without our contribution whereas, for us, it will be much more difficult. Economic blackmail is possible. It is already in operation. But even a blockade will not undermine the Lithuanians' determination. We do not fear economic reprisals. We are seeking and will find other partners. The people know that living conditions in Lithuania may grow worse. But only the use of force could make us bend.

[De Chikoff] Do you think the use of force is out of the question?

[Kudarauskas] Our experience is too bitter not to envisage the worst.

[De Chikoff] Will Lithuania send an ambassador to Moscow?

[Kudarauskas] We do not yet have any diplomatic representation in the USSR. But the Supreme Soviet deputies already regard themselves as Lithuania's legates. They are no longer deputies representing the Soviet people, they are Lithuanian representatives in Moscow.

[De Chikoff] Have you sent back your CPSU membership card?

[Kudarauskas] No, that is not the essential issue.

[De Chikoff] What is essential?

[Kudarauskas] That the Western countries recognize and confirm Lithuania's return to the family of free nations in Europe.

Roundtable of Soviet Officials Discuss Lithuania

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["Roundtable Discussion on Lithuania," chaired by A.A. Maslennikov, chief of the USSR Supreme Soviet press center; with Ilmar Olgertovich Bisher, deputy chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities; People's Deputy Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev; Minister of Justice Veniamin Fedorovich Yakovlev, government spokesman; and (Aleksandr Nikolayevich Troshin), Gosplan deputy chairman]

[Text] [Maslennikov] Good evening, dear viewers! As you know, the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] made a number of decisions between 10 and 12 March, in accordance with which—and here I quote—it was announced that the independence of the Lithuanian state had been restored, and that the Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR and the USSR Constituion had been stripped of its validity on the territory of the republic. These decisions were discussed at the extraordinary Third Congress of People's Deputies, held 12-15 March. In the decision that was adopted, the congress participants noted that, although—just like any other union republic—the Lithuanian SSR has the constitutional right to self-determination, no republic can tackle issues relating to withdrawing from or joining [the union] without regard for its economic, legal, political, and territorial obligations which exist in the union state.

The Congress of People's Deputies declared that it regards the decision by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet as devoid of legal force. The congress participants stated that, in line with Articles 74 and 75 of the USSR Constitution, the sovereignty of the Union and the valdiity of the USSR Constitution continue to extend to the territory of Lithuania, as a Union Soviet Socialist Republic. Also adopted was a section containing a decision, in which the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet's decisions were declared to be unilateral and in contravention of the Constitution, and thus invalid. Until such time as the appropriate decisions on the matter can be taken, the USSR Supreme Soviet, president and Council of Ministers were charged with defending the legal rights of every person resident in Lithuania, and with ensuring observance on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR of the laws and interests of the USSR and of the other Union republics. The bodies of state power and government in Lithuania were advised to take every possible step to ensure that the law and order is not broken on the territory of the republic and is unservingly observed.

People's Deputy Bickauskas, a spokesman of the Lithuanian SSR, made a speech today at the session of the Supreme Soviet, which has resumed its work. He stated this decision has been examined at the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR, and the immutability of the decisions taken was reaffirmed, as was the determination of the Lithuanian authorities to implement them. At the same time, in the words of Bickauskas, the representatives of Lithuania have declared their readiness to hold the necessary talks on these questions, so as to achieve a settlement of the problems that have surfaced. So, that is the situation that has arisen.

A dramatic situation, frankly. A situation that has generated great anxiety not just here, in Moscow, in the Union bodies and in other Union republics, but also among the populace of Lithuania, itself, which, as you know, is not homogenous. Aside from the Lithuanians—and the Lithuanians are not unanimous either in assessing these decisions—there is the so- called Russophone population on the territory of Lithuania—i.e. Russians and members of other nationalities, Poles and other ethnic groups. A problem has arisen, which

demands a solution. It demands a solution at the level of argument and convictions, if you will: it demands a solution at the political level. This is evidently the prerogative of the USSR president and the USSR Government who have been commissioned by the Congress; and at all other levels, too.

Today, to discuss these issues, we have invited People's Deputy Comrade Ilmar Olgertovich Bisher, deputy chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities; People's Deputy Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev, the famous historian; and spokesman for the government Veniamin Fedorovich Yakovlev, minister of justice, and (Aleksandr Nikolayevich Troshin), deputy chairman of Gosplan [State Planning Committee], who is, I happen to know, within the framework of Gosplan currently dealing with the questions of the siting of productive forces, of inter-republican and territorial links, and so on.

Well, where will we start? The most sensible thing to do first is to look at the affair from the legal point of view.

Veniamin Fedorovich, as a lawyer, a legal academic and at the same time a minister, how do you view this matter?

[Yakovlev] I think that of course the situation requires thorough juridicial study, legal study. To this end we must elucidate what served as the legal basis for the declaration of Lithuania's independence. It would be logical to suppose that the people of the republic was making use of its right to self- determination, including the right to secede from the Soviet Union provided for under Article 72 of the USSR Constitution. Then, of course, the relevant procedures would have to operate in connection with the implementation of this constitutional right. True, no such procedures exist at the present time, because the law about implementation of the constitutional right to self-determination with secession from the Soviet Union as recorded in Article 72 is so far only at the examination stage, it is being worked out by the USSR Supreme Soviet. But nevertheless, the draft exists, and evidently this will not delay things very much, and evidently such mechanisms will be created, and it is natural that the matter should be resolved in accordance with these mechanisms, such that both the will of the people that has decided not to link its future with the other peoples of the Soviet Union, and to secede from the USSR, would be taken into account, while on the other hand, of course, this would be tied up with the resolution of a multitude of questions arising when our life together ends.

Well, what has happened? It is not Article 72 of the Constitution that is being implemented, not the right to secede from the Soviet Union recorded in the Constitution, but a quite different legal foundation is being employed. In essence, if you analyze the acts recently adopted by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, in particular, on 11 March, it emerges that the Lithuanian Republic never did join the Soviet Union, and has not been a component part of it. So these 50 years, or 45 years, one can calculate it in different ways, that it has been part of the Soviet Union are declared as legally nonexistent. There was no entry of the Lithuanian republic, there never has been any Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, it was not part of the Soviet Union, Lithuania was and is an independent state far as the USSR is concerned. That, in fact, is the idea behind the decisions they made there.

So, of course, I think this decision—as it is even for all those who are not initiated into the subtleties of the law—is a surprise. How can it be that you live together for 50 years, then you suddenly announce that none of this has happened? So, in fact, quite a qualified juridical analysis is needed here. After all, the Lithuanian republic's entry into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was legally recorded in the proper fashion. That is, there was the declaration of the Sejm of Lithuania, of 21 July 1940, if my memory serves me well; there was the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 3 August on acceptance of Lithuania as part of the USSR. I understand that secession from the USSR on the basis of Article 72, has to be based, obviously, the secession itself, on a unilateral expression of will, but acceptance as part of the USSR, nevertheless, is a bilateral act. This bilateral act is now being scored out unilaterally. I think this circumstance in itself indicates the juridical vulnerability of such kinds of decisions.

[Unidentified speaker] Including from the point of view of international law.

[Yakovlev] From the point of view of international law as well, naturally, and in the sphere of international relations. Whatever the case, for some treaty, some agreement between states, to lose legal force, observance of a definite legal procedure is required. In any case, participation of both sides and certain mechanisms are needed, and so on. But here, everything has been done unilaterally, and it is an act which was of a bilateral nature that is unilaterally being declared invalid, that is, the expression of the will to join, and the expression of will for acceptance into the USSR. But that is not all. The fact of the matter is that the Constitution itself of the Lithuanian SSR and the law on referendums which has been passed are operative in this republic, and it has been established that self-determination is implemented on the basis of nationwide referendum. There has been no referendum, it has not been held. So, a most important, truly fateful decision has been adopted, as it were, behind the back of the people, without its participation. It has been calculated that the deputies whose votes carried this decision represent something like a litte over 40 percent of the republic's population. Why such haste?

[Medvedev] I should like to say that, for me personally, as a historian, those 1940 legal acts which secured Lithuania's entry into the Soviet Union...it seems to me, personally, that one ought not, and should not refer to that sort of document. This is because—and as a historian I can prove this—these acts were adopted under enormous and intense outside pressure. I could cite

dozens of acts which were legal at the time, but which we cannot go along with today. After all, under the laws of wartime the State Defense Committee had every right to make decisions which we would regard today as barbaric and illegal. For instance, the deportation of the Kalmyks, the deportation of the Chechens and Ingushs. From the juridical point of view, the State Defense Committee made these decisions, referring to the need for and importance of these decisions. They have now been rescinded. The legal aspect here is that those decisions of 1940 which refer to Lithuania have not been rescinded. One should very carefully study the atmosphere in which these decisions were made. Some competent commission should study this problem, in just the same way as Yakovlev's commission operated. After studying this, it might accept that, while formally correct, these decisions are essentially illegal. Therefore, I believe that...

[Maslennikov, interrupting] For that to happen, there must presumably be some sort of examination.

[Medvedev] Yes, of course, it is essential to study this, and talks, too, must be held in one form or another. We have already called on Azerbaijan and Armenia, for instance, to hold talks. We have called on them to get around the negotiating table and resolve their differences. There have been talks between the two republics, and that has facilitated the solution to the issue. A conflict has now arisen between the whole of the Soviet Union and one of its republics, which, under the Constitution, has the right to self- determination and complete secession. It has not directly broken any law, because we have not yet passed any such law. There are no procedures for secession. The law has no retrospective force. Therefore, it is necessary to hold some sort of talks. Most of all, I am worried about the possibility both of an emotional backlash against Lithuania within the Soviet Union, and of an emotional backlash against the Soviet Union inside Lithuania. This would make even a subsequent legislative solution, or rather a legal solution very hard.

[Maslennikov] Right, you say talks. Clearly the process of studying these problems must have some sort of legal basis, but the legal basis remains the constitution. Am I right?

[Medvedev] Of course, of course. Without any particular external pressure, Lithuania elected its deputies to the Supreme Soviet and to the Congress of People's Deputies. It has helped draft many laws, which we have already passed at the Supreme Soviet. It has taken part in tackling laws connected with economic independence, the economic independence of the three republics, in the law on leasing and property. I get the impression that, after achieving or at any rate while proceeding through this most important legislative stage within the framework of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, and having thus consolidated the entire Soviet people's awareness of its presence within the Soviet Union, now, all of a sudden, Lithuania unilaterally breaks off all relations with the Soviet Union. This is what I fail to understand. Why is it that last year the Lithuanian people voted in the elections to the Supreme Soviet and took part in the work of the Supreme Soviet, and yet today all this is declared invalid?

[Yakovlev] Fifty years of living together are being scrapped, as are those very complex links that had been forged. Moreover, they really had been forged. This all means the realities are entirely disregarded. That which exists today is just picked up and cancelled out. Those links and relations, however, also grew up on some sort of legal basis. You cannot just say that they are hanging there.

[Maslennikov] I would just like to say that it was announced today that the law is virtually ready. There are just three committees there where this has not been thoroughly aired. Essentially, this law on the mechanism has been drawn up, and I do not think it has given rise to any objections.

[Yakovlev] Retrospectively...

[Bisher, interrupting] Actually, it has met with quite a lot of objections.

[Yakovlev] Laws which introduce new responsibilities or which give weightier responsibility have no retrospective force, but laws which set up new mechanisms or which regulate relations which previously were unregulated generally are retrospective. Because, quite simply, otherwise there is no way out of the situation.

[Bisher] I just cannot go along with the references to the actions of the Stalinist government, which the esteemed minister has tried to justify here. It has to be said that we...

[Yakovlev, interrupting] No, no. I did not try to justify them. I just said they were a factor.

[Bisher] Well, they are certainly a factor. They are, of course, a factor. It is a different matter as to how we should regard them today. We have now opened many dark pages in our history, have cast light on them, and spoken the truth about them. There has been a great deal about the deportation of peoples, about collectivization, and about very many other issues. But there is one fairly large problem on which we continue to adhere to the Stalinist concept, and that is the question relating to the Baltic states' accession to the Soviet Union in 1940. The second congress came closest to casting light on this matter, when it was engaged in examining the issue of the 1939 nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany and the secret agreements appended to it, which in fact provided the legal basis—or rather the political basis, since that document could never be called legal—for the incorporation of the Baltic states in the Soviet Union. This was accomplished with the use of force and without any attempt to elicit the true will of the peoples. I believe the sooner we recognize this, the better. We should not create fresh problems or delay the issue of acknowledging the historical truth and justice. In

this way we would remove very many problems both in the domestic and the international sense, since many foreign states and the world community likewise view this issue as an illegal action, and as an act of annexation, which is the same way Lithuania regards it. Of course, the word annexation sounds quite harsh, but to decide whether it is used correctly or incorrectly with reference to Lithuania, I should return to the very first law of Soviet power: Lenin's Decree on Peace. There Lenin writes: In accordance with the sense of justice of democrats in general, and of the working class in particular, the government conceives the annexation or seizure of foreign lands to mean every incorporation of a small or weak nation into a large or powerful state without the precisely, clearly and voluntarily expressed consent and wish of that nation, irrespective of the time when such forcible incorporation took place...and irrespective, finally, of whether this nation is in Europe or in distant, overseas countries.

It should be said that that is indeed the way it was: The three Baltic states were issued with an ultimatum, which was immediately followed by a large army being brought into those countries, and by a demand that their governments be replaced. Stalin's henchmen Zhdanov, Dekanozov and Vyshinskiy, a very well-known figure, appeared there and virtually saw to all these documents and the formation of the government without the participation of the people and even without the communist parties of those republics. They set up governments which arranged the accession of the peoples.

If we refer to these declarations- - as it happens, one of my voters sent them to me, with a tabulated comparison of all these three declarations which served as the basis for accession—what one can see is that all these declarations were written up as copies. Well, of course, these peoples have an interest in close ties with the Soviet Union, just as the Soviet Union obviously has an interest in relations between the Soviet Union and these republics being built on the basis of amicability, mutual benefit and friendliness. Obviously we have to, most importantly, think about how our paths can proceed such that we remain friends, and so that we have this. Of course, there is a whole range of issues—the economy, humanitarian relations, civil rights and so on—which must be examined very scrupulously. They must be resolved, all the reciprocal claims which exist must be discussed, although I think it will be very difficult to examine all the reciprocal claims over fifty years and to say who owes what to whom.

[Maslennikov] One is put on one's guard somewhat by the decision of the leaders of today's Lithuanian republic, the Lithuanian SSR, the fact that they are prepared to act straight from the shoulder as far as political ties are concerned, but insist on preserving, first and foremost, normal economic ones, good heavens, we will not touch those, so to speak. Again there is the election campaign approach. In history, we ignore what does not suit us, and we push what suits us to the fore. In today's relations, we would also like to preserve what is advantageous to us and to get rid of what irks us in one way or another. I think that Aleksandr Nikolayevich, as representative of Gosplan, a person who is professionally involved in these questions, will help to cast some light.

[(Trushin)] I have been to the republic twice, one year ago and then together with Comrade Maslyukov this year, when Mikhail Sergeyevich was visiting Lithuania. We met a large number both of leaders and of ordinary people, and managers of enterprises, and in general I must say that what was stressed virtually everywhere was the peril of a break, some even call it simply a catastrophe, a break of economic ties with the USSR, and you can understand why, because in fact these ties are so strong, and if even individual representatives in Lithuania are raising the issue and presenting it as if to say that we could quickly establish ties with the West. In general, this is not realistic, it is not possible, it is a prolonged process, I think, if that is what they are banking on. So, the bulk of the comrades speak correctly of the necessity of preserving these economic ties. In this regard I would like to say that there is a definite group of people, some of them among the new set of leaders, who are continually insinuating this thesis that we cannot understand, that we might impose economic sanctions. On the one hand this is incomprehensible, and on the other, I can understand it. I think this is not altogether the right move, and the choice of such methods for relations. Nobody has any intention of imposing any kind of economic sanctions, but what was said here is quite right concerning the fact that we have all the same to think in friendly terms. Whatever the case, relations must be sensible, correct and good.

I have brought along one document which was published in SOVETSKAY LITVA. This document—I am not referring to many other documents, but I would like to refer to this one—it is a document of the commission of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet on preparation of a plan for restoration of Lithuania's independence. There are here very many projections which speak of the grand consequences of a possible break of economic ties.

[?Bisher] What about the figures.

[(Trushin)] Even in figures, the approximate figures are more or less the same as those Yuriy Dmitriyevich Maslyukov quoted when speaking at the Congress of People's Deputies, but the most important thing is, this is in the article, the interview which published in IZVESTIYA on 10 March 1989, and I will refer here simply to a few excerpts from this document. That is where it was published. All the republic's requirement for natural gas, oil, all types of metal, cotton, tractors and motor vehicles, it reads; this list could go on considerably. All in all, raw and processed materials and various manufactured goods worth approximately R7,500 million have been imported into the Republic. That makes up about 47 percent of the material resources consumed. Further on this document gives a breakdown of individual products. Some 97 percent of fuel has to be imported; only three percent, that is, logs and peat, is

what the republic has at its disposal. Gas—5,000 million cubic meters of natural gas was supplied in 1989, and 7,000 million cubic meters is planned for 1990. This has not been done by chance, and it is despite the colossal needs for gas fuel in other republics. They decided to increase the volume of gas supplied to the Lithuanian Soviet Republic; this is connected with ecology, and it is connected with the need for gas for apartments, although I have to say, for comparison, that 80 percent of apartments already have gas. I will not say how low the percentage of apartments with gas is in other republics, I am far from thinking of making comparisons of this right now, but all the same, even those republics which extract it, where this gas is located, have percentages for this which are much, much lower.

[Bisher] Every people which opts for independence has to calculate how it is going to survive and endure. (?Socialism) [words indistinct] mean that it cannot reckon on some (?favorable) supplies from another state with which they do not want to share one home.

[(Trushin)] This document is interesting, if only for the one paragraph. Speaking about alternative supplies of gas and oil, we must take into account the fact that the prices for them here are several times lower than prices on the world markets. For example, we are presently paying R28 for 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas, but the price in the world market is more than 90 dollars; the prices for a tonne of oil are R30 and $110. There is another part of this document, which of course is somewhat surprising for us. The draft treaty should envisage—the treaty that is presupposed in new economic relations—should envision the preservation of existing economic ties, first and foremost in the fuel and power industry, while maintaining, for several years, today's accounting prices, or at least a gradual transition to world market prices. With such an approach, can one really speak of equivalent and mutually beneficial exchange?

[Maslennikov] Venimin Fedorovich, please, you wanted to say something.

[Yakovlev] Yes, I wanted to say that one, on the whole I agree with what Ilmar Olgertovich said, and I even welcome much of what he said, that is, I mean the considered and sensible approach. An approach whereby common sense, calm and account for each other's interests and preservation of good relations would predominate, it seems to me, is the very foundation for everything, because in fact it is only on such a foundation that we can escape from this very acute situation, and I think this is the direction we must keep to, and so we must avoid all kinds of extremes in our assessments and arguments, including the legal ones. Nevertheless, I would like to say that all the same, one of the extremes is that on the one hand the pact of 1930 and on the other hand these acts of accession of 1940 are kept so firmly together, and that the accession of the Baltic Republics to the Soviet Union in 1940 is viewed in essence as the result of a plot together with Hitlerite Germany. Meanwhile, this is obviously not so, because in 1940, Germany was on the verge of starting war against the Soviet Union, and it was only what they considered their military unreadiness that kept them from doing so, only circumstance, and meanwhile, they were thinking of using the violation by the Soviet Union of all kinds of agreements, including the accession of the three Baltic Republics to the Soviet Union, as grounds for unleashing military action. When the war did begin on 22 July 1941, this circumstance, that is, the Soviet Union's violation of agreements, manifested by the fact that these republics, despite the agreement, had become part of the Soviet Union, was used as one of the reasons for attacking the Soviet Union. So I think that in any case, I do not know, one cannot make such a hard and fast connection here. Although I do agree with Roy Aleksandrovich that all these acts require a reappraisal, and a modern, critical approach, and so on. I simply think we must avoid extremes in this regard. Apart from this, I am saying again that one must take stock of realities, including the legal realities. After all, we have the Helsinki Agreement, which states as the main principle of relations, modern relations, civilized relations, the immutability of borders. Inter alia, it is interesting that the decisions of the bodies of authority in the Lithuanian republic refer to the Helsinki Agreements. Well, one must bear in mind that whatever the case, the borders were registered as they existed, and as they exist at the moment, including the borders of the Soviet Union. I think such a lightweight approach to these things is in fact capable of destabilizing the situation to a considerable extent, and this destabilization can hardly be contained within the borders of the Soviet Union, it could go far beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. Hence, once again, what is required here is a very well-considered approach.

[Bisher] I think that, all the same, the Helsinki Agreement must not be interpreted in this way—that agreement on the immutability of borders contradicts the right of peoples to self-determination or that it makes self-determination impossible. Incidentally, I think Lithuania does not currently raise the question of changing the borders. We did read some publications which raise the question of changing the frontiers and I think that it is, perhaps, these publications that run counter to the Helsinki Agreement.

[Maslennikov] I think Veniamin Fedorovich spoke of something else. He spoke of the seeds of destabilization contained in such hasty, ill-considered decisions, at times dictated not so much by reasons as by emotions, by a wave of nationalistic feelings and here I wish to avoid more harsh expressions. I think he is correct, because they are part and parcel of a very complex, very complicated social, psychological situation and moral climate.

[Medvedev] Practically everyone has said that it is a unilateral act.

[Maslennikov] Well, it is enough to just think of the hundreds of thousands of families. You were correct

when you said, when you mentioned that some of them will not wish to stay put, will not wish to accept Lithuanian citizenship. So, what are they to do? They have lived there for decades, they have may be spent their entire working lives there. They have some savings, maybe some of them have houses. They have to go somewhere, these united, mixed families. We know what is now happening, it is no secret, to mixed families that emigrated, were compelled to flee from, say, other regions.

[Bisher] I think things will not go as far as that in the Baltic Republics.

[Maslennikov] This is what you think, but we have grounds. We already receive letters here with complaints and appeals for help precisely from mixed families, when the husband, or, say, the wife, is deprived of his or her electoral rights. This, unfortunately, is reality. I think these humanitarian aspects of this problem must also be taken into account when leaders or political forces, political parties and movements in this republic or that take it upon themselves to tackle such complex problems. In other words, I do not know, does anyone wish to add anything? Roy Aleksandrovich?

[Medvedev] Well, I would simply like to say that although the decision of the Lithuanian state which has now been proclaimed, the decision of Lithuanian Supreme Soviet states that it will not encroach upon citizens' rights at all, by its very existence it already encroaches on the rights of many tens and hundreds of thousands of people—and not merely their property rights, not only their material rights. What we have here, quite simply, is that there is this awareness that you have been a citizen of the Soviet Union and you wanted to be a citizen of the Soviet Union and, unexpectedly, without making your will known, actually, you turned into a citizen of a new state in which maybe you do not want to live. This represents a serious violation of rights. One could not but take it into account. That is why I am troubled here not only by the unilateral decisions, but also by this extreme haste. One gets the impression that this haste was precipitated precisely by the fact that a law was being prepared in the Supreme Soviet—a law which would have enshrined the procedures, the normal procedures for secession if a republic does not wish to live as part of the Soviet Union. There will be strains, without fail. There will be some changes, without fail. This requires time, so that it can take place painlessly, both for the Soviet Union and to an even greater extent for Lithuania. After all, the huge Soviet Union will find it easier to survive the rupture of these ties than Lithuania. In this respect a certain procedure to do with time must, of course, be established—two years, three years, five years. Subsequently yet another referendum should be held, a second referendum, because the people's view may change and this must also be taken into account. It is only after the people have twice confirmed its firm decision to leave the Soviet Union that I would say that everything is absolutely just. The decision that has now been made is, it seems to me, all the same, from some sort of human... [changes thought] which also offends my feelings,.. [changes thought] it is not fully rational and it is to a significant extent precisely in the interests, not in the interests of Lithuania, perhaps, yes.

[Maslennikov] Please go ahead.

[(Trushin)] All the same, perhaps we should have put the human dimension in the first place in our conversation today. It is precisely from these positions that I would like, Roy Aleksandrovich to fully support you here. We must not oversimplify the problem of the human dimension, the problem of those who live in Lithuania, all those who live there.

[Maslennikov] If you do not mind we will end our discussion on this. I think it has shown very convincingly that no matter what aspect of the problem we take, whether the political, or the historical, or the legal, or the state-constitutional, or, at long last, the humanitarian and the economic aspect, all these aspects make a serious approach imperative, making it imperative to have regard for the law and to take numerous factors and above all the human factor into account. Any haste or unilateralism in the tackling of such issues may turn out to be a great calamity not just for the republic that makes such a decision, but also for all of us.

Roundup on Estonian Election Results Reported

LD2103110590 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Summary] The final Supreme Soviet election results are not yet clear, even though more and more names are being added to the final list. At the moment there are 88 names on the list, out of 105.

At the moment, allowing for a certain overlap, the People's Front holds 39 mandates, the Rural Union 20, the Free Estonia Association 10, the Union of Work Collectives 13, and the inter-bloc together with the Army hold 17 to 19 mandates. Possibly the strength of the inter-bloc will eventually amount to about a quarter of the Supreme Soviet.

Latvian Delegation Meets With Gorbachev

LD2003173290 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1410 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Excerpts] [passage omitted: recording of popular hymn] [Announcer] You have probably realized that this hymn was not played without reason. Next to me in the studio is Editor Anta Busa. So far as I understand, you have quite some new information.

[Busa] Yes, I have new information which concerns our relations with Moscow. But first a little more about yesterday.

Yesterday the Supreme Soviet Presidium confirmed the composition of a delegation for talks with the Soviet

Union's leadership on the restoration of Latvia's economic and political independence as decided, if you remember, by the last Supreme Soviet session on 2 March.

There are 12 widely-known persons in our republic in the delegation. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] So then, the composition of the delegation is:

Ilmars Bisers, Vilnis Edvins Bresis, Andrejs Eizans, Anatolijs Gorbunovs, Dainis Ivans, Janis Lucans, Vladimirs Martinsons, Petr Nefedov, Janis Peters, Eizens Pocs, Janis Vagris, and Mavriks Vulfsons.

[Busa] Yes, that is the delegation. But yesterday, Anatolijs Gorbunovs, contacted the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev about a possible meeting and received agreement that it could take place today, 20 March, at 1700 Moscow time.

So, at this moment, according to Latvian time, our Republic's delegation has already arrived at the Kremlin to meet with Mikhail Gorbachev, but the only delegation members present are Anatolijs Gorbunovs, Vilnis Edvins Bresis, Ilmars Bisers, Mavriks Vulfsons, and Janis Vagris.

This, then, could be regarded as the actual start of the talks on the question of restoration of Latvia's economic and political independence, on our future relations with Moscow.

What turn the talks will take, how they will have gone today, perhaps we shall be able to tell after 1800 and maybe we shall be able to telephone someone from the delegation.

[Announcer] Thank you. So, we shall await information.

More on Meeting

PM2003223190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Meeting With Leaders of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic"]

[Text] On 20 March M.S. Gorbachev received A.V. Gorbunov, chairman of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium; J.J. Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee; and V.E.G. Bresis, chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers. Present at the conversation were People's Deputies I.O. Bisers and M.G. Vulfsons.

The conversation focused on questions associated with the development of the Federation and the principles of a treaty of union. Here the need for practical work to prepare proposals on these issues was emphasized.

RSFSR

Results of Russian Federation Elections

LD2003140190 Moscow TASS in English 1350 GMT 20 Mar 90

[by TASS correspondent Lev Aksenov]

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—Run-off elections were held last Sunday in about 800 constituencies of the Russian Federation. In several constituencies they were considered invalid, because less than 50 per cent of electors went to the polls. On the average, the activity of electors was rather high. The turn-out reached over 70 per cent in some areas. This information was supplied today by the central electoral commission for the election of people's deputies of the Russian Federation.

Not all deputies elected in the Russian Federation could be named by the electoral commission, because information from district electoral commissions is still coming to Moscow. A full list of deputies will soon be published.

The results of elections in Moscow are already known. On March 4 Muscovites elected the first eight deputies. The March 18 elections were to decide who would win the remaining 57 seats. Now we known the names of another 56 people's deputies to the parliament of the Russian Federation, who will represent Moscow.

These include many scientific workers and journalists. Four journalists from the ARGUMENTY I FAKTY weekly were elected deputies (its editor-in-chief Vladislav Starkov was elected on March 4). Oleg Poptsov, editor-in-chief of the SELSKAYA MOLODEZH magazine and a number of TV journalists, including Vladimir Mukusev, presenter of the popular VZGLYAD (Look) TV program, were also elected.

There are many lawyers among the newly elected deputies, which is important for the future work of the parliament of the Russian Federation. These include Dr. Alexander Gurov, head of the main department for the struggle against organized crime and corruption at the Soviet Interior Ministry. Nikolai Vorontsov, a prominent ecologist, head of the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection, was also elected a deputy of the Russian Federation.

Russian Regional Party Chiefs Elected Deputies

LD2003182990 Moscow TASS in English 1807 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Volgograd March 20 TASS—By TASS correspondent Inha Biryukova:

Despite fierce criticism of the Communist Party apparatus in the Volgar region, three leaders of the Volgograd Communist Party Regional Committee have been elected people's deputies of the Russian Federation.

The recent deterioration of economic and social conditions, the previous party leadership's command and

administrative methods of work led to discontent amongst rank-and-file communists and many Volgograd residents.

Pressed by popular meetings, former party regional committee secretaries, who also broke the law in providing their children with state apartments, were compelled to resign earlier this year.

The new party regional committee was elected two days before the run-off. The election victory by Aleksandr Anipkin, just elected first secretary of the party regional committee, came as a sensation.

He launched the election campaign when he was first secretary of the Volgograd Party City Committee, with seven other people, including informal movement leader Lieutenant-Colonel Igor Lukashev also running.

Party functionary Aleksandr Anipkin addressed electors at meetings, trying to convince them of the need for consolidation in solving acute problems.

Two new Communist Party Regional Committee Secretaries Ivan Rybkin and Mikhail Kharitonov faced respectively four and seven rivals during the election campaign. The electors put their trust in the communists who before that headed the regional party apparatus and took upon themselves the criticism against the old party leadership.

All three new people's deputies are about 50-years-old. They hold radical views in the party. The second place amid Russia's deputies from the Volgograd region has been taken by doctors. By their choice the Volgograd people underlined the need for the humanisation of society.

"The people's confidence makes it incumbent upon us to do our utmost to renew and democratise our society and promote the early transfer of power to the elected local government councils, the solution of acute problems and Russia's economic and political independence within the framework of the Union," Anipkin told TASS.

'Democratic Forces' Win in Leningrad

LD2103124790 Moscow World Service in Russian 1044 GMT 21 Mar 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" Feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] The repeat ballots in the elections to local soviets and the Russian parliament in Leningrad ended with a convincing victory for democratic forces. Of the 400 seats in the city soviet, 250 will be taken by representatives of the Democratic Elections-90 bloc, which includes the local section of the Memorial Society, the People's Front of Russia, voters' clubs, and other radical groups. Of Leningrad's 34 seats in the Russian Parliament, 25 have been won by representatives of the bloc of democratic forces. Virtually all leaders of informal groups got through into the Russian Supreme Soviet: [name indistinct], Nikita Tolstoy, (Yuriv Nesterov) and others. What is more, in Leningrad not one candidate from the party apparatus was elected a deputy to the Russian Parliament.

We believe that now we can form a democratic Soviet of People's Deputies of Leningrad that will resolve the problems of our city in the spirit of perestroyka, Yuriy Nesterov said in an interview for an INTERFAX correspondent.

Electoral Chairman on Campaign Abuses

LD2103065790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2125 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Video report by correspondent K. Kharaidze]

[Text] [Announcer] Let's return now to yesterday's elections in our country. Once again, methods which are impermissible in civilized countries have been used in the course of them.

[Kharaidze] During the second round of the pre-election campaign, there were even more posters calling for votes against. [video shot of poster, part of which says "For eight years now Kunayev has been trying to establish himself by abusing the late Vysotskiy] That is a more harmless text. Often on posters one comes across uncensored abuse, and threats. It is interesting—what does the Central Electoral Commission think of such methods of campaigning?"

[V.I. Kazakov, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Central Electoral Commission identified by screen caption] We know of cases when, to provocatory ends, a certain number of leaflets have been distributed and then they come and say we demand that the elections be revoked [otmeit]. And as for the leaflets, I will say that I myself, as an ordinary voter, find them in my mailbox every day, leaflets signed—I don't know if that is really the case, or if it is a falsification—by Comrade Travkin, and Comrade Stankevich, specific calls on who to vote for. I am not sure that they sign them themselves. That must be.... We are collecting all of it, and we will give it to the deputy's committee on ethics. We must get to the bottom of it. Is somebody impersonating them or does it come from them?

There have been a great many varied attempts to influence the will of the voters, which, on the whole, is inadmissible under our law. However, there are cases of simple forgeries. Leaflets are printed somewhere, there have been instances of that, of the erasing of protocols, of foisting one's opinion on the voters, especially elderly persons. Well, granny, let me help you, and they score it then and there.

Well, according to these facts, we have even revoked elections in a number of cases and disbanded commissions. That is why tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, if

these and more serious signals come in, we will check them, we have a conflict commission. If need be we can revoke these elections. According to the results of the elections, we intend to write a note to the Supreme Soviet, and it is possible that in our law, under which we have held just the first elections, we have to make the relevant changes and additions. [Video shows interview with Kazakov]

Tyumen Oil Workers Criticize Committee Response

LD2103063590 Moscow World Service in Russian 1038 GMT 20 Mar 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] The labor collectives of the oil and gas extraction enterprises in Tyumen Oblast, western Siberia, where the situation has deteriorated, are not satisfied by the reply from the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] to their appeal. Their main demand is to hasten the pace of solving social problems in the region, where 60 percent of all Soviet oil and half of its natural gas is extracted. There is a shortage of housing and food produce in Tyumen. The workers suggested selling 1 million tonnes of oil abroad—that is merely 24-hours output from the deposits—and spending the currency obtained on solving the food problem. However, Gosplan has failed to meet their demands. The temporary Tyumen Oblast CPSU committee bureau has announced that it is awaiting a precise answer to the questions raised from the USSR Government.

Drug Dealers, Laboratories Seized in Leningrad

LD2103033690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1552 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 19 Mar (TASS)—TASS correspondent Aleksandr Borisov reports:

The internal affairs organs and the KGB in Leningrad eliminated two underground laboratories for the preparation of sythesized narcotic substances almost simultaneously. Today your TASS correspondent was informed at the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of Internal Affairs Criminal Investigation Main Administration that two producers of narcotics and seven accomplices have been arrested, from whom drugs valued at about R2.5 million at "black market" prices and items and valuables valued more than R200,000, as well as weapons and hard currency, were confiscated.

It became known in the course of the investigation that both drugs producers were chemists by training and had unlimited access to chemical reagents. This allowed them to carry out their criminal activity in safety. Thus, one criminal prepared the powerful narcotic substance methadone directly in the laboratory at his work. Then it was sold at a price of R400-R600 per gram. As far as the other is concerned, he stole chemical reagents from the store of the institute where he worked as a laboratory assistant. Then, at a flat specially hired for these purposes, they prepared a narcotic poison with properties several times more powerful than heroin. It "went" for R1,500 per gram.

Both dealers had worked out through precautionary measures for handing over drugs and receiving money for them. The criminal deals, as a rule, were carried out in crowded, previously agreed places. Specially equipped caches were also used for these purposes.

The criminals have been arrested and an investigation is under way. After all the circumstances of the case have been cleared up the drugs dealers will go on trial. It is to determine the degree of guilt of the criminals not only before the law but also before the hundreds, and, possibly, thousands of those who consumed this deadly "product."

Ousted Volgograd Oblast Party Leadership Scored

PM2003143790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Mar 90 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report: "Heated Debate"]

[Text] Volgograd, 16 Mar—The major problems of restructuring the activities of the oblast party organization under the conditions of extensive democratization were examined by the participants in an oblast report-and-election party conference which concluded the first phase of its work today.

The delegates stressed that the administrative-edict work methods of the former party obkom [oblast party committee] bureau and its secretaries, their uncritical attitude toward the assessment of their own activity, and their violation of the principles of social justice had led to an exacerbation of the sociopolitical and economic situation in the oblast and damaged the prestige of its party organization. For the first time in history the party obkom's work over the report period was deemed unsatisfactory.

And although the conference was not without its demagogic phrases and attempts at self-justification, most delegates focused their attention on the search for ways to extricate the oblast party organization from the crisis. They submitted proposals on the radical renewal of political, organizational, and ideological work at all levels of leadership and on the democratization of life under the conditions of pluralism and the multiparty system. The need for a priority role to be taken by primary party organizations and for those organizations to enjoy autonomy was stressed.

The conference advocated creating an RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party within a united CPSU, and granting to the delegates elected to the 28th CPSU Congress on a broad contested

basis in party okrugs the right to take part in a Russian party conference on behalf of the Volgograd party organization.

The party obkom first secretary was chosen for the first time at a conference rather than at an organizational plenum. Party organizations nominated 28 Communists for this post. Of these, 25 declined the nomination. Three men continued the contest: A.M. Anipkin, first secretary of Volgograd CPSU Gorkom [city party committee]; I.P. Rybkin, first secretary of Sovetskiy CPSU Raykom [rayon party committee]; and V.A. Kochetov, chief of a party obkom department.

Each of them made a speech setting out their program. After a discussion of the candidacies A.M. Anipkin was elected first secretary of Volgograd CPSU Obkom as a result of a secret ballot.

The conference was addressed by G.I. Usmanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The oblast's working people followed the course of the conference on radio and television.

Leningrad Deputies Appeal for Order

90UN1154A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Feb 90 p 1

[Appeal by USSR people's deputies, 10 February 1990, under the rubric "Open Letter": "Do Not Allow a Tragedy"]

[Text] To the deputies of the Leningrad city soviet of people's deputies

To Comrade V.Ya. Khodyrev, chairman of the Leningrad soviet executive committee.

To Comrade D.M. Verevkin, procurator of Leningrad

To Comrade G.P. Voshchinin, head of the directorate of internal affairs of the Leningrad Oblast and city soviet executive committees

To Comrade A.A. Kurkov, head of the directorate of the USSR KGB for Leningrad Oblast

Today in our city one hears open talk about "anti-Russian forces" that have taken over science, culture, and the mass media. And lately there has been an increase in appeals to USSR people's deputies from people who are alarmed by rumors about imminent Jewish pogroms in Leningrad.

By themselves these rumors are not proof of the reality of such a danger. However, we cannot help but be alarmed by the activities in Leningrad of organizations and groups that, under the guise of the noble idea of national restoration, promote in society a search for political opponents on the basis of nationality and carry out openly chauvinistic propaganda with impunity.

By way of example, it is sufficient to cite the speech of a group of writers on Leningrad television on the broadcast "My Turn To Speak" on 22 December 1989; the article by I. Losev, "Slogans on the Square," in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA No. 8 (22750) of 11 January 1990; the meeting in the Lenizdat [Leningrad Publishing House] building on 12 January 1990 (SMENA No 12 (19462) of 14 January 1990); the speeches of a number of candidates for RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy in the western national-territorial district No. 13 on the television debates of 4 February 1990; and leaflets distributed in the name of the National Democratic Party, the Leningrad soviet of the NPF [National Progressive Front] "Pamyat," the Central Committee of the All-Union anti-Zionist Front, etc.

Nationalist ideology, identified by its aggressive message, poses a significant danger to society. The tragic experience of the events in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia forewarn us that under conditions of a deterioration in the economic situation, tolerance of nationalist propaganda at first provokes individual outbursts of violence and then involves substantial sections of society in interethnic conflict.

A worsening of the situation becomes more likely during the election campaign, which allows opinions to be communicated widely, and it can lead to destabilization, threatening the very possibility of conducting our first democratic elections to the republic and local soviets.

If the state does not rise to the defense of the honor and dignity of its citizens today, then there is no guarantee of the sanctity of their lodgings and even their lives tomorrow.

Given the present situation, to further ignore instances of the dissemination of ideological chauvinism is intolerable, and to tolerate it and fail to take those measures stipulated by law in a timely manner is criminal.

We demand that citizens who conduct nationalist propaganda and officials who indulge them by their passivity be called to account.

It is up to you to respond with action.

And the responsibility for inaction is yours.

[Signed] USSR People's Deputies Yu. Boldyrev, A. Denisov, A. Sobchak, A. Shchelkanov

From the editorial board: In our opinion the letter from the people's deputies has touched upon a subject that is very important and painful for today's reality. In publishing it the editorial board promises to analyze the mail informatively and inform the readers of its content. We are also prepared to print on our pages the responses from those officials to whom the people's deputies have made their appeal.

Donetsk City Party Conference Opens

LD2003211790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 19 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A city party conference began its work in Donetsk today. [video shows conference delegates in foyer and shots of the conference in session]

[G. Kondaurov] It is an extraordinary conference. Primary party organizations demanded that its convocation be speeded up. It was indeed they who elected the delegates.

The Donetsk city and rayon committees of the party have been subjected to sharp criticism in recent months. Their resignation has been called for at meetings and gatherings of labor collectives. The process of leaving the party has been gathering pace: thousands of people from the start of the year alone.

Party organizations in mines have in essence become autonomous. They themselves are deciding when to hold reports-back and elections, how to elect delegates to the congress, and how to pay membership subscriptions. Amongst the city's communists there are those who support both the platform of the CPSU and also the democratic platform.

Almost every party committee has arrived at the conference with its own position on the main item on the agenda: on the new functions and structure of the city party organization under conditions of a multi-party system.

Widespread discussion is needed and the conference has decided to leave this up to the primary party organizations, in order that every communist has a say.

By a majority of votes, the decision was taken to abolish the city committee of the party as a body of the administrative-command system, and to end the work of the conference after the 28th Congress of the CPSU. [video shows G.I. Onishchuk, first secretary of the city committee speaking to unseen correspndent]

[Onishchuk] I want to say that in principle, we have already developed a model for switching the city of Donetsk to regional financial autonomy, and the task of the party organizations of the city is to do everything to implement this program and to ensure that the individual really can live with greater well-being and more freedom and comfort and that all the matters of the city's social development are resolved. This is a party matter. [video shows V.V. Belousov, senior lecturer of the state university, who stands next to Onishchuk speaking to unseen correspondent.]

[Belousov] (?I'd just like to) add simply that precisely this path—when the party does not leave these matters—this is a grouping of communists, and deputies in the soviets. And the city committee of the party should shape these communists, shape their platform.

Western Republics

Kiev Troops Continue Military Exercises

LD2003185390 Moscow TASS in English 1424 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Kiev Military District, March 20 TASS—Troops of the Kiev Military District continue operational-tactical exercises on Ukrainian territory. "Southern" forces penetrated 150 to 200 kilometers deep into "Northern" forces' defences and met stiff resistance. In order to fortify their positions, the attacking forces are bringing in a reserve.

Forty-six observers from 23 participating countries in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are present at the exercises, in line with the document of the Stockholm Conference.

In the run-up to the exercises, the command of the Kiev Military District organized a briefing for foreign observers to answer military specialists' questions.

Military observers from West Germany arrived in the area of the exercises today. The exercises continue.

Ukrainian Ecological Situation Called 'Critical'

90UN1073A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 8, 19-25 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Nikolay Baklanov: "Ecological Problems With a National Focus"]

[Text] **The teletypes of information agencies, the pages of newspapers, and radio and television programs have been swept by a sensational announcement: The majority of deputies of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet have supported the demands of the broad community in the republic to close down the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power plant] and this decision is not a great surprise. It could have been anticipated—for many people recognized the critical situation that is developing with the environment in the Ukraine. The chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Protection of the Environment, N. Vorontsov, in his speech at the session reported that the level of pollutants in the atmosphere is extremely high: More than 11 million tons of harmful substances are discharged into it each year—this is only one-third less than in the Russian Federation, whose area is 30 times as great.**

It must be noted that today fairly frequently we hear comparisons like this which give ecological problems a clearly expressed national focus. For example, these figures have been given: The Ukraine occupies only three percent of the country's territory but it produces almost one-fourth of the country's national product, 17 percent of the electric energy, 44 percent of the steel, and 52 percent of the iron. Yet on this three percent of the territory which includes a large share of the best land in the country, one finds 20- 25 percent of all the pollutants in the Soviet Union.

Naturally, this ecological situation cannot but evoke protests from a considerable part of the population and it provides justification for certain speakers to demand in their street rallies and from their parliamentary podiums that the republic government retire. It is no secret that there are forces in the republic which call the abnormal ecological situation that has developed over decades "genocide against the Ukrainian people" and they openly declare the need for the "independence" of the Ukraine—only with this, they say, will they be able to raise the standard of living, having improved the environment along the way...

In a word, today it is becoming quite obvious that the ecological "map" will continue to be used as an extremely important trump card in the political battle which will become increasingly fierce in the republic, especially on the eve of the forthcoming 4 March elections to the Supreme Soviet and local Soviets. It would seem that the current republic government which was formed from representatives of the Communist Party of the Ukraine is clearly aware of this. In any case the program put forth at the session by the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, V. Masol, was clearly directed toward a radical break in the critical tendencies in the ecological situation in the Ukraine, which, according to preliminary estimates, will require 20 billion rubles before the year 2000 alone—and a considerable share of this should be found in the republic budget.

Decree on Ukrainian Famine Published

90UN1128A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 7 Feb 90 p 4

[Statement and decree of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee: "The Truth About a National Tragedy"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Communist Party [CPUk] Central Committee adopted the resolution "On the Famine of 1932-1933 in the Ukraine and the Publication of Archival Materials Related to It." The text is given below.

Scholars from the Institute of Party History under the CPUk Central Committee branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee have revealed documentary material on the famine of 1932-33. For more than 50 years this subject has been suppressed in the country's historiography, which has obstructed scientific inquiry and an objective moral and political evaluation of this national tragedy.

A deviation by the leadership of the country and the republic from Leninist principles of the cooperation of the peasantry lies at the bottom of the appearance of food difficulties and the later famine of 1932-33 in the Ukraine as well as in several other regions of the USSR. Forcible methods of collectivization, mass dispossession of kulaks, a low standard of agriculture, the weak technical base of the collective farm, and other reasons led to a reduction in the gross yield of grain.

Archival materials show that the immediate reason for the famine in the republic at the beginning of the thirties was the policy of compulsory state grain procurements from the peasantry accompanied by the wide use of persecution.

In the winter of 1931-32 the food situation had already become difficult in the Ukrainian countryside. By spring a genuine famine had begun in dozens of rural rayons. A further deterioration in agricultural production in the course of 1932 caused a significant reduction in the volume of state procurements. But the Stalinist leadership intensified the pressure on the republic's party and state organs with the goal of increasing deliveries of grain.

The documents show that the leadership of the republic was unable to oppose the dictate and in fact carried out the policy, which resulted in numerous victims from among the Ukrainian people. The CPU(b) [bolshevik] and the USSR Sovnarkom [Council of People's Commissars] passed a resolution stating that the main emphasis in state grain procurements would be placed on administrative and repressive methods. Travelling judicial sessions and special commissions were quickly created—the so-called "chetverki." The organs of justice, the procuracy, and state security became involved in the grain procurements.

Thousands of chairmen and administrators of collective farms, specialists, and party and soviet workers were arrested and sentenced for "connivance in kulak sabotage." "Cases" were fabricated, like the Orekhov case near Dnepropetrovsky where leaders of the rayon accused of "malicious sabotage of the state grain procurements" were sentenced to be shot and to long periods of imprisonment. A purge of several rayon party organizations was begun in the CPU(b), and the search intensified for "right opportunist elements," "renegades," etc.

Despite the repressive measures, the plan for the republic was not fulfilled even when target figures were reduced. Under these conditions the leadership resorted to confiscating seed, forage, and food funds in place of grain procurements, which was fatal for the republic's population. The archival materials give a tragic picture of mass death from famine and epidemics, especially beginning in March 1933. Such a fate befell the peasantry of the northern Caucasus, the Volga River region, and a number of other regions.

The documents also reflect attempts by party and state organs to render food aid to the starving rayons. But it turned out to be too late and insufficient to prevent the tragedy. The documentary materials on the 1932-33 famine in the Ukraine have great political and scientific significance. Their publication will help to illuminate truthfully one of the most painful problems of our past.

The CPUk decrees:

To acknowledge that the 1932-33 famine was a genuine national tragedy and a consequence of the criminal policy of Stalin and his closest circle (Molotov and Kaganovich) with respect to the peasantry.

To condemn the unprincipled policy of the leadership of the republic at that time (Kosior, Chubar) in the conduct of the grain procurements. To dissociate ourselves decisively from forcible, repressive methods of resolving the problems of social development.

To charge the Institute of Party History under the CPUk Central Committee branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee (comrade F.M. Rudich) together with the Politizdat [Publishing House of Political Literature] of the Ukraine (Comrade G.F. Nemazannyy) with publishing in 1990 a collection of scientific articles and archival documents about the 1932-33 famine in the Ukraine.

To recommend to the editorial boards of newspapers, journals, television, and radio that they provide an honest, objective treatment based on documentary materials of the events of the 1932-33 famine.

Ukrainian Election First Round Totals Reported

PM1303145190 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 13 Mar 90 p 3

[TASS report under general heading "Election Results": "In the Ukraine"]

[Excerpt] Kiev—Having scrutinized the protocols filed by okrug electoral commissions, the Central Electoral Commission registered 112 Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputies elected 4 March 1990.

The elections of Ukrainian SSR people's deputies were held in 450 electoral okrugs formed for this purpose. There were 2,888 candidate people's deputies running for election. Before polling day, there were four okrugs with just a single candidate left on the ballot papers, 34 okrugs were left with two candidates each, 130 okrugs had three or four candidates, 211 okrugs had between five and nine candidates, 64 okrugs had between 10 and 19 candidates, and seven okrugs had 20 or more candidate people's deputies.

The list of voters for the elections of Ukrainian SSR people's deputies contained 37,264,666 persons, of whom 31,560,229 persons or 84.69 percent voted. [passage omitted

Candidate Deputy Charged With Campaign Violations

PM1403114590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 7

[Report by Stepan Troyan: "From Candidate Deputy to the Dock"]

[Text] Simferopol—The Ukrainian Central Electoral Commission has repealed the decision of the okrug electoral commission for Tsentralnyy Electoral Okrug No. 242, Crimean Oblast; on the registration of A. Dmitriyev, a candidate people's deputy of the republic, in the list for the runoff and has agreed that criminal charges be brought against him.

What lies behind this resolution of the republic's central electoral commission? A. Dmitriyev heads the fourth sector of the main radio relay communications, which ensures the transmission of Ukrainian and local television and radio broadcasts. The enterprise has no right to broadcast independently. Nonetheless on the eve of the first round of the elections, or to be more precise 1-2 March, A. Dmitriyev, grossly violating existing procedure, made a program available to a journalist who in nine 20-minute programs spoke "warmly" of him.

This willfulness on the part of a contender for a parliamentary seat not only contradicted the rules for the operation of communications facilities but was also a gross violation of the law on elections, which states in black and white: "A candidate deputy's use of his official position to conduct his election campaign is not allowed." The court will determine the degree of A. Dmitriyev's responsibility for exceeding his official powers.

Round of Elections in Belorussia 22 April

LD1703073790 Moscow TASS in English 0723 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Minsk March 17 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vladimir Bogdanov:

A total of 210 deputy mandates left unowned after the elections of Belorussian people's deputies on March 4 will be competed today and on Sunday in the republic.

All in all, 360 mandates were available on March 4. One hundred of them were won in a direct vote at electoral districts, another fifty were received by four public organizations, including the war and labor veteran society, as well as associations of handicapped, blind and deaf, back in February.

The granting of mandates to these organizations is supposed to esnure the constant attention of the Supreme Soviet to their needs.

In 190 electoral districts, two candidates, who have gained the majority of votes in comparison with the others, will compete in the second round of elections on March 17-18.

New elections will be held on April 22 in 20 electoral districts, where only one or two candidates were on the ballot sheet and none of them won. The losers are not allowed to run for deputy again.

More on First Round Elections

PM1403115590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report under the general heading "First Round Results": "Belorussian SSR"]

[Text] Some 87 percent of the republic's voters took part in the voting. The highest turnout—92.6 percent—was recorded in Minsk Oblast. Some 1,427 candidates ran in 310 territorial okrugs. Uncontested elections occurred in only 20 okrugs. The range of votes proved so great that people's deputies were elected in only 98 okrugs. Runoffs will occur in 194 okrugs and repeat elections in 18.

The names of 60 deputies were well-known before 4 March—that was the number of parliamentary seats held by representatives of Belorussian societies for the deaf, blind, and invalids and war and labor veterans' organizations, which they were given under the Law on Elections of Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] People's Deputies. The elected deputies include eight women, two workers, 11 kolkhoz [collective farm] members, 39 party committee secretaries, and 15 chairman of ispolkoms [soviet executive committees]. The fact that 139 people's deputies are communists indicates trust in the party. The election contest in a number of okrugs was won by representatives of the Belorussian People's Front.

The results of the first runoff in Kopylskiy Electoral Okrug No. 63 have become known. They could be regarded as sensational: V. Pechennikov, secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, was defeated by I. Gerasyuk, a journalist working for the republic's SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA.

Belorussian Census Figures Published

PM1403094590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by Mikhail Shimanskiy under the rubric "Direct Line; IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Who Lives in Belorussia"]

[Text] Minsk—The results of the 1989 all-union population census in Belorussia have been made public.

The republic's population is 10.2 million. It has increased in all oblasts and in the majority through natural increase. The proportion of city dwellers has increased to 65 percent. At the same time the numbers of the rural population are declining. The main reason is the migration to the cities.

There is an extremely complex situation in Belorussia with regard to the able-bodied population and its increase in the past 10 years has been by only 139,000 people, or 2.5 percent. One fifth of the entire population consists of people of pension age.

According to the census, men comprise 47 percent of the republic's population and women 53 percent. The number of families has increased. The average size of the family has decreased. Today 8,935,000 people, or 88 percent of the republic's population, live in families.

Belorussians make up the main nationality in the republic. There are also 1,342,000 Russians, 418,000 Poles, 291,000 Ukrainians, and 112,000 Jews living here. Nearly 78 percent of the republic's population considers the language of its nationality to be its native language (among Belorussians the figure is over 80 percent) and over 22 percent consider the language of other peoples to be their native language.

More on Report of Minsk, Kiev Election Results

90UN1123A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 10 7 Mar 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Elections: First Results"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]**Minsk**

On 4 March 86.5 percent of the registered voters showed up in the election precincts. The greatest activity was found in Brest Oblast—90 percent. This is where, in the most remote regions, Ye.Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia, and M.V. Kovalev, chairman of the republic Council of Ministers, ran as alternative candidates for the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. They each had one opponent from the local economies. But who won? Comrades Sokolov and Kovalev. In spite of the active pressure on the voters through the press and television, the chairman of the Sejm of the Belorussian People's Front also became a Belorussian people's deputy.

Kiev

In the Ukraine this time there were 450 districts for the election of people's deputies, in which 3,091 people ran. About 200 people gave up the fight during the election campaign. In the final analysis, as I was told in the Central Election Committee, there were four districts in the republic with unopposed candidates and 31 with two candidates.

So far we can speak only about the preliminary results of the voting. But even now we can give certain names. The following became Ukrainian SSR people's deputies: the writers I. Drach, V. Yavorivskiy, and V. Karpenko; the chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, V.A. Masol; secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine S.I. Gurenko and L.M. Kravchuk; and one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union—V. Chernovol.

We must give the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, V.A. Ivashko, his due. He did not go out and get elected somewhere in the hinterland but agreed to run in Kiev. He did not receive the necessary number of votes for victory but he went into runoff elections. [passage omitted]

Intermovement Supporters Rally in Kishinev

LD2003210490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1211 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Kishinev, 20 Mar (TASS)—TASS correspondent Aleksandr Takiy reports:

Several thousands of town residents gathered at a stadium in the capital of Soviet Moldavia for a rally called by the "Unitatia- Yedinstvo" Intermovement which unites, mainly, representatives of the non-Moldavian population of that republic.

The rally, sanctioned by the city authorities, was devoted to the results of the elections to the republican Supreme Soviet held in last February and in March. It was noticed at the meeting that of the 363 deputies to Soviet Moldavia's new parliament at least 113 share and support the views and tasks of the Intermovement. In Kishinev, all the presidium members of this organization have been elected parliamentaries. Participants in the rally described the results of elections as successful, on the whole.

The supporters of the Intermovement won less than a third of the mandates to the new parliament but they do not regard themselves as an opposition. Their main opponents—members of the Moldavian People's Front—do not have a majority of seats, either.

Late last year the fact that the Moldavian language was given the status of the state language and the problems related to that were the main source of conflict between the two movements in republican industrial areas that resulted in mass strikes by non- Moldavian workers.

At today's rally a resolution was adopted condemning the recent decisions by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet as "leading to a de facto change of the state system of that Union Republic."

Caucasus

Report on Update of Nagorno-Karabakh Situation

LD2003214590 Moscow TASS in English 2115 GMT 20 Mar 90

[By unidentified TASS correspondent]

[Text] Stepanakert March 20 TASS—Meetings between senior officials of the interior agencies of Nagorno-Karabakh, frontier areas of Azerbaijan and Armenia have become regular. They are held with the assistance of the military commandant's office of the special region (Nagorno-Karabakh) and the adjacent areas of the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. Such a meeting, the fourth in the past three months, was held in Stepanakert today.

The need to unblock the roads and ensure safe traffic on highways were discussed by the chiefs of the regional interior administration and of the car traffic inspection services of the areas of the autonomous region, a number of areas of Azerbaijan and Armenia along with senior officials of the interior affairs ministries of both republics, representatives of the USSR's Ministry of the Interior and the military commandant's office of the special region.

The pressing problem, which was also set forth in the USSR Supreme Soviet's decision " on the situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia and measures to normalise the situation in that region," dated March 5, 1990, needs to be solved as soon as possible, participants in the meeting noted.

They also spoke about concrete areas of work to be done, the tasks of interior agencies in implementing the road unblocking programme.

It was decided to send the meeting's minutes to Azerbaijan's and Armenia's Councils of Ministers, which, in accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet's March 5 decision, should..."ensure the conclusion of an agreement between the republics to immediately normalise the railway, highway and air transport situation in the region and to elaborate a system of measures to ensure the reliable functioning of the transport arteries."

Hundreds of guarded truck convoys with national economic cargoes passed on the autonomous region's roads since the state of emergency was introduced. Over 2,500 bus trips were made, About 2,000 passengers are carried daily.

But the task now is wider—to ensure the safety on Azerbaijan's and Armenia's roads and to open for traffic the still blocked roads that run to Nagorno-Karabakh and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, Major-General V.N. Safonov, military commandant of the special region (Nagorno-Karabakh), said.

Two Killed in Freight Railway Accident

NC2103073290 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] A locomotive and two railway cars were damaged when a passenger train collided with a freight train on the Kerchivan-Megri section of the Azerbaijan railways network last Sunday. The accident occurred because the locomotive brigade workers, who were responsible for Yerevan-Kafan passenger train No. 685, did not comply with their work instructions and [word indistinct]. The passenger train collided with a freight train parked in front of a [word indistinct] close to the Megri railway station at 0500. The locomotive of the passenger train and the two rear railway cars of the freight train were derailed. The passenger train engineer, Allakhberdiyev, who was affiliated with the Dzhul'fa locomotive depot in the Nakhichevan section of the tracks, and his assistant Kurbanov were killed in the accident.

The railways administration informed an AZERINFORM correspondent that none of the passengers were

harmed. Movement on the tracks was restored eight hours after the accident as a result of the measures taken that same day. Experts from the Azerbaijan railways administration, who arrived at the scene of the accident, are investigating the incident.

Armenian Operational Staff on Rail Accident

NC2103112990 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0600 GMT 21 Mar 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] We read in an ARMENPRES report from the Operational Staff that some people become very dangerous when they are in possession of guns. On 18 March, a car driver in Artashat remonstrated with another driver and in return received rifle shots. The records presented to the Operational Staff by the Armenian Internal Affairs Ministry on 19 March shows once more how dangerous guns can be in the hands of irresponsible people, and not only irresponsible people: [words indistinct] a five-year old girl accidentally shot and killed her father while playing with a gun carelessly left behind by a [words indistinct] serviceman.

According to the republic's Internal Affairs Ministry, the situation in general is still tense in the republic. Amongst the notable incidents was an accident on the railway. Two trains collided on the Azerbaijan railway sector, as a result of which the driver and his assistant on the train which had departed from Armenia were killed. An investigation into the causes of the accident has commenced.

The meeting also examined the transportation problems of Nagorno- Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] and of the Armenian villages in Azerbaijan. Our republic faces this problem due to the situation that prevailes in the region. The participants in the meeting were informed that the republic will soon examine an integrated plan for road and [word indistinct] communications aimed at developing all types of transportation systems on short-term and long-term bases.

Agadzhanyan, first secretary of the Shaumyanovskiy Rayon Party Committee in Azerbaijan, took part in the staff meeting.

It was decided to discuss the situation in the NKAO during the next meeting of the Operational Staff.

Georgia Supreme Soviet Drops Party Leading Role

LD2103123190 Moscow TASS in English 1202 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Tbilisi March 21 TASS—An extraordinary session of the Georgian Supreme Soviet made on Tuesday amendments to the Republican Constitution.

The Supreme Soviet amended Articles 6, 7 and 49 of the Republican Constitution. Article 6, which previously recorded the Communist Party's leading role in society, now ensures the right "to participate on equal terms in policy-making and the management of state and public affairs" to all political parties, trade unions, youth and other public organisations.

Articles 7 and 49 have been amended to say that all political parties, public organisations and movements should act within the framework of the Georgian Constitution and legislation. They prohibit the creation and activities of parties, organisations and movements that set themselves the task to change by force the constitutional system and the integrity of the republic, to undermine its security, to kindle inter-ethnic and religious strife. Guarantees are given to public organisations that they will be able to fulfil the tasks recorded in their rules.

Numerous letters coming to the Supreme Soviet suggested that it would be unreasonable to hold elections to the Republican Supreme Soviet and local Soviets on the previously set date because a multi- party system is being created. The session decided to postpone elections until October-November 1990. The mandates of deputies to the Georgian Supreme Soviet and to local Soviets were prolonged accordingly.

Georgian Front Urges Election Postponement

LD2003181790 Moscow TASS in English 1644 GMT 20 Mar 90

[By TASS Correspondent Paata Tsintsadze]

[Text] Tbilisi March 20 TASS—The Georgian Popular Front has called for postponing local and republican parliamentary elections scheduled for March 25.

The Front, which is one of the major social organizations in the republic, made the appeal to the presidium of the Georgian parliament at an emergency conference of its members, which ended here late Monday night.

It suggested an extraordinary parliamentary session to drop clauses in the Republican Constitution about the leading role of the Georgian Communist Party, halt the election campaign, work out a new law on elections in conditions of a multiparty system, and hold the ballot at a later date.

In most other Soviet republics, local and republican parliamentary elections have already taken place.

National Forum Brands Candidates 'Traitors'

LD2003162890 Moscow World Service in Russian 1038 GMT 20 Mar 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] The National Forum of Georgia, elected at a conference of the national liberation movement, has declared that every candidate deputy who fails to withdraw his candidacy for the elections on 25 March will be

declared a traitor to the nation. The INTERFAX correspondent also reports that in Tbilisi on 18 March, the delegates at the Congress of the republican Union of Journalists announced their decision to withdraw from the USSR Union of Journalists. He points out that dissatisfaction is spreading among the major rural party organizations because the Communist Party of Georgia Central Committee has failed to give any assessment of the processes of depoliticization in the higher education institutes in the republic, where party organizations have been eliminated. Perplexity is being voiced that no draft documents on the status of the Communist Party of Georgia, its rules and program, or on the princples of election for delegates to the April Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia, have yet been issued.

Georgian Party Plenum Information Reported

90US0630A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 1 Feb 90 p 1

[Statement on Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum]

[Text] A plenum of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee was held on 31 January. Invitations were sent to first secretaries of oblast, city and rayon committees of the Georgian Communist Party, leaders of ministries, state committees and departments of the republic and of the Georgian LKSM [Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee who are not members of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and Auditing Commission, figures of science and culture, and leaders of the mass media and certain public organizations.

The plenum discussed the following issues:

—the social and political situation in the republic and the tasks of the Georgian Communist Party;
—the draft concept of national development of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic];
—the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee statement in connection with the upcoming elections to the GSSR Supreme Soviet and the local soviets of people's deputies;
—the convening of the 28th Georgian Communist Party Congress.

A report on these issues was delivered by G.G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee.

N.M. Lekishvili, first secretary of the Tbilisi Gorkom [city party committee]; N.A. Petriashvili, leader of a brigade of Akhmetskiy Rayon's Zemo-Alvanskiy Sovkhoz [state farm]; B.S. Dzhikiya, secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee; T.G. Shashnashvili, chairman of the Ispolkom [soviet executive committee] of the Kutaisi City Soviet of People's Deputies; E.A. Beridze, first secretary of the Lanchkhutskiy Raykom [rayon party committee]; A.Yu. Pavshentsev, second secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee; A.I. Kavsadze, first secretary of the Gori Gorkom; A.M. Apakidze, vice president of the GSSR Academy of Sciences; V.F. Khishba, first secretary of the Abkhaz Obkom [oblast party committee]; P.P. Chkheidze, chairman of the Georgian Council of Trade Unions; S.Yu. Gogiberidze, first secretary of the Georgian LKSM Central Committee; A.A. Kachmazov, chairman of the Ispolkom of the South Ossetian Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies; V.A. Razmadze, prosecutor of the GSSR; V.V. Keshelava, chief editor of the journal SAKARTVELOS KOMUNISTI; V.D. Shannidze, first secretary of the Khuloyskiy Raykom; N.A. Chitanava, chairman of the GSSR Council of Ministers; T.Sh. Mosiashvili, first secretary of the Akhaltsikhskiy Raykom; V.S. Zorina, needle woman of the Tbilisi "Komsomolka" Textile-Haberdashery Factory; G.N. Yenukidze, minister of public education of the GSSR; F.M. Makharadze, director of the Tbilisi branch of the V.I. Lenin Central Museum; and G.D. Lordkipanidze, chairman of the board of the Union of Theatrical Figures of Georgia; took part in the debate which ensued on the report.

Concluding remarks at the plenum were delivered by G.G. Gumbaridze.

The plenum adopted a resolution on the social and political situation in the republic and the tasks of the Georgian Communist Party. It approved the propositions, evaluations and conclusions contained in the report in connection with the social and political situation in Georgia, the events of 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi and the ethnic conflicts which had occurred in individual regions of the republic. It is observed that the political and organizing work of the Georgian Communist Party and its elective authorities and structural subdivisions failed to correspond and does not today always correspond to the social and political processes developing dynamically in the republic; the style of work of the party committees and their commissions and staff and the forms and methods of the party authorities relations with the soviet, state, and public organizations require serious revision.

The plenum adopted a concept of national development of the GSSR, worked up with regard for the general discussion which had taken place, and instructed the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau to reflect therein the proposals, additions and clarifications expressed at the plenum. The text of the concept will be published in the press.

The plenum approved a statement of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee in connection with the upcoming elections to the GSSR Supreme Soviet and the local soviets of people's deputies, which will be published also.

The decision was made to convene the 28th Georgian Communist Party Congress early, in April 1990. The following items are on the agenda:

1. Report of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee on the course of perestroyka and the tasks of the republic party organizations.

2. Status of the Georgian Communist Party.

3. Report of the Georgian Communist Party Auditing Commission.

4. Elections of executive bodies of the Georgian Communist Party and delegates.

The plenum formed a commission for preparation of the 28th Georgian Communist Party Congress.

The plenum studied organizational matters.

The plenum released N.A. Popkhadze as secretary and member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia in connection with his transfer to other work.

In connection with the transfer to other work of O.Ye. Cherkeziya, former chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; the plenum released him from his duties as member of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau.

The plenum released from his duties as candidate of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau V.M. Siradze, who was released from the office of chairman of the Georgian Council of Trade Unions in connection with his retirement on pension.

The plenum released from the duties of candidate of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau A.G. Chekhoyev, who was released from his duties as first secretary of the South Ossetian Obkom and transferred to other work.

The plenum released Col. Gen. I.N. Rodionov, former commander of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District, from his duties as member of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and in a secret ballot expelled him from the Central Committee.

The plenum made a member of the Central Committee V.G. Gurgenidze. He was elected secretary and member of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau.

The plenum confirmed N.R. Sadzhaya as head of the Department of Organizational-Party and Cadre Work of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee.

The plenum confirmed D.T. Savaneli head of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Agrarian Department.

V.I. Romanov, head of the Department of Party Building and Cadre Work of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in the plenum.

Central Asia

Turkmenistan Sets Penalties for Public Crimes

LD1203100790 Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 24 Feb 90

["Decree of the Turkmen SSR]

[Text] **Supreme Soviet Presidium on Increasing Responsibility for Actions Aimed Against Public Order and the Security of Citizens**

In order to safeguard public safety, strengthen order and discipline, and put an end to provocative rumors which cause panic among the population, the Turkmen SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium has decided:

1. To establish that the preparation or storage—with the aim of distributing—of spoken, written, printed, or video-recorded material containing calls for pogroms and the forced expulsion of citizens as well as threats against public order or people's safety, or administrative arrest for up to 10 days with confiscation of the means of preparing and distributing the material.

2. Spreading rumors and falsehoods for the same purpose will incur a fine of up to R500 or corrective work for up to one month with up to 20 percent of earnings withheld in the state's favor or administrative arrest for up to 10 days.

3. If those actions envisaged in Articles 1 and 2 of this decree are repeated within one year or carried out serially and the involvement of a minor in such actions will incur a fine of between R500 and R1,000 or up to two months corrective work with up to 20 percent of earnings withheld in the state's favor or administrative arrest for up to 15 days with confiscation of the means of preparing and distributing the material.

4. For carrying out the actions described in Articles 1, 2, and 3 of this decree and involving grave consequences, criminal responsibility will ensue as envisaged by current legislation.
S. Niyazov, chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet
Ashkhabad, 23 February 1990

Results of Uzbek Election Runoffs Summarized

PM1403140390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Mar 90 First Edition p 1

[Unidentified TASS correspondent report under general headline "Election Results": "Uzbekistan"]

[Text] Tashkent, 12 Mar—The republic's Central Electoral Commission scrutinized the results of the 4 March runoffs for election of Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputies. They were held in 94 electoral districts.

The Central Electoral Commission registered 92 people's deputies. They include four women, 11 workers, and one kolkhoz [collective farm] member. The elected deputies comprise 83 members or candidate members of the party and nine nonparty persons. The deputies include representatives of seven nationalities.

Due to investigations of alleged breaches of the law, the runoff results in two districts will be announced later. The election was declared invalid in one district.

Rayon Party Officials Penalized for Violations

LD1203164490 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 23 Feb 90

[Text] As has already been reported there were unsancationed meetings and gatherings in Bukinskiy Rayon on 20 and 21 February. Internal Affairs organs have taken measures to stop violations of public order. There were no deaths or injuries.

The situation in Bukinskiy Rayon was examined at a session of the Bureau of Tashkent party obkom [oblast party committee] at which measures to stabilize the situation were determined. The party obkom Bureau also noted that the reasons for people's discontent have deeper roots. They lie in slowness to resolve socioeconomic problems, violations of the principles of social justice, and abnormalities in matters regarding cadres. A decision by the Bureau of Tashkent Obkom of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan has imposed severe party penalties on several leading officials in the rayon and outlined urgent measures to reduce social tension.

At present the situation in Bukinskiy and surrounding rayons is stable and completely under control. Law enforcement organs are continuing to investigate the violations of public order.

Uzbek Supreme Soviet Session To Meet 24 Mar

LD1203163890 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 23 Feb 90 p 1

["Decree of the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet on convening the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] The Presidium of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet decides:

To convene the first session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation on 24 March 1990 in the city of Tashkent.

The session will examine the following issues: Forming Uzbek Supreme Soviet bodies; an Uzbek Council of Ministers and other bodies accountable to the Supreme Soviet; the republic's transition to economic independence; and proposals on changing the procedure for military service by Uzbek citizens.

Syr-Darya Party Obkom Elects Bureau, Secretary

PM0903161690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report under the general heading "Plenums Held"]

[Text] Gulistan, 7 Mar—An organizational plenum of Syr-Darya Uzbek Communist Party Obkom [oblast committee] took place here, in the center of the restored Syr-Darya Oblast, today. It elected a new Bureau.

A.A. Aydarkulov, formerly chairman of Syr-Darya Oblast Soviet Executive Committee, was elected first secretary of Syr-Darya party obkom.

I.A. Karimov, first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, spoke at the plenum.

Tajikistan Supreme Soviet To Meet 12 April

LD1603133990 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 1700 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] The Presidium of the Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet in accordance with Article 101 of the Tajik SSR Constitution decrees that the first session of the 12th Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet be convened in Dushanbe City on 12 April 1990.

The following issues are to be proposed for discussion in the first session of the 12th Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet: establishment of the offices of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet; organization of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers and other authorities subordinate to the Supreme Soviet; the draft law on position of people's deputies in the Tajik SSR; and the approval of decrees by the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

A number of other issues will also be discussed.

Situation in Dushanbe Normalizing

LD1003121490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] The state of emergency has not been lifted in Dushanbe, but as a Gosteleradio correspondent reports, life in the city is gradually returning to its normal course. During these nonworking days, all of the cultural establishments in the capital and in the republic have been working and the matches between higher-league football teams that have taken place there with the participation of the Dushanbe Pamir team have pleased fans.

Makhkamov Addresses Tajik Plenum Opening

LD0303184190

[Editorial Report] Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik at 1000 GMT on 3 March reports on the opening of the 18th Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee plenum in Dushanbe on 3 March, including a 1 hour and 25 minute recording of the speech to the plenum by

Kakhar Makhkamov, first secretary of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee.

The speech begins: "Proceeding from an analysis of the political situation today, we have the right to observe that destructive forces have formed in the republic and are getting ready to act. Making use of perestroyka slogans, they can, in certain situations, influence individual groups in society, destabilize the situation with all ensuring consequences. And we have already experienced them. But in the course of the events healthy forces, too, have emerged, who, having united on a fundamental perestroyka basis, are capable of withstanding [words indistinct] of political life. It is these forces which are the "engines of perestroyka." They truly express the will of the people. "The people are rightly asking us the main question: Why did these events take place and who directed them? It seems that hasty conclusions without sufficient proof are inappropriate here. To elucidate the truth quite a lot of work still needs to be done."

"Nevertheless, there are sufficient grounds to say confidently that with whatever noble purposes organizers of (?various) demonstrations, which turned into disturbances, cover their actions, they are a blow against perestroyka, an attempt to wreck it. Such is the main political result."

"Comrades, analyzing the causes of the events in February, we clearly realize that the administrative-bureaucratic system and the period of stagnation make themselves felt in all spheres and in all regions. Lack of consideration for the person, for his requirements and spiritual needs, the secondary importance of precisely this factor—a consequence of which were the distortions which were allowed to occur previously in the deployment of productive forces—the orientation of the economy toward the production not only of finished but of intermediate output, the low return on capitalist investment, the worsening of the ecological situation in a few areas have resulted in the living standard lagging behind greatly in increased unemployment, especially among young people, in a dangerous growth of crime, and, as a consequence, have considerably aggravated social tension in the republic, including in the city of Dushanbe."

"However difficult it is to admit this, we must honestly state that the responsibility for this lies with us, with the members of the Central Committee, [words indistinct] and above all with the political leadership of the members of the bureau of the Central Committee."

"In this report it is impossible to give a detailed analysis of each [word indistinct]. This is be done at the next Communist Party of Tajikistan [CPTa] Congress. The Central Committee Bureau believes it possible to convene it on 24 May of this year."

A self-critical and objective analysis of all areas and problems lies ahead in preparation for the congress, Makhkamov continues.

"The paramount task of all primary organizations in today's conditions is to revive the authority of the party organizations, of the CPTa as a whole; and to do so we need to draw up our platform to represent precisely the national interests of the Tajiks and of other nations and ethnic groups and determine ways of implementing them as well as the direction of our relations with the center and the union republics. This work needs to be carried out all the more vigorously because we have lost quite a lot of time, not having displayed due persistence in implementing the decisions of the 15th republican Central Committee plenum on harmonizing ethnic and interethnic relations.

"I think that the plenum should instruct the Central Committee Bureau to complete the draft platform and present it for republic-wide discussion within a very short time—specifically by mid-April. This draft platform is to specifically express and outline ways of implementing the main ideas of the platform of the CPSU Central Committee and of our party organization."

"Today it is necessary in all links of the republic's political system to carefully analyze the problems which have accumulated in the given sphere [interethnic relations] and to create such a mechanism, while constantly improving things to contribute to the harmonization of ethnic interests. This is especially important now when recent events have complicated the relationships between people of various nationalities and have aroused in many a feeling of lack of protection and lack of confidence in their future—even the desire to leave Tajikistan, where they have been living and working for tens of years. It is the urgent task of the communists of any nationality to ease this problem, which, to put it frankly, is being whipping up artifically."

"It would be desirable, or, to put it more precisely, it is our duty to adopt a special resolution at the plenum on this matter. This would be a statement not only condemning actions which have nothing in common with the spirit, the traditions, and the worldview of our people, but also emphasizing our common political responsibility and guaranteeing our brethren and sisters confidence in their future."

"And, one more thing. As a Tajik, as a citizen, as a communist, I cannot but support the wise, courageous, and moral step taken by the Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan, by its leadership, by the scientific public in addressing (?an apology) to their Armenian colleagues (?for the suffering caused by) the instigators."

Makhkamov says he wants to associate himself, the participants in the plenum, and all healthy forces in the republic with the above message.

He observes that a self-critical assessment does not at all absolve communists who are the leading officials of ministries and departments and the managers of enterprises and institutions, including also of the Ministry of Public Education, of all educational establishments and

the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee for their responsibility for major errors in educational work with young people, above all among students and the pupils of vocational and technical colleges which have been revealed at the present time. "And the point is not only that young people—students, pupils of schools of vocational and technical colleges—made up the majority of the participants in the demonstrations and disturbances. The point and the most important thing is: Why didn't they believe those who are with them every day, who, because of their professional and party duty, are called upon to be their teachers and mentors, to form their worldview, their moral positions, who, by their personal example, must educate them as citizens?"

Makhkamov goes on to say that all of them must address young people's problems, live by their interests and take young people into account, this must be done sincerely and honestly.

He says that the formalism in educational work "undermined to a certain extent confidence in us on the part of the students." Evidently, for this reason, students and young representatives of creative and scientific intelligentsia found the program of unofficial organizations more attractive. "Various political clubs and youth centers, existing attached to Komsomol committees, have in fact no real authority. Komsomol committees need to revise their activities profoundly and self-critically, starting from their style of work among young people to organizational and political conclusions. The main task now is to return to the Komsomol its former authority, to actually be at the head of young people and Komsomol members, to channel their efforts in creative activity.

"Today ideological work must be especially dynamic and be above all of a forestalling [uprezhdayushchiy] nature."

In the new conditions the party cadres and the specific ideological bodies are obliged to respond quickly and correctly to specific life situation, Makhamov says.

"It must be admitted honestly that already prior to those events the analytical and predicting functions of party committees and ideological institutions had already virtually vanished. This was also contributed to by the fact that, so far, a system of studying and predicting public opinion has not yet been organized in the republic. Our recommendations for organizing a socialogical service have remained on paper, unfortunately. These questions should be resolved in the near future."

Agitators and propagandists have not been operating and still are not operating.

"It is assumed that precisely for this reason the vacuum was filled by demagogues, (?politicians), and speculators."

"Comrades, I consider it necessary to say a few words about our intelligentsia, whose role in sociopolitical life and influence on the processes taking place in the republic is very great. Let's say with all frankness that for many years ideological and political work and party influence in this milieu have been at the very lowest level."

He stresses the need to find such forms of interrelations between the Communist Party and intelligentsia so as to make them real allies, a unified force for renewing all spheres of life in the republic.

He touches on religion, on its place and role in society and in the processes taking place. He notes that to-date a marked revival of clergy activities is being noted and that an increased interest by young people in Islam is being discerned. "This is a result of our superficial work," Makhkamov says and notes the poor level of atheistic work in the republic.

Makhkamov says: "In the situation that has arisen the role of the mass media has grown immeasurably." He notes that the majority of journalists, even prior to the February events, and especially in the subsequent period, took up a tendentious and subjective position. He cites as an example a report which alleged that Soviet doctors were refusing assistance to ethnic patients, a malicious invention—"We have decided to invite the leading officials of party publications, Gosteleradio and Tajik TASS to a weekly conference of secretaries and heads of departments of the Central Committee. This will help them be more informed, to have more (?honest) contacts with the leadership of the Central Committee."

Makhkamov reminds his audience that the law on language, which was the first to be adopted in the central Asian region, contains 37 articles, of which 21 came into force on 1 January 1990. The 16 others will be introduced gradually. He then goes on to list what is being done now to promote the Tajik language. He stresses that the laws is not aimed against non-Tajik speakers.

Makhkamov touches on the role of the Internal Affairs Ministry [MVD] bodies in the February events. He notes that they were insufficiently trained for work in extreme situations. But he praises what they did on 12 February when a small number of MVD staff confronted a huge number of people taking part in pogroms. He goes on to list the number of injured among them. He reports on the investigations into the pogroms, acts of hooliganism, bodily harm, robberies, thefts, being carried out by the republic's procuracy. He stresses his opposition to various "interethnic" and "interfronts." He dwells on importance of legal work among people in places of their residence.

Analyzing the causes of the troubles, Makhkamov says that everything has so far been done is patently insufficient and will in no way meet the population's needs. He recalls achievements in providing housing achieved in the 1986 to 1988 period and points out that one of the reasons that this has been insufficient is that virtually

every year Tajikistan has been hit by earthquakes and other natural disasters. He outlines measures being planned to improve the housing situation. More plots will be made available to the population. More jobs are being created. Social conditions for farms are being improved. New purchasing prices for cotton will mean a marked increase in revenue of cotton farms. Students will be provided with better condition and grants.

Makhkamov says that trade unions should play a more active role and goes on to outline the concept of the republic's transition to economic independence, something which is proceeding impermissibly slowly, he thinks. He says it is necessary not only to measure an acclerated development of the industries of the national economy but also to compensate for the damage inflicted by the events in Dushanbe. "According to preliminary calculations, in the production and the nonproduction sphere over 51 million rubles of losses have to be compensated. Work in this area is being carried out."

"Comrades, it seems to me, that no one should be in any doubt that the disturbances which took place were aimed also at wrecking the elections of people's deputies of the Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]," Makhkamov says. He then goes on to give details on run-off elections on 4 and 9 March and general details about the elections, noting that in all constituences there were alternative candidates. He observes that among people's deputies already elected 95 percent are CPSU members. He says that two months have elapsed since the elections to local organs of government but no changes are in evidence.

He goes on to outline the plans for the report-back and election campaign in the CPTa which will be completed with the 21st CPTa Congress.

Reception precludes further processing.

Russian KGB Cadets, Khazakh Students Clash

PM1203205990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Vladimir Ardayev dispatch: "Dangerous Hooligan Escapades"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—Since the morning of 12 March, rumors have been going round Alma-Ata about a clash between groups of young people the day before.

This is what A. Isabayev, the republic's deputy minister for Internal Affairs, had to say on the subject:

"Such an incident did indeed take place. A brawl broke out between cadets from the local military school of USSR KGB border troops and students from the veterinary institute. As many as 200 people were involved on both sides.

"The situation is now under control, but it would still be premature to say that passions have died down completely. These hooligan escapades can have extremely unpleasant consequences: Primarily because it was mainly Russian youths involved in the brawl on the cadet side, while the students were Kazakhs, from rural areas, as a rule. We hope that we will be able to prevent the incident from having negative consequences."

It is hard to argue with A. Isabayev's assessment. Indeed, we are already familiar with a considerable number of examples where brutal events which have subsequently proved hard to resolve have started from similar incidents: Think of Fergana, for example.... Moreover, the situation that has developed in the republic, particularly on holidays, shows that similar hotbeds do, unfortunately, exist in Kazakhstan.

For example, at 2300 hours on 8 March in the central area of the Michurin State Farm in Tyulkubasskiy Rayon, Chimkent Oblast, an argument flared up near the Palace of Culture between groups of indigenous youth and young Azerbaijanis, which later developed into a brawl. Measures were taken to stop the hooliganism.

On 9 March, a group brawl flared up by the Palace of Culture in the city of Atbasar, Tselinograd Oblast. Some 15 people of indigenous and Caucasian nationality were involved.

The republic's party, soviet, and law enforcement bodies are taking measures to prevent any consequences stemming from these clashes.

Cadets Charged After Fighting

PM1403120390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 7

[Report by Vladimir Ardayev under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "After the Fight...."]

[Text] Alma-Ata—IZVESTIYA (No. 72) reported a fight between cadets and students. The hooliganism has been stopped. Now it is for justice to have its say.

On the evening of 12 March, party and soviet workers and leaders of the law enforcement organs met with the collective of the veterinary institute. It was noted that there were no grounds for assessing the clash as having taken place on the soil of interethnic hostility. It was the result of acts of hooliganism, primarily by the academy cadets. V. Pasheyev, the chief of the academy, apologized to the entire collective of the veterinary institute for his subordinates' escapade. Alma-Ata military prosecutor V. Tyutyukin also reported that criminal proceedings have been instituted against the border troops academy cadets who took part in the fight for their violation of military discipline and public order. An investigation is under way in which, with the consent of the military prosecutor's office organs, staffers from the investigation apparatuses of the territorial prosecutor's office and internal affairs organs have taken part.

Lukyanov Receives Kazakhstan Muslims Mufti

LD1703231990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0935 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 17 Mar (TASS)—On 16 March, Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, received Mufti Mukhammad Sadyk Mamayusupov, chairman of the Presidium of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

During the course of their conversation, issues related to the life of Muslims and the functioning of their religious establishments in our country and links between Muslims of the USSR and their religious colleagues in other countries were discussed.

The mufti reported on the results of his trip to several Muslim countries, made a declaration about support by leaders of the Muslim world for the process of perestroyka in the USSR, and spoke about the efforts being made by Muslim figures to free Soviet soldiers who are prisoners of the mujahidin.

Anatoliy Lukyanov stressed that the release of the prisoners of war would be a good will gesture and would be evaluated in the Soviet Union in accordance with its true value.

Karaganda Miners Feel Ongoing Dissatisfaction

PM1203144590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Oleg Stefashin report under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Miners Await Changes"]

[Text] Karaganda—The meeting between the Karaganda miners and the government commission headed by L. Ryabev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, lasted five days.

The miners' dissatisfaction at the progress made in fulfilling the well known Resolution No. 608 was the reason for the commission's arrival. Admittedly, in the last six months the government has taken a number of resolute steps aimed at boosting miners' standard of living and improving the socioeconomic position of labor collectives in the sector. The Ministry of the Coal Industry has allocated an extra 1.3 billion rubles for these purposes. What do the miners not like?

Above all, it was noted at the meeting with the commission, they do not like the delay in fulfilling the highly important demands set out in the so-called protocol of coordinated measures. At present only 17 of the 47 points adopted by the government have been withdrawn from the agenda. In particular, despite statements by the ministry, coal enterprises have still not received real independence. Many social problems worrying the region's inhabitants have not been resolved either.

The commission members shared the miners' concern over the state of affairs. According to L. Ryabev, the government is ready to give the sector a kind of respite: Its targets for coal extraction and the commissioning of new capacities will not be increased in the next five-year plan. The funds released will mainly be used to develop the social sphere in mining cities and settlements. In Karaganda construction of housing, kindergartens, and hospitals of which there is a catastrophic shortage in the area will be made a priority. The question of granting Karaganda's miners the right to independently trade on the foreign market has also been considered.

It is hard to tell whether the tension will lessen after the government commission leaves. This will depend in many respects on whether it succeeds in fulfilling the promises it made to the miners.

The next meeting is scheduled to take place in Karaganda in approximately one month.